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ABSTRACT

This thesis employs qualitative and quantitative methods to provide a comprehensive
picture o f the judicial use o f Hansard as an extrinsic aid to statutory interpretation in the
courts o f Canada from 1999 to 2010. The qualitative portion o f the thesis examines all
Supreme Court o f Canada judgments in 2010 that make reference to Hansard and
Hansard-like materials. The findings are compared with the findings of Professor
Stéphane Beaulac, who studied the phenomenon in 1999. The quantitative portion o f the
research examines the prevalence and distribution of judgments that make reference to
Hansard in the Courts throughout Canada from 1999 to 2010.
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 Introduction
Once upon a time, Hansard1was forbidden fruit in Canadian courts. Although the
pendulum has been swinging back and forth for a century now, and many doubts still linger
about the particulars, the Supreme Court o f Canada [500] has now established that Hansard
excerpts are admissible as evidence o f legislative intent.23In the UK, Pepper v Harp
delineates when such evidence is admissible and how it is to be assessed for weight. In
Australia, there is a statute that determines many o f these issues.4 In Canada, however, there
was a waffling creep towards the admissibility of this evidence that culminated in the 1998
Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes5 decision which established that Hansard evidence is admissible as an

1

“HANSARD, n. A record o f speeches made in the House o f Commons and answers to written questions
from the Order Paper. 2. Also refers to the similar record o f debates in a legislative assembly or
legislature.” The Dictionary o f Canadian Law, 3rd ed.

2

The most well-known precedent for this principle is Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at
paras 20-23. [Rizzo\. It should be noted that the term “evidence” could be misleading. Evidence as a legal
term o f art refers to anything that is admissible in court for the purpose o f proving or disproving facts.
Hansard is an aid to statutory interpretation and is not evidence, strictly speaking. However, Hansard is
evidence o f the intended meaning o f the text in a statute, and the term “evidence” is being used in this
manner throughout this paper. As well, the concept o f legislative intent is controversial. Some have argued
that it is an absurdity, others have argued that it is a useful legal fiction. See for example, M.W.B. Sinclaire
“Legislative Intent: Fact or Fabrication” Book Review o f Dynamic Statutory interpretation by William N.
Eskridge (1996-97) 41 NYL Sch L Rev 1329; also see Richard L. Hasen, “Bad Legislative Intent” (2006)
Wis L Rev 846. More will be said about this controversy at page 49 where the debate over textualism is
explored.

3

Pepper (Inspector o f Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593 (HL) [Pepper]', also see J. H. Baker “Statutory
Interpretation and Parliamentary intention” (1993) 52:3 Cambridge L J 353; also see Girvin supra note 8;
also see Scott C. Styles “The Rule o f Parliament: Statutory Interpretation after Pepper v Hart” (1994) 14:1
Oxford J Legal Stud 151.

4

Acts interpretation Amendment Act 1901 (Cth), online: Commonwealth o f Australia Law
<http://scalep!us.law.govau/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsf/ffamelodgmentattachments/371FC
0D084ACB5D0CA25767F0081C27C>; Interpretation Act 1987 No 15 (NSW), Online: New South Wales
Government <http://www.Iegisiation.nsw.govau/scanview/inforce/s/l/?TITLE=%22Interpretation%20Act
% 201987%20No%2015%22&nohits=y>; Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), Online:
Australasian Legal Information Institute <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/iolal984322/>;
interpretation Act /9W (W A ), Online: Australasian Legal Information Institute
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/ial984191/>; also see Stéphane Beaulac “Parliamentary
Debates in Statutory Interpretation: A Question o f Admissibility or Weight” (1997-1998) 43 McGill L J
287 at 296-298.

5

Supra note 2.
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extrinsic aid to statutory interpretation.67Rizzo did not, however, set out any criteria for
determining when Hansard evidence should be considered or how its weight and
influence on interpretive outcomes should be assessed. Given the lack o f guidance, it is
perhaps unsurprising that Canadian courts used Hansard in a rather unprincipled fashion
in the wake o f Rizzo.1
The use o f Hansard evidence as an aid to statutory interpretation has attracted
limited scholarly attention in Canada. Stéphane Beaulac has penned the only articles to
focus directly on this subject, the most recent o f which was published in 2000. In this
article entitled “Recent Developments at the Supreme Court of Canada on the Use of
Parliamentary Debates”, Beaulac examined the twelve SCC judgments in 1999 in which
the Court made reference to Hansard.8 This study was a qualitative analysis o f the judicial
use o f Hansard at the SCC which focused on the issues surrounding admissibility and
weight.
Eleven years have passed since Beaulac’s research was published. Given the
absence o f scholary attention, it is an open question whether or not consistent methods
for the use o f Hansard have evolved at the SCC. This thesis seeks to determine whether or
not there has been any change injudicial practice since the last study o f this phenomenon.
With this goal in mind, this study focuses on two basic research questions:
Question #1: How was Hansard evidence being used by the SCC justices in
2010?

6

For a brief history o f Hansard use in Canadian Courts, see Beaulac, supra note 4 at 300-308.

7

Stéphane Beaulac “ Recent Developments at the Supreme Court o f Canada on the Use o f
Parliamentary Debates” (2000) 63 Sask L J 581. The issue is discussed in further detail in Chapter 2 at
page 36.

8

Ibid.
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Question #2: Has the use o f Hansard by the SCC justices changed since 1999?

When this study was originally conceived, the plan was to trace back through the
lower court decisions that preceded the SCC judgments to find out how Hansard was
finding its way into the highest court in Canada. Once the research began, it became
apparent that the decisions from the courts below were very unlikely to make reference to
Hansard at all. More significantly, it turned out that six o f the ten 2010 judgments citing
Hansard came to the SCC from the Quebec Court o f Appeal. As a result, a third research
question was considered:
Question #3: Are there some jurisdictions where justices are more likely to
use Hansard?
There are two parts to this study. The first consists o f an exhaustive qualitative
analysis of all judgments o f the SCC made in 2010 in which reference was made to
Hansard evidence.9 This part of the study is a direct follow-up to Beaulac's 1999 research.
The objective is to explore the same substantive issues explored by Beaulac, including
the way that judges used authorities to justify recourse to Hansard; what information was
provided about Hansard when it was cited; and how the judges appear to have assigned
weight to particular Hansard excerpts. A significant component o f this portion o f the
study arises from the ability to compare the findings in 2010 with the findings in 1999.
Although the inherent limitations of both the method and the small sample size must be
kept firmly in mind, comparison reveals changes that might otherwise go unnoticed.

9

The reasons for choosing the year 2010 along with the host o f related decisions concerning the design
o f this research are explained in the section on Methodology at page 11.

4
The second part o f the study is quantitative. It is an effort to ascertain the
prevalence o f references to Hansard at the SCC in the study period, and to also determine
the prevalence o f Hansard use in the various courts throughout Canada in the study
period. While the primary purpose of this part o f the study was to determine whether or
not Quebec is the source jurisdiction of a disproportionate amount of Hansard use, it was
necessary to look at Hansard use in general across Canada in order to make such a
determination. This quantitative look at judicial reference to Hansard throughout Canada
is an interesting study on its own. This represents the first attempt to empirically measure
Hansard use in Canadian courts.
The insights gained by the qualitative and quantitative components o f this thesis
provide a comprehensive picture of Hansard in the courts of Canada. It provides an indepth examination of the current practices at the SCC with insight into what has changed
and what has remained the same over the past eleven years. As well, it provides insight
into the prevalence and distribution of Hansard use throughout the courts of Canada over
the study period. Some o f the findings are quite surprising to say the least.
As it turns out, there has been considerable evolution in the Court's practices over
the study period as the practices o f the Justices have had time to mature. Issues
surrounding admissibility have largely been resolved while issues concerning use of
materials that have questionable weight remain an ongoing problem. Meanwhile, the
prevalence o f Hansard appears to be fairly stable over time. Fears o f opening the
floodgates appear to be unwarranted although there are some problems should be
addressed going forward.

5
1.2 T he N ature o f H ansard Evidence
Hansard refers to published transcripts of proceedings of elected assemblies.
Excerpts from “the Hansard” are occasionally presented in court to support or oppose
particular interpretations o f a statute, and when used in this manner, Hansard evidence is
an extrinsic aid to statutory interpretation. To put this in perspective, there are three types
o f material that can be used in the act of interpretation, loosely speaking.101First, there is
the actual text o f the statute which constitutes the “intrinsic” component. Second, there
are components o f statutes which are typically included in formal statutory documents
but are not part o f the official statutory text. This includes items like preambles, headings,
and marginal notes." This second set of elements is readily identifiable as a class of
interpretive aids that is extrinsic, from a technical perspective, yet very nearly intrinsic
due to the close proximity to the statutory text. Finally, there is a third class of items
which do not form part o f the statute yet are consulted to facilitate the process o f
interpretation. These are the items most readily identifiable as extrinsic aids to
interpretation. The most typical example is a dictionary, but it could also include
scholarly works and government documents. Among the many government documents
10 These are not formal scholarly classifications, but merely convenient characterizations for the purpose
o f understanding Hansard and Legislative history in the context o f this study. For a more exhaustive
look at the components o f statutes and the various types o f extrinsic aids to interpretation, see J. Bell &
Sir G. Engle, ed. Cross on Statutory Interpretation, 3d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1995) at 152; also
see Francis Bennion, Statutory Interpretation:A Code, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1992) at 445;
also see R. Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application o f Statutes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975) at
137.
11

Surprisingly, this can include punctuation (according to some jurists). See for example, R v Jaagusta
[1974] 3 WWR 766 (BC Prov Ct.); for commentary on this judgment and more about punctuation as
an extrinsic aid, see Randal N. Graham, Statutory Interpretation: Cases, Text and Materials (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 2002) at 162-164. The disregarding o f punctuation is exceptional, and generally
punctuation is considered part o f the statutory text. See for example V. C. R. A. C. Crabbe,
Understanding Statutes (London: Cavendish, 1994) at 25.
The Interpretation Acts in most Canadian jurisdictions often prescribe which components o f a statute
count as “intrinsic” and which count as “extrinsic”. For example, in Ontario, the preample is intrinsic
while the tables o f contents, marginal notes and headings are extrinsic. Legislation Act, 2006, SO 2006,
c 21, Sch F, ss. 69, 70.
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that might be consulted, there is a class of documents that are created by the law-makers
themselves throughout the process o f drafting and enacting legislation. This subclass is
referred to as the legislative history.12
Legislative history includes such items as Committee Reports, Commission
Reports, Bills, journals o f proceedings, transcripts o f proceedings and government policy
papers (for example white papers, green papers or budget papers).13 The term “Hansard”

12 According to Hogg:
[t]he term “legislative history” does not have a precise meaning. ... I use the term to mean
the documentary evidence o f the events that occurred during the drafting and enactment o f a
statute. It may include the following elements:
1. the report o f a royal commission or law reform commission or parliamentary
committee recommending that a statute be enacted;
2. a government policy paper (whether called a white paper, green paper, budget paper
or whatever) recommending that a statute be enacted;
3. a report or study produced outside government which existed at the time o f the
enactment o f the statute and was relied upon by the government that introduced the
legislation;
4. earlier versions o f the statute, either before or after its introduction into Parliament or
the Legislature;
5. statements by ministers or members o f Parliament and testimony o f expert witnesses
before a parliamentary committee charged with studying the bill; and
6. speeches in the Parliament or Legislature when the bill is being debated.”
Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law o f Canada, (Toronto: Carswell, 2009) at 60.1(b) 1-2. It should be
noted that item number four excludes “the state o f the law, whether common law or statutory, before
the enactment o f the statute”. Many scholars including Beaulac draw a sharp distinction between
legislative history and the law in its prior state (i.e. before amendment or repeal). See for example,
Beaulac, supra note 7 at 596. The use o f the prior state o f the law is uncontroversial, and the
distinction has been justified on those terms. As legislative history becomes acceptable in court, this
distinction can seem rather arbitrary. Previously enacted statutory provisions will inevitably be
considered in conjunction with legislative history in the process o f statutory interpretation. Like all
extrinsic materials, the prior state o f the law is not the law. It is merely information that might assist in
determining the meaning o f the currently enacted statute.
13 For a more thorough description, see Beaulac, supra note 4 at 289.
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refers to transcripts o f proceedings o f the legislative bodies such as Parliament, the
Legislatures and the Senate.14 It is a small subset of the legislative history.15
Hansard evidence has always been controversial.16A host o f practical and
philosophical considerations come to bear on arguments for and against its use in court.
First and foremost, Parliament enacted the words in the statute; anything said about the
text o f proposed legislation in the House is not law. Reasons to oppose the use o f quotes
from parliamentary debates in court often raise concerns that judges might be misled by
politicking.17 If a statute is being pushed through Parliament, statements might be made
that exaggerate or downplay certain aspects in order to sell the Bill to the opposition
members. Statements might be made based on a poor understanding (or even a total
misunderstanding) o f the text. MPs might not take the time to properly inform themselves
before speaking. There is also the more fundamental problem o f equating the opinion of
one person with the intention o f Parliament as a whole. Indeed, many scholars have

14 The Hansard family produced and published the debates in the English Parliament privately from 1812
to 1888. The name Hansard appeared at the top o f each page in the publication and it became
synonymous with the publication. When Parliament began to publish the official record o f debates
internally, they adopted this name for the records. See, for example Gordon Bale, “Parliamentary
Debates And Statutory Interpretation: Switching On The Lights or Rummaging In The Ashcans o f the
Legislative Process” (1995) 74 Can Bar Rev 1 at 7.
15

It will become clear through the course o f this study, that Hansard is intimately connected with the rest
o f the legislative history. Any study o f Hansard will end up including Bills and Committee Reports in
the analysis.

16 According to Girvin, documented judicial comment on the use o f Hansard dates as far back as Millar v
Taylor (1769), 4 Burr 2303, 98 ER 201, see Stephen V. Girvin “Hansard and the Interpretation o f
Statutes” (1993) 22 Anglo-Am L Rev 475 at 476. This predates formal record-keeping by two
centuries.
17 See e.g. Richard A. Danner “Justice Jackson’s Lament: Historical And Comparative Perspectives On
The Availability O f Legislative History” (2003) 13 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 151; Francis Bennion
“Hansard - Help o f Hindrance: A Draftsman’s View o f Pepper v H a r t (1993) 14 Statute L Rev 149;
Michael P, Healy, “Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation in England and the United States: An
Assessment o f the Impact o f Pepper v Hart” (1999) 35 Stan J Int'I L 231; and William T. Mayton “Law
Among the Pleonasms: The Futility and Constitutionality o f Legislative History in Statutory
Interpretation” (1992)41 Emory L J 113.
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argued that there is no such thing as legislative intent in the first place.18 There is also a
fear o f opening the floodgates. Hansard and the accompanying record o f Bills, journals of
proceedings, etc. comprise an enormous volume o f information to search through with no
guarantee that there will be any useful information therein. This could increase the cost of
litigation while providing little benefit.19As well, there is the potential for clever lawyers
to complicate otherwise simple interpretive matters. Finally, there is the argument of
uncertainty. Citizens are supposed to know what the law is, and if further background
information is required in order to understand statutes, this fundamental pillar o f justice is
eroded.20 Supporters of textualism and formalism are aligned with this position,
generally.21
The other side o f the debate is fueled by the various complexities that inevitably
surround the language-based application o f rules.22 The chronic underdeterminacy of
language, problems arising from vagueness and incoherence, and results that appear

18 See for example, Sinclaire and Hasen, supra note 2.
19 Baker notes that this argument had more force in 1969 when Hansard was not available online. See J.
H. Baker “Statutory Interpretation and Parliamentary Intention” (1993) 52 Cambridge L J 353 at 354.
20

These arguments are listed in a number o f different works. See for example, Law Commission &
Scottish Law Commission, The Interpretation o f Statutes (Law Com. No. 21, Scot. Law Com. 11)
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1969); also see Beaulac, supra note 4 at 315-318; also see
Bennion, supra note 17 at 151 - 155.

21

Formalism is a doctrine that prescribes following rules strictly for essentially economic reasons.
Exceptions add complexity and dilute the effectiveness and simplicity o f rules. According to Black's
Law Dictionary, 9th ed, textualism is “[t]he doctrinal view o f judicial construction holding that judges
should interpret a document or statute ... according to its literal terms, without looking to other sources
to ascertain the meaning.” Textualism is a doctrine championed by Scalia J. that eschews the use o f
legislative history and emphasizes the primacy o f statutory text. The two schools o f thought are related.
See Antonin Scalia, “The Rule o f Law as a Law o f Rules” (1989) 56 U Chicago L Rev 1175. Also see
John F. Manning “Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism” (1999) 66 U Chicago L Rev 685.
Also see Fred Schauer, “Formalism” (1988) 97 Yale L J 509.

22

See for example, Johan Steyn "The Intractable Problem o f the Interpretation o f Legal Texts" (2003)
25:1 Syd L Rev 5; also see Stanley Fish “There Is No Textualist Position” (2005) 42 San Diego L Rev
629; also see Michael Rawlinson “Tax Legislation And The Hansard Rule” (1983) Brit Tax Rev 274 at
288.
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blatantly at odds with the purpose of a statute are simply unavoidable.23 The text o f any
statute will inevitably fall short o f its intended (ideal) objective, which is to provide clear
answers about what the law is in all possible circumstances. Recourse to all sorts of
extrinsic considerations is inevitable.24 Considerations o f social context, comparison to
previous versions o f statutes, policy arguments, etc. are brought to bear as a matter of
routine. As Beaulac notes:
Before initiating the interpretative process ... practically all statutory
provisions are susceptible to more than one meaning and, accordingly, may
be viewed as unclear. ... The truth o f the matter is that ambiguity is an
inference that can be drawn only after a full assessment o f legislative
intention, using canons and tools o f statutory interpretation, including
parliamentary materials.25
Although this statement was made to criticize the ambiguity requirement (discussed
below at page 64), it is representative of the general position of those who tend to favour
recourse to legislative history.26
Another factor concerns legislative pronouncements in Canada about statutory
interpretation. The federal government and most provincial governments have enacted

23

See for example Randal N. Graham, Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 2001) at 45-84; also see Allan C. Hutchinson, I t’s All in the Game: A Nonfoundationalist
Account o f Law and Adjudication, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, Durham); Also see James
Boyle, “The Politics o f Reason: Critical Legal Studies and Local Social though” (1985) 133 U o f Penn
L Rev 687.

24

Indeed, all o f the memories and knowledge that judges use to understand language in general is an
extrinsic aid to interpretation. Within linguistics, the study o f the role that knowledge, memory and
inference play in the comprehensive o f language is called pragmatics. See for example Lawrence R.
Horn & Gregory L. Ward, eds, The Handbook o f Pragmatics (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004); also see
Robyn Carston, Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics o f Explicit Communication (2002:
Blackwell: Maiden MA); also see Rebecca Fincher-Kiefer, “The Role o f Prior Knowledge in
Inferential Processing” (1992) 15(1) J o f Research in Reading 12; also see J. Aakerman, “A Plea For
Pragmatics” (2009) 170 Synthese 155.

25

See for example Beaulac, supra note 7 at 605-607.

26

The ambiguity requirement is a rule which precludes recourse to extrinsic aids in the absence o f
ambiguity or some other defect in the statutory text such that it does not have a plain meaning. More
will be said about this at 64.
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interpretation acts mandating purposive interpretation.27 These statutes are silent on the
use o f legislative history. Although the use o f legislative history is not necessary for
purposive interpretation, its use is consistent with purposive interpretation in the sense
that Hansard materials are likely to cast light on the purposes pursued through the
enactment o f the law. Permitting more types o f materials to be considered facilitates a
more enlightened consideration of legislative purpose.28
Hansard exists within these tensions. There are scholars who remain firmly on one
side o f the debate or the other, and loosely speaking, the debate coincides with deeper
ideological divisions in legal theory between formalism and pragmatism.29 It should be
kept in mind that legal philosophy is a component of policy argument. Appellate court
judges are all legal philosophers to some extent.30
The law in Canada, as received from the UK, upheld the ‘exclusionary rule’ that
Hansard (and legislative history) should not be considered by the courts.31 In 1903 the
SCC described the rule as a principle that would tolerate exceptions in R v Gosselin,

27

See e.g. Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c. 1-21 s.12; Interpretation Act, RSA2000, c. 1-8 s.10;
Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c-238 s.8; Interpretation Act RSNB 1973, c. 1-13 s. 17; Interpretation
Act RSNL 1990, c. 1-19 s. 16; Legislation Act, 2006 SO 2006, C-21 s.64.

28

See e.g. R. S. Geddes “Purpose and Context in Statutory Interpretation” (2005) 2UNELJ 5 at 21-25;
also see G eoff R. Hall “Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court o f Canada: The Triumph o f the
Common Law Methodology” (1998-1999) 21 Advoc. Q. 38 at 56-59; also see William N. Eskridge, Jr.
“The Circumstances o f Politics and the Application o f Statutes” (2000) 100:2 Colum L Rev 558-581.

29

See for example Fish, supra note 22; also see Richard Posner, “Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and
the Interpretation o f Statutes and the Constitution” (1986-87) 37 Case W L Rev 179; Also see Manning
and Schauer, supra note 21.

30 The notion that judges are all legal philosophers to a certain extent is obvious and uncontroversial to
me, but it is a topic that is much too large for a footnote for those who challenge the issue. Although
Legal theory is rarely addressed directly in appellant court decisions, it is an essential component o f
legal disputes. See for example Henry J. Friendly, “Reactions o f a Lawyer - Newly Become Judge”
(1961) 71 Yale L J 218; also see Francis P. McQuade & Alexander T. Kardos, Mr. Justice Brennan and
His Legal Philosophy (1957-58) 33 Notre Dame L. 321. Indeed, issues pertaining to legal philosophy
are engaged merely by considering the concept o f legislative intent. See supra note 2.
31

Beaulac, supra note 4 at 300-304.
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judicial use o f Hansard by the SCC, and the quantitative analysis provides a broad
overview o f the prevalence o f judicial reference to Hansard in the Courts o f Canada. The
combination brings about a comprehensive study o f Hansard in the Canadian Courts from
1999 through to 2010.

(a) Part One: Q ualitative Study o f 2010 S C C Judgm ents
This part of the study is an effort to build on and add to research conducted by
Stéphane Beaulac that was published in 2000.37 Beaulac conducted an exhaustive
qualitative analysis o f all SCC judgments in 1999 that made reference to Hansard. This
thesis centres around a parallel exhaustive qualitative study of the 2010 SCC decisions
that make reference to Hansard.38
In 2000, Beaulac found that the court's approach to Hansard lacked consistency in
four distinct areas. These areas will be revisited in 2010, and attention will be focused on
whether there have been any changes in these areas of inconsistency after the passage of
eleven years. The areas o f inconsistency were as follows:
(i)

When is Hansard evidence admissible?39 Prior to Rizzo there were three

separate justifications for considering Hansard evidence based on the adjudicative
context. Such evidence was held to be permissible for determining the
constitutional character o f statutes, for interpreting the language o f the

37

Beaulac, supra note 7.

38 2010 was chosen for a practical reason. Arguably, there is an elegant symmetry to 2009 as the year o f
study. This would make the study period an even decade in duration. However, there are more cases in
2010 than in 2009. With such a small number o f judgments to study, every one counts. It carries with it
the perception o f being more current. It seems unlikely that much would change with respect to such a
complex phenomenon in a single year, so timeliness is likely more o f a perception than a reality as a
distinguishing factor between these two years.
39

Beaulac referred to this as the “purpose o f the use parliamentary debates”; supra note 8 at 597.
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Constitution and (in certain poorly defined and relatively rare circumstances40) for
construing specific provisions in statutes.41 The use of Hansard in the context of
Constitutional issues was well-established by 1998 however the use o f Hansard
for pure statutory interpretation was unsettled at that time. Arguably, Rizzo
resolved this matter decisively, and as a result, Hansard was admissible regardless
o f context.42 Several decisions in 1999 held that Hansard should be restricted to
one o f the three compartmentalized purposes. Rizzo eliminated the need for a
compartmentalized approach to the admissibility o f Hansard, but old habits die
hard. Given the passage of eleven years, it would be reasonable to expect that the
Justices will have moved forward and dropped references to those obsolete rules.

40

The rare and poorly defined circumstances in which courts sometimes permitted the use o f Hansard for
the interpretation o f ordinary enactments (prior to Rizzo) is discussed in chapter 2 at 36.

41

Supra note 34. The combined effect o f the judgments available as precedents meant that Hansard was
admissible regardless o f context. This was the case since the mid 1980's when the rule against using
Hansard to interpret the language o f the constitution became diluted to the point where it was no longer
a rule with any teeth (although there were decisions which continued to uphold this rule). See for
example Reference re: Upper Churchill Water Rights Reservation Act 1980 (Newfoundland), [1984] 1
SCR 297 at 318 [Upper Churchill]. Nonetheless, the use o f Hansard in the absence o f Constitutional
issues was unsettled. As a result, the value judgments like Vasil and Stevensont supra note 35, as
authorities for the use o f Hansard for pure statutory interpretation was in doubt. Indeed, R. v G. (B.),
[1999] 2 SCR 475, 1999 CanLII 690 [/? v GB\, a post-Rizzo judgment, held that Hansard was generally
not admissible in the absence o f Constitutional adjudication. In hindsight, the compartmentalized
approach seems rather absurd and Rizzo brought about a logical conclusion to an irrational approach to
admissibility based on context o f use. However the admission o f Hansard represented the overturning
o f a rule that had ostensibly been in place for two-centuries, and the judiciary is conservative, it is
understandable that judges would take an incremental approach over twenty years when making such a
significant change in the law. Judges interpreted precedents in a narrow fashion and were quick to
reject Hansard in the 1980's. See for example Evans v British Columbia (Employment Standards
Board% 1983 CanLII 463 (BC SC); also see contra McDonald and The Queen, Re, 1985 CanLII 162
(Ont CA). There was a gradual shift from the cautious approach o f the early 1980’s towards a general
acceptance o f Hansard in 1999 which was accompanied by contradictory and inconsistent
pronouncements about admissibility.

42

It is entirely possible that too much emphasis is being placed on Rizzo as a precedent concerning the
use o f Hansard. Arguably, Rizzo was merely one incremental step in a gradual shift over twenty-five
years. From another perspective, Rizzo was a judgment that explicitly eliminated a rule that had been
implicitly eliminated years earlier. Whether or not Rizzo was pivotal on this point, by 1999 there was
no need for a compartmentalized approach.
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(ii)

Is there an ambiguity requirement?43 Many decisions in 1999 implied

that Hansard should be considered only when there is ambiguity or some sort of
obvious interpretive problem to be resolved. Beaulac argued that there should not
be such a requirement, however the judicial process requires economy. Judges
have good reason to limit the use o f extrinsic aids to interpretation simply because
there could be no end to it if there are no restrictions for limiting the
circumstances of their use. Lawyers are duty-bound to raise every argument in
favour o f their client. In the absence of further considerations, Hansard is
necessary if it is even remotely helpful.44 There is an ambiguity requirement in the
UK as established by Pepper v Hart.45 There is an ambiguity requirement for the
use o f any extrinsic aids to interpretation in the courts o f several US states.46
Although the matter is not entirely settled in Australia, Federal legislation restricts
the use o f legislative history in the context o f plain language.47Before conducting
research into this issue, it was impossible to predict what the current practice
would be at the SCC.

43

The term “ambiguity” is ambiguous, ironically. In this context the word refers to ambiguity, vagueness,
incoherence, or any interpretive problem that cannot be resolved easily by consulting intrinsic aids.
The term was used extensively in the Pepper decision and legal scholars appear to be following suit.

44

See for example The Law Society o f Upper Canada, Rules o f Professional Conduct, Toronto, Law
Society o f Upper Canada, 2000, Commentary under subrule Rule 4.01(1); online:
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=671>.

45

Pepper, supra note 3 at 635. More will be said about this judgment at 38.

46

According to Gluck, Wisconsin has a plain meaning rule established by precedent; Connecticut has
enshrined a plain meaning rule in a statute; and in Oregon, a plain meaning rule was established by a
precedent that was followed religiously and proved resistant to modification by legislation. Abbe R.
Gluck “The States as Laboratories o f Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New
Modified Textualism” (2010) 119 Yale L J 1750; Kalal, 2004 WI 59, 681 NW 2d at 126; Connecticut
General Statute section 1-2z; OR REV STAT § 174.020(3) (2009).

47 Supra note 4 at 296-297. The circumstances in Australia are discussed in greater detail at 72.
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(iii)

Is Hansard treated as a stand-alone form of evidence, or is it only

considered as a corroborative component in conjunction with other types of
evidence? Beaulac found several statements in the 1999 judgments which suggest
that Hansard is somehow more compelling if it confirms a finding that is
supported by other interpretative means. The implication is that Hansard is
somehow a second-class interpretive aid that cannot be used alone. Beaulac could
find no reason for confining Hansard to such a secondary role, and argued that the
weight and role o f any particular quote from sessions o f Parliament should be
decided based on the circumstances o f the case. The same arguments that justify
an ambiguity requirement can also justify confining Hansard to the secondary role
o f corroborative evidence. Meanwhile, whenever its weight as contradictory
evidence is doubtful, a judge can justify disregarding Hansard based on lack of
corroboration as an exclusionary principle. It does not necessarily follow that
there is a formal rule which holds that Hansard will never be compelling enough
to stand on its own, and for this reason, this issue is difficult to assess with any
certainty when analyzing judgments. Nonetheless, a best-efforts approach was
taken to follow up on this element.
(iv)

Is there evidence of a methodological approach to the assignment of

weight to Hansard? There are essentially two components to this issue. The first
concerns providing enough information about any quote from Hansard to properly
understand its value as evidence o f the intended meaning o f a statute. The second
component concerns a circumspect analysis of the Hansard excerpts referred to in
the SCC decisions to assess just how authoritative they are, and how much weight
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ought to be assigned to them. The tool of assessment consists o f a list o f four
criteria put forward by Beaulac in 1998 which will be referred to as the Beaulac
Test.48 The four criteria are:
1. The reliability of the source o f information;
2. The contemporaneity with the legislative process;
3. The proximity to the legislative process; and
4. The trustworthiness of the records
These four criteria are the elements that Beaulac regarded as essential for
assessing how much weight should be assigned to Hansard and most other types
o f materials that comprise the legislative history. Given that the Rizzo decision
was new in 1999, it is not surprising that no formal method for assessing Hansard
had been developed by that time.49
The comparison of the 2010 findings with the 1999 findings revealed some fascinating
changes in the way that judges have been referring to Hansard in their judgments.

(b) Part Two: Q uantitative Study o f H ansard in the C ourts o f C anada
In the 2000 study, Beaulac did not look at Hansard use in the lower courts. Out of
curiosity, I traced back through the lower court judgments to see if there was any pattern
48

See Beaulac, supra note 4. Also see Beaulac, supra note 7 at 609. This will be explained further at 96.

49

Within the common law realm, Canada and N ew Zealand were at the “no method” end o f the spectrum
in 2000. The UK was at the other end o f the spectrum: Pepper established an ambiguity requirement
and a number o f precise contextual requirements for the admissibility o f Hansard. For example, only
statements made by the Minister responsible for the statute could be considered, and the statement
must have been made during a debate leading up to enactment o f the statute. See Pepper, supra note 3
at 635. Australia was in the middle: there was a method set out by precedent and legislation, although
the approach was open-ended. There was a list o f very general criteria that must be met for the
evidence to be regarded as persuasive in Australia. See Beaulac, supra note 4 at 296-298. There was no
ambiguity requirement as such in Australia, although the federal Acts Interpretation Act did restrict the
use o f Hansard to the role o f confirming and not contradicting the meaning o f statutory text that has a
plain meaning. Arguably, this is a type o f plain meaning rule. Supra note 4 s. 15AB. Within the US
there has been a great deal o f variation among the states. According to a recent study o f the appellant
courts o f five US states by Gluck, methods for statutory interpretation with respect to legislative
history have evolved and have been overturned over time in some states. Gluck, supra note 46.

17
with respect to the level o f court where Hansard was being introduced into the judgments.
It turned out that Hansard was unlikely to be mentioned in the lower court judgments.
Meanwhile, because the issues that are dealt with in judgments change so dramatically as
a “case” moves up to higher courts, there were no obvious patterns or trends to analyze.
However, this research turned up an intriguing fact: six o f the ten judgments in 2010
came from Quebec.50
This was an issue that deserved some further research. Unlike the other
jurisdictions in Canada, the Quebec legal system has civil code roots. It is a live question
whether or not there is a cultural legacy that renders Quebec courts more likely to
consider legislative history or travaux préparatoires. In pursuit of this, a series of
qualitative analyses were conducted to answer the following general research question: Is
Quebec the source of a disproportionate share o f judgments referring to Hansard?
In order to answer this question properly, the source jurisdictions o f SCC
judgments had to be considered, but the provincial courts had to be looked at as well. As
a result, the prevalence o f Hansard references in judgments was assessed for the
provincial superior courts, the provincial appellate courts, and the federal courts of
Canada. Because the necessary data was available, it was a simple additional step to
assess the prevalence of Hansard at the SCC. This provided for a comprehensive
assessment o f the prevalence of judicial references to Hansard throughout the courts of
Canada.

50 Globe and Mail v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 41, [2010] 2 SCR 592 [Globe & Mail];
Németh v Canada (Justice), 2010 SCC 56, [2010] 3 SCR 281 [Németh]; Quebec (Attorney General) v
Canadian Owners and Pilots Association 2010 SCC 39 [COPA]; Quebec (Attorney General) v
Lacombe 2010 SCC 38 [Lacombe]; Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2010 SCC 61 [Re
AHRA]; Syndicat de la fonction publique du Québec v Quebec (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 28,
[2010] 2 SCR 61 [Syndicat].
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First, I assembled the complete list of SCC judgments that referred to Hansard
over the study period o f 1999 through to 2010.51 Then the proportion of judgments
making reference to Hansard in SCC judgments was calculated as a percentage of the
total number of judgments published for each year over the study period.52
The source jurisdictions for each judgment from the list of SCC judgments were
assembled into a table, along with the percentage of judgments coming from each
jurisdiction over the study period.53 If any jurisdiction had a greater probability o f being
the source o f SCC judgments, it would show up in the percentages, based on the relative
size o f the jurisdiction.54
As a follow-up step, the prevalence o f judicial reference to Hansard was
considered for the appellate courts, provincial superior courts and federal courts. Surely if
there were a “Quebec phenomenon” it would show up in the provincial courts as well.
The research question was this: What is the prevalence o f judgments making reference to

51

Given that recourse to Hansard was predominantly justified using a compartmentalized approach prior
to Rizzo in 1998, the period o f 1999 through to 2010 was the most appropriate time frame to consider.
It also dovetails nicely with the qualitative study. The complete list o f judgments is attached as
Appendix 1 at page 153.

52

See Table #4: Judgments Referring to Hansard at the SCC from 1999 to 2010 at page 127 .

53

It should be noted that 2010 was deliberately excluded from the study period. If 2010 is an anomaly
with respect to Quebec, then its inclusion would tend to distort the overall average in a manner that
reduces the difference between Quebec and the other jurisdictions since the data set is so small. On the
other hand, if Quebec is genuinely the source o f a larger share o f SCC judgments over time, then the
exclusion o f 2010 would make no significant difference. The exclusion enables a more robust
comparison: 2010 is compared with average o f years other than 2010. See Table #5: Source
Jurisdictions o f SCC judgments from 1999 - 2009 at 130.

54

For example, according to Statistics Canada, Quebec had approximately 23% o f Canada's population
in 2010, and would therefore be expected to be the source jurisdiction for something in the
neighbourhood o f 23% o f the judgments, if there is no other factor at play, although perhaps the
number would be a bit less since the Federal Courts would also take a share. O f course, fairly wide
room should be left for variation given the relatively small number o f judgments at issue. As well, a
certain amount o f leeway must be left for differences in provincial court structures and case
management practices between different jurisdictions. Population information was taken from
Statistics Canada online: <http://www40.statcan.gcxa/101/cst01/demo02a-eng.htm>.
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Hansard in the provincial superior courts, provincial appellate courts and the federal
courts o f Canada?
The complete list o f judgments that make reference to Hansard was assembled for
all but the provincial non-s. 96 courts o f Canada for both 1999 and 2 010.55 For the
jurisdictions that had larger volumes of judgments, the total number o f judgments in 1999
and 2010 were determined; and, as with the data from the SCC, the proportion of
judgments referring to Hansard was calculated as a percentage o f the total judgments for
each level o f court in each jurisdiction.56 This data provided a snapshot o f Hansard use at
55

Section 96 courts are enshrined in s. 96 o f the Canadian Constitution and have constitutionally
protected jurisdiction over trials o f first instance concerning matters like property and civil rights. The
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3. (U.K.) [Canadian Constitution]. These courts go by
different names in different provinces, however, all share the same Constitutionally protected authority
within their respective provinces. Most provinces have created statutory provincial courts to reduce the
case loads on the s. 96 courts. These statutory provincial courts are not permitted to infringe upon the
jurisdiction o f the s. 96 courts. The non-s.96 provincial courts were left out for two reasons. First, there
were very few jurisdictions that published any judgments from these courts in 1999. Meanwhile, when
judgments from these courts were published, this generally represented a small percentage o f the total
number o f judgments heard. This would have prevent a meaningful percentage from being calculated.
The selection o f the first and last year as samples was a choice based on economy. It was timeconsuming to assemble the complete list o f judgments therefore a study o f 1999 through to 2010 was
simply not possible. In hindsight, the choice o f 1999 was unfortunate. The available databases o f
decisions for 1999 were not complete for the Ontario and Quebec Provincial Superior Courts. Given
that Quebec is the jurisdiction o f interest, this is unfortunate. However, because o f differences in case
management and publishing practices, apples-to-apples comparisons between provinces is doubtful in
the case o f Quebec, as will be shown. Meanwhile, even when the database o f cases is complete, these
numbers are nothing more than indications from which some insight can be gained. The entire
quantitative study is based on small samples and provides only a glimpse. It was decided that the
amount o f time required to assemble a complete list o f cases from these jurisdictions for another year
would not yield sufficient benefit to be justified. Despite the shortcomings o f the data (and by
respecting the shortcomings), valuable insights can be gained into the judicial use o f Hansard across
Canada. By examining 1999 and 2010, the quantitative study parallels the qualitative analysis o f SCC
judgments, and therefore makes the entire study cohesive and consistent.

56

The assessment o f the percentage o f judgments referring to Hansard was limited to Alberta, British
Columbia, Ontario, Quebec and the Federal Courts, again for the sake o f economy. There was no easy
way to find the total number o f judgments. The number o f entries in the Canlii database had to be
counted. Meanwhile, in smaller jurisdictions there is a low probability o f there being any relevant
judgments in any given year; therefore the percentage o f judgments in a single year is not a particularly
meaningful piece o f information. The complete list o f judgments that make reference to Hansard from
the various appellate courts in 1999 are shown in Appendix 2: Appellate Court Judgments Referring to
Hansard in 1999 at page 156. The complete list o f judgments that make reference to Hansard in 2010
are shown in Appendix 3: Appellate Court Judgments Referring to Hansard in 2010 at page 157. The
list o f judgments for the Provincial Superior Courts and the Federal Court in 1999 is shown in
Appendix 4: Provincial Superior Court and Federal Court Judgments Referring to Hansard in 1999 at
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the appellate and provincial superior courts, as well as at the federal courts. From this
data, it can be determined if any particular jurisdiction is more likely to make use of
Hansard. As well, it provides some insight into just how often Hansard is being referred
to in judgments. Prior to this research, this was entirely a matter o f speculation.

(c) The Subject M atter o f this Study
In a perfect world, this study would begin by searching a database containing all
submission to the courts by counsel. Then all decisions in which Hansard excerpts we
presented could be analyzed. Primary literature research does not reveal decisions where
Hansard was presented by counsel but no comment was made about it in the court's
judgment. Meanwhile, there is no searchable database o f submissions to facilitate such
research. In the absence o f such a database, and with the relatively small list o f cases at
issue in this study, it would have been preferable to consult the submissions for each case.
However, within the timetable of an LL.M. thesis there are only a few short months
available for research, and a review o f counsel's submissions in every case in in this study
was simply not possible.
The use o f the primary literature was therefore a compromise, and its limits must
be respected. This is a study o f the judicial comment on Hansard. All conclusions drawn
must bear this fact in mind. Given the inability to consider submissions, the primary
literature is the information source most closely connected to the phenomenon at issue.
Interviews with judges and lawyers, for example, are more remote. Because the subject is
controversial and there are political, ideological and philosophical dimensions to the

page 159. The list o f judgments for the Provincial Superior Courts and the Federal Court in 2010 is
shown in Appendix 5: Provincial Superior Court and Federal Court Judgments Referring to Hansard in
2010 at page 161.
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controversy, personal accounts about the use of Hansard might not reflect realities of
judicial decision-making. Meanwhile, political considerations that come to bear on
judicial decision-making are embedded within the decisions themselves, for the most
part.
Given that the previous study upon which this current research is based57 also
examined only judicial comment on Hansard, the current study represents an effort to
build on the body of knowledge in this area of law in the most efficient manner possible.
Despite the limits of this approach, much can be learned through the study o f judicial
pronouncements.
For a number o f reasons, a qualitative approach is essential for a meaningful study
o f Hansard in court. This is an unusual type of evidence that plays a unique role in each
case where it is admitted. Since Hansard is but one element in a complex process that
lacks the kinds o f controls that would make quantitative study a straightforward activity,
attempts at quantitative analysis face substantial obstacles. The only metric that lends
itself to quantitative study is judicial reference to Hansard. Quantitative analysis of this
very phenomenon can provide an assessment o f the prevalence o f judicial use o f Hansard,
but not much more. Analogous attempts to assess more complex matters via quantitative
studies, for example the ideological leanings of judges, have been the subject o f
significant controversy and scholarly criticism.58 Meanwhile, judicial use o f Hansard in
57

Beaulac, supra note 7.

58

See e.g. Frank B. Cross and Stefanie A. Lindquist “The Scientific Study o f Judicial Activism” (2006)
91 Minn L Rev 1752-1784; Jack Knight, “Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial
Decision-making?” (2009)58 Duke L J 1531-1542 ; also see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer
“The Continuum o f Deference: Supreme Court Treatment o f Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan" (2008) 96 Geo L J 1083-1226. Many problems and criticisms are cited in the
paper; also see Eric R. Claeys “The Limits O f Empirical Political Science and the Possibilities o f
Living-Constitution Theory for a Retrospective on the Rehnquist Court” (2003) 47 St Louis U L J 737752; and see Herbert A. Simon “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue o f Psychology with Political
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Canada has not received widespread scholarly attention, so it is not as well-understood as
other elements o f law in Canada.

(d) The Search Criteria Used to Assemble the List of Judgments
The search for relevant cases was a matter of diligent preparation and ongoing
research during the study. There are a variety o f different names used for what is loosely
called “the Hansard” throughout Canada over time. For example, in Nova Scotia, the
publication was originally called Assembly Debates, then changed to Debates and
Proceedings o f the House o f Assembly in the 1900's, then changed again to House o f
Assembly Debates and Proceedings in 1971. In Quebec the publication was called
Débats De L'Assemblée Législative for many years and then changed to Assemblée
Nationale Journal des Débats.59 To begin, a complete list o f the publications for each
jurisdiction was created by looking at the hard copies in the library. Keyword searches
were conducted to catch all o f the titles for the target years on Canlii. In conjunction with
this, certain commonly used non-technical terms were used for searches as well, like
“parliamentary debates” and “legislative debates” and “legislative history”. Each case
that turned up was vetted for false positives, and decisions that positively met the criteria
were downloaded.60 When reading and analyzing cases, other terms that appeared in
decisions that had not previously been considered were noted. Further searches were
Science” (1985) 79 Am Pol Sci Rev 293-304; also see Maksymilian Del Mar “The Spectre o f Max
Weber: From Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy to a Theory o f Evidence-Based
Normative Design for Statutory Interpretation” (2006) [unpublished, online:
<http://ssm.com/abstract=946122>],
59 There is a significant difference between journals o f proceedings and transcripts o f proceedings insofar
as journals do not include the verbatim record o f statements made. However Journals were included in
the search criteria because it made the search process more comprehensive.
60 “Hansard” was a particularly noisy term because o f several lawyers named Hansard and a BC Case
called re: Hansard Spruce Mills that is apparently a well-established precedent about comity. In the
end, the word “debate” proved to be the most useful key-word despite the high incidence o f nonHansard related usage in judgments. Re Hansard Spruce Mills Ltd., [1954] 4 DLR 590 (BCSC)
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conducted on an ongoing basis to ensure that the list was as complete as possible. The
Westlaw Canada database was also searched.61 On an ongoing basis, the search criteria
were used on the 1999 SCC judgments to ensure that the method uncovered the same
judgments that Beaulac considered.
This study was not strictly limited to Hansard. Instead, criteria were used to
parallel Beaulac's list o f cases from 1999 which treated the transcript o f proceedings
before a legislative committee as equivalent to Hansard. As well, the mere statement of
the word “Hansard” with respect to extrinsic aids to statutory interpretation was sufficient
to warrant inclusion. As a result, certain cases do not actually involve the use o f Hansard
but only involve discussion about Hansard. In some of these cases, there is an unusual
type o f extrinsic interpretive aid drawn from the collection of materials that comprises the
legislative history.62
As a result, the quantitative data in particular must be understood for what is
actually being measured. This is a study of judicial comment on Hansard and Hansardlike materials. This will include judicial comment on the phenomenon whether or not
such materials are used in the judgment. The number o f judgments where Hansard is
actually used in the judgments is therefore somewhat less than the total number of
judgments counted in the study. Based on the judgments in the qualitative study, it seems

61

Online: <http://www.westlawecarswell.com/home>. No cases turned up on Westlaw's database that did
not appear in Canlii's database.

62

Beaulac included a judgment where Orders-in-Council were discussed as aids to interpretation. This
was regarded as sufficient to warrant inclusion in his study: Delisle v Canada (Deputy Attorney
General), [1999] 2 SCR 989, 1999 CanLII 649 [Delisle]. The 2010 SCC judgments in the current study
included a judgment where a statement under oath by an elected municipal official about the purpose
o f a municipal by-law was used as an aid to interpretation.
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likely that the number o f cases where such materials are actually used comprises a large
proportion o f the judgments that make reference to Hansard.63

63

One o f the ten judgments in 2010 made reference to Hansard without making use o f such evidence,
Kitkatla Band v British Columbia (Minister o f Small Business, Tourism and Culture), 2002 SCC 31 is
another judgment o f this ilk [Kitkatla]. As an educated guess, it is plausible that this type o f judgment
comprises roughly ten percent o f the judgments.
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CHAPTER 2
2.1 The H istory o f H ansard
Without knowledge o f the international historical context, it would be easy to
conclude that the use o f Hansard excerpts as aids to statutory interpretation in court is a
marginal phenomenon undeserving of serious scholarly attention in Canada. Hansard has
a relatively low probability o f appearing in any particular judgment.64 This makes
intuitive sense since the various legislative bodies in Canada sit for a limited number o f
hours per year and have busy agendas dominated by partisan politicking. As if in
concurrence with this line o f thinking, Canadian scholars have devoted little attention to
this phenomenon over the past decade.
Despite the absence o f consideration in Canada, the use o f Hansard (and the US
equivalent) in court is extremely controversial in the UK and US.65 A heated debate rages
with an intensity and passion comparable to the blood-feud over originalism, and every
year new contributions are made to the substantial volume o f scholarly work devoted to
the subject.66 Through the absence of scholarly attention, Canada has become an outsider
to this highly charged international dialogue when only a decade ago our scholars were
vibrant contributors. This noticeable absence has occurred even though the Canadian
context is unique and research could provide meaningful insights for those seeking a
larger understanding o f the phenomenon.

64

Although this is a fair statement to make, until the research in this study was performed, the actual
amount o f judgments that referred to Hansard was entirely a speculative matter with the sole exception
o f SCC judgments in 1999.

65

In the United States, the federal transcript o f proceedings is included in the Congressional Record.

66

Danner cites 40 journal articles on the use o f legislative history in US courts published from 19882003. Supra note 17 at 158, footnote 30.
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If the various views with respect to the use o f extrinsic aids to statutory
interpretation were to be plotted on a spectrum, with the textualist stance67 at one
extreme, where only the language o f the statute is to be considered and no recourse to
interpretive aids is permitted, the use of Hansard evidence would sit on the other end of
the spectrum as the extreme outlier o f interpretive aids. Those who argue for firm
restrictions on the use of extrinsic aids to interpretation tend to preclude this type of
evidence first, although the list o f prohibited sources will likely include other types of
aids as well.68 Meanwhile, the controversy aroused by the use o f Hansard in court far
outstrips the actual impact o f this occasionally useful source o f interpretive guidance. In
this respect, Hansard is something of a barometer. Its treatment is a reflection o f a much
larger jurisprudential debate about how statutes should be interpreted. What follows is a
brief history o f the use o f legislative history in court followed by an exploration of the
controversy surrounding the use o f Hansard, highlighting where Canada fits in and why
the use o f Hansard in court needs to be studied more closely in Canada.
The “exclusionary rule” is central to any exploration o f the history o f Hansard.
This is the rule that forbade the use of legislative history for several centuries throughout
most o f the common law realm. Various cultural forces influence the nature and
enforcement o f the exclusionary rule, ultimately determining whether or not legislative
history is admitted by judges engaged in the construction o f legislation.
67

See5w/?n3note20.

68

There is at least one exception: see George A. Costello, “Average Voting Members and Other 'Benign
Fictions': The Relative Reliability o f Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources o f
Legislative History” (1990) 39 Duke L J 39. Essentially, Costello argues that floor debates are more
closely tied to voting by elected members and are therefore more a more trustworthy reflection o f
legislative intent than committee reports. His position is nuanced. In his conclusions he asserts that
“[ejxcept at the most general level o f theory ... the case has not yet been made for customarily valuing
floor debates ahead o f committee report explanations.” Nonetheless, he begins his conclusions by
stating “[pjerhaps a good case can be made for reordering the interpretational hierarchy.” At 72.
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(a) England: The Birthplace o f the Exclusionary Rule
The earliest documented judicial discussion of Hansard appears to be in the
English case o f Millar v Taylor in 1769.69 Ironically, all the judges for the majority stated
that the proceedings of the House o f Commons are not to be consulted, but expressly
made reference to legislative history and parliamentary debates in their reasons.70 Shortly
thereafter, this case became entrenched as authority for the 'exclusionary rule' that
Hansard and any documents pertaining to the preparation and enactment o f a statute were
not to be used in court as an aid to statutory interpretation. This rule was reiterated in
decision upon decision in the UK throughout the 20th century. In 1983, Lord Diplock
stated that “[tjhere are a series o f rulings by this House, unbroken for a hundred years and
more recently affirmed emphatically and unanimously in Davice v Johnson that recourse
to proceedings in either House o f Parliament during the passage o f a B ill... is not
permissible as an aid to its construction”71
The exclusionary rule functioned as a prohibition against litigants using materials
pertaining to legislative history in court, rather than as a prohibition against judicial
recourse to legislative history. The rule prohibited litigants and their counsel from
presenting legislative history materials in their submissions, while judges were free to

69 Millar v Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2302, 98 ER 201 [Millar], In this case, an author named Millar argued
that he was the copyright holder o f a book called The Seasons. He sought an injunction to prevent a
publisher from making and selling copies o f the book without his permission.This judgment held that
there was a common law copyright to a work that preceeded the Statute o f Anne. A multitude o f
legislative history materials were presented and considered concerning whether or not the Statue o f
Anne was merely the encoding o f the common law copyright at that time. Copyright Act 1709 (UK) 8
Anne c.21.
70

Ibid; Bale, supra note 14 at 3; Beaulac, supra note 4 at 293; Danner, supra note 17 at 160; Theodore F.
T. Plucknett, A Concise History o f the Common Law (5th ed) (Boston: Little, Brown & Company,
1956) at 335.

71

Hadmor Productions v Hamilton, [1983] AC 191, [1982] 1 All ER 1042,45 MLR 447, 11 ILJ 111,2
WLR 322 at 337 [Hadmor]-, quoted from David Miers “Citing Hansard as an Aid to Interpretation”
(1983) 4 Stat L Rev 98 at 98.
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seek out and consider these materials of their own volition. The judges in Millar treated
the rule in this manner. As well, there were many occasions during the reign o f the
exclusionary rule when judges consulted Hansard for the purpose o f understanding a
statute, although the Hansard was not always mentioned in the judgment.72
There were very practical reasons for establishing the exclusionary rule in
England in the 1700's. At that time, the proceedings o f the assemblies were not
documented through formal internal procedures o f Parliament. Speech in Parliament was
privileged: things said in the House were not to be used against MLAs (or for any other
purpose) by persons outside o f the House. Because England was a monarchy and
historically there had been attempts by Kings to interfere with the activities in the House
o f Commons, the cultural import o f parliamentary privilege was not based solely upon
the need to protect parliamentarians from defamation suits. Privilege was regarded as
necessary to protect elected officials, and therefore democracy, from interference by the
Crown, nobility and other non-democratic political forces.73 Publishing the proceedings
o f Parliament was prohibited.74 However, in a system based on 'responsible' governance,
72

Danner, supra note 17 at 161; Lord Lester o f Heme Hill “Pepper v Hart Revisited” 15 Stat L Rev 10 at
10-11; Robert G. Vaughn, “A Comparative Analysis o f the Influence o f Legislative History on Judicial
Decision-Making and Legislation” (1996) 7 Ind Int'l & Comp L Rev 1 at 9. Also see Davis v Johnson,
[1979] AC 264 at 276-7; R v Local Commissioner [or Administration, ex p. Bradford Metropolitan
City Council, [1979] 2 All ER 881 at 898; and Hadmore, supra note 71. In 1981, the then Lord
Chancellor, Lord Hailsham, admitted to consulting Hansard: see UK, HL, Parliamentary Debates, vol
408, col 1346 (26 Mar 1981). In Australia, Mr Justice Lionel Murphy also admitted to consulting
Hansard. See Symposium on Statutory Interpretation, above, n. 13, at 39. See, also, Mr Justice Anthony
Mason, also speaking in an extra-judicial capacity: ibid, at 83. In Robert C. Beckman & Andrew Fang,
“Beyond Pepper v Hart: The Legislative Reform o f Statutory Interpretation in Singapore” (1994) 15
Stat L Rev 69 at footnote 22. The legislative history materials were not necessarily mentioned in the
judgments.
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According to Bale, “[i]t is readily understandable why during the Tudor and Stuart times the Commons
needed the protection o f secrecy. Disclosure o f what was said in parliament could, and did, result in the
imprisonment o f members by monarchs who believed that they ruled by divine right.... Freedom o f
debate was secured following the revolution o f 1688.” Bale, supra note 14 at 6. Rawlinson notes that
leave was never required to present extracts from proceedings o f the House o f Lords in court. See
Michael Rawlinson, “Tax Legislation and the Hansard Rule” (1983) Brit Tax Rev 274 at 286.
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1688,1 Will & Mar Sess 2 c 2.
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the public has a right to know what is going on in Parliament, and reporting had evolved
through the actions o f private reporters who were given the tacit support o f the House. At
the time o f Millar, there were records which appeared to be complete, however their
integrity was suspect. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some debates were documented
in a partisan fashion in accordance with the politics o f the author, and occasionally they
were fabricated by authors who did not witness the proceedings first-hand.75 Because of
the prohibition and the doubtful integrity o f the records, it was quite reasonable for the
judges in Millar to hold that “[t]hat history is not known to the other house or to the
sovereign.”76
Another political undercurrent at work at the time was the judicial mistrust o f
statute law. The mischief rule established by Heydon's Case in 1584,77 often cited as the
beginning o f purposive interpretation, was really a method of narrowing what many
judges and scholars perceived to be Parliament's ham-fisted meddling with the highly
evolved judge-made common law.78
The circumstances were quite different by the middle o f the 20th century. The
proceedings o f Parliament were published officially, and the integrity of the information

75

Bale, supra note 14 at 7, citing T. E. May, The Constitutional History o f England, vol I (London:
Longmans, Green & Co, 1912)* Also see Sir Courtney Ilbert, Parliament: Its History, Constitution and
Practice (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 1951).
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Millar supra note 69 at 217.
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Heydon*s Case , 76 Eng Rep 637.
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This type o f thinking persists even today. In the words o f Graham, “[m]any judges are somewhat
skeptical o f the legislator's ability to respond to the needs o f justice, and see an Act o f Parliament as an
ill-conceived political tool that does little more than erode the genius o f the common law.” Randal
Graham “Good Intentions” (2000) 12 SC L Rev (2d) 147 at 148; also see Bale, supra note 14 at 11-12.
According to scholars like Bale, this type o f thinking is less prevalent now than it was two centuries
ago. See Bale, supra note 14.
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was no longer suspect.79As well, Parliament was generally recognized as the supreme
law-making authority. The notion that statutes were to be treated with suspicion had
given way to the notion o f parliamentary supremacy which mandated judges to uphold
the will o f Parliament, generally speaking.80 The very practical impediments to the
reception o f Hansard in court no longer existed. At the same time, the modem regulatory
state was evolving. The common law was supplanted by ever-increasing layers o f
statutory law.81 Along with it, the task of legislative drafting was delegated to an
increasing number o f committees, and dispute resolution was gradually delegated to an
expanding variety of specialized tribunals.82
The enunciation of the rule in Millar did not include explanations or justifications.
It appears to be the case that, over time, justifications were advanced by judges and
scholars, some o f which were political and philosophical in nature, and these
justifications enabled the rule to survive well beyond the circumstances in which the rule
was established. In the joint report by the UK and Scottish Law Commissions, for

79 The Official Report o f parliamentary proceedings was published by parliament commencing in 1909.
See UK, HC, Factsheet G-17 General Series, House o f Commons Official Report (London: House o f
Commons Official Information Office, 2010) online: <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commonsinformation-ofTice/gl7.pdf>. Also see Bale, supra note 14 at 7.
80

See for example John Burrows “Changing Approaches to the Interpretation o f Statutes” (2002) 33
Victoria U Wellington L Rev 561 at 564. According to Blatt, the stated objective o f the US judiciary
became legislative intent in late the 1800's. See William S. Blatt, “The History o f Statutory
Interpretation: A Study In Form and Substance” (1984-1985) 6 Cardozo L Rev 799 at 805-808. In the
exchange between Radin and Landis on statutory interpretation, the discussion is focused on the proper
method for determining legislative intent. Parliamentary sovereignty is presumed: Max Radin,
“Statutory Interpretation”(1930) 43 Harv L Rev 863; James M. Landis, “A Note On 'Statutory
Interpretation'^ 1930) 43 Harv L Rev 886. The English Law Commission Report in 1969 also
presumes that legislative intent is the objective o f statutory interpretation, see Law Commission,
supra note 20 at 60: “The judiciary has remained a protector o f citizens' legal rights, for example rights
o f the accused in criminal prosecutions, and the tension remains between the judiciary and parliament
on certain matters, however the overarching narrative is that parliament has the legitimate authority to
make law and the judiciary's role is to enforce it.” Also see Bale, supra note 70 at 12-13.
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82 IbidaX 183-185.

31
example, the reliability of Hansard was challenged because of the inherently political
nature o f parliamentary debate. However practicality remained the dominant concern:
“The citizen, or the practitioner whom he consults, may have a heavy burden placed upon
him if the context in which a statute is to be understood requires reference to materials
which are not readily available without unreasonable convenience or expense.”83 The
Commission argued that “specially prepared explanatory material”, enacted for the
express purpose o f aiding interpretation of statutes, would be a more appropriate way to
meet the need for which lawyers are seeking permission to use legislative history. The
Commission concluded that the exclusionary rule should be preserved and that the
production o f explanatory material should be encouraged.84
The exclusionary rule prohibited legislative history in submissions to the court,
but there was a procedural route for exceptions. Upon request, Parliament could grant
leave for the records to be used in court. Leave was requested at least four times in the
past century and two o f these requests were refused.85 In 1980 the UK legislature
amended the Bill o f Rights to remove the requirement o f leave for the use o f legislative
history in court.86 The parliamentary committee driving the resolution described the
amendment as the aligning o f the law with long-standing practice.87 This reasoning is
83

See Law Commission, supra note 20 at 60. There were several reasons considered both for and against
admitting legislative history in this report. The issue o f availability o f the records was the final reason
stated as justification for retaining the exclusionary rule, and appears to be a reason that the authors felt
to be particularly compelling.

84 Ibid at 61 and 81. The fact that the enactment o f supplemental information as an aid in statutory
interpretation was a formal recommendation o f the English and Scottish Law Commissions is itself an
interesting point. To use the language o f economics, this suggests that there is a demand for more
information to facilitate the process o f statutory provisions than what is provided within the four
comers o f the statute. Arguably, this demand was a key source o f pressure to relax and eliminate the
exclusionary rule.
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Miers, supra note 71 at 101-102.

86 UK, HC, Parliamentary Debates, Vol 991 (31 October 1980) cols 879-916; from Miers, supra note 71.
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suspect given that leave had been refused as recently as 1975;88 however, this amendment
coincides with the increased use o f legislative history in UK Courts and throughout
former British colonies around the world.
In the infamous case o f Pepper v Hart, the House o f Lords overturned the long
standing exclusionary rule in 1992.89 The case concerned the valuation o f taxable benefits
received by employees o f Malvern College. The children of high-ranking employees at
the College were permitted to attend the school at a 20% discount off the standard tuition
amount. This was a taxable benefit, and s 63(1) of the Finance Act 1976 stated that “[t]he
cash equivalent o f any benefit... is an amount equal to the cost equivalent o f the benefit,
less so much (if any) o f it as is made good by the employee to those providing the
benefit.”90 Subsection (2) states that “the cost of a benefit is the amount of any expense
incurred in or in connection with its provision, and (here and in those subsections)
includes a proper proportion o f any expense”. The employees argued that the “cost” o f
the benefit was the marginal cost of the additional students. The school had excess
capacity, and the marginal cost was therefore negligible. Her Majesty's Revenue argued
that the cost should be the average cost per student (i.e. the total annual cost o f running
the school divided by the number o f students). The tax tribunal decided in favour o f the
employees, but the decision was reversed by the High Court and the reversal was upheld
by the Court o f Appeal. The House of Lords was made aware of highly relevant
statements made about the intended meaning o f s 63 in the House o f Commons,91 which
88

See UK, HC, Parliamentary Debates, Vol 895 (18 July 1975) cols 1922-1937; quoted from Miers, ibid
at 101, footnote 19.

89 Pepper, supra note 3.
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Finance Act, 1976 c 40.
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The Financial Secretary was asked about the exact scenario before the court: What would be the cost
for teachers whose children attend their employer's school at a reduced rate o f tuition. His response:
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favoured the taxpayers, and the litigants were permitted to present arguments about
whether Hansard could be used as an aid to statutory interpretation.
The standard objections were raised by counsel on behalf o f Her Majesty's
Revenue.92 Use o f Hansard violates parliamentary privilege; it would make litigation
unduly complicated and therefore very expensive and time-consuming; and the rule
preserves the “constitutional proprieties o f leaving Parliament to legislate in words and
the courts (not Parliamentary speakers) to construe the meaning o f the words finally
enacted”.93 O f the seven Law Lords presiding, only one was convinced that the
exclusionary rule should be upheld. In the reasons, the House of Lords concluded that the
words o f MPs were not being impeached and therefore privilege was not at issue.94
Indeed, their words were being used to confirm the will of Parliament. If the relaxation of
the rule is properly limited, given the low probability of debate directly on point about the
meaning o f particular statutory provisions, it was concluded that such a change would be
unlikely to cause a significant increase in the cost o f litigation. Meanwhile, where there is
evidence in Hansard that provides clear resolution to a dispute, the cost o f litigation is
eliminated altogether.95 The issue o f “constitutional propriety” was therefore trumped by
the propriety o f determining the will o f Parliament when the words o f a statute are
ambiguous or otherwise unclear.96

“The benefit will be assessed on the cost to the employer, which would be very small indeed in this
case.” UK, HC, Parliamentary Debates , vol 913 (22 June 1976) col 1095.
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For a complete discussion o f the objections to the use o f Hansard see Bennion, supra note 17.
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As per Lord Brown-Wilkinson, Pepper, supra note 3 at 645-646.
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See for example, the concurring decision o f Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Pepper, ibid.
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See the concurring decision by Lord Bridge o f Harwich, supra note 3 at 617.
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See for example, the Lord Browne-Wilkinson, ibid note 3 at 635. Also see the concurring decision o f
Lord Oliver o f Aylmerton, ibid at 620.
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As often occurs when a long-standing precedent is overturned, the House o f Lords
went to great lengths to couch the decision as a slight change rather than a sweeping
revolution. The exclusionary rule was not cast aside, but merely experienced a “limited
relaxation” for those rare occasions where the words spoken in the house provide
valuable insight into the intended meaning o f legislation. But restrictions and guidance
were provided.97 Statutory text must suffer from ambiguity or lack o f clarity as a
precondition for considering evidence from the legislature, and only material that “clearly
discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention” can be considered.98 As well,
quotes from Hansard must be from an MP in a position o f knowledge with respect to the
statute, for example the Minister in charge o f the Bill or the Bill's promoter.99 Despite
these restrictions, Pepper marked a watershed moment in the United Kingdom. This was
a decidedly abrupt shift from exclusion to admission. As the lead judgment made clear,
not only Hansard, but the entire set of documents that comprise legislative history were
now available to litigants when a dispute revolved around the interpretation of statutory
text.100

(b) The E xclusionary Rule in the United States
In the US, the circumstances were quite similar to the UK initially. There was a
received exclusionary rule and unreliable records. However, use of legislative history in
court occurred much sooner than in the UK. The federal courts began using legislative
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Ibid.

98 Supra note 3 at 634.
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Pepper,; supra note 3 at 640.

100 Ibid at 634-635.
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history in the 1890's, and it became a common practice within a few decades.101 Rector o f
Holy Trinity Church v United States established the precedent in 1892 that permitted
recourse to legislative history, including the Congressional Record, for the purpose of
interpreting statutes.102
There were some important differences between the US and UK contexts. There
was no monarchy in America so there was never any justification beyond privilege for
resisting publication o f the proceedings of the various elected bodies.103 Perhaps as a
result o f this difference, both federal Houses were publishing official reports of
proceedings by 1850, six decades earlier than in England.104As well, the use o f
committees in the US was much more extensive and the volume of materials was much
larger than in England.105 Meanwhile, American legal scholarship in the 19th century was
dominated by the hermeneutical theories o f scholars like Francis Lieber who championed
purposive interpretation based on the concept of legislative intent.106Although there is no
logic that necessarily connects recourse to legislative history with purposive
101 Hans W. Baade, “’Original Intent' in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses” (1991) 69 Tex L
Rev 1001 at 1079-1081. See also Lawrence M. Solan, “Law, Language,and Lenity” (1998) 40 Wm &
Mary L Rev 57 at 97.
102 Church o f the Holy Trinity v United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). There are some scholars who take a
different view o f this case. Baade, for example cites this case as one o f a trilogy o f decisions from 1892
to 1904 which established judicial use o f legislative history. See Danner, supra note 17 at 178.
103 There was never a ban on the publication o f the proceedings o f the Houses in the US. Instead,
Congress had historically been concerned with publication and distribution o f documents pertaining to
its activities because o f their “growing importance and permanent value o f its ... transactions”. S eeAct
o f Dec. 27, 1813, 3 Stat. 140 (1814) which mandated publication and distribution o f particular
documents to state libraries. Also see Danner, supra note 17 at 185-186. Also see US, Senate, Public
Documents o f the First Fourteen Congresses, 1789-1817 (S Doc No 428- 6) (Washington DC: US
Government Printing Office, 1900).
104 O f course, it is impossible to know for sure what the various differences were between the two
contexts that brought about the earlier publication o f the records in the US. The years that publication
commenced are from Danner, supra note 17, citing Elizabeth G. McPherson, “Reporting the Debates
o f Congress” (1942) 28 Q J O f Speech 141 at 147.
105 Danner, supra note 17 at 163.
106 Ibid at 173-175.
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interpretation, whenever a statutory text is unclear and it is presupposed that the
legislative body had some particular purpose in mind when enacting that legislation, it
does make sense to look deeper into the legislative process for enlightenment. Many
scholars argue that the acceptance o f purposive interpretation has played a role injudicial
acceptance and use o f legislative history.107
Use o f legislative history in US courts increased until the 1980's when the
pendulum began to swing in the opposite direction. This turning point coincided with the
appointment o f a self-described textualist,108 Justice Scalia, to the US Supreme Court.109
Despite a modest decline in the use o f legislative history and the impassioned arguments
o f textualists, the use of legislative history in the US appears to be entrenched.110
However, the doctrine of textualism, and along with it, a heated debate about how to
interpret the statutes (and constitutions) has inspired volumes o f scholarly work. The US
is the global hotspot for the textualism debate.

107 See, for example ibid\ also see Scott C. Styles “The Rule o f Parliament: Statutory Interpretation after
Pepper v Hart” (1994) 14 Ox J Leg Stud 151 at 152; also see Bale supra note 14 at 17; also see John
Burrows “Changing Approaches to the Interpretation o f Statutes” (2002) 33 Victoria U Wellington L
Rev 561 at 563.
108 Textualism is the doctrine that eschews the use o f legislative history when interpreting statutes. See
supra note 36.
109 Beaulac, supra note 4 at 299; also see J. L. Carro & A. R. Brann, “The U.S. Supreme Court and the
Use o f Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analaysis” (1982) 22 Jurimetrics J 294 at 298. In a recent
empirical study o f legislative history in the US, Law and Zarring are skeptical that Scalia has caused
the decline in use o f legislative history: “we reject the oft-expressed hypothesis that Justice Scalia's
vocal criticism o f legislative history helps explain the overall decline in legislative history usage since
the Burger Court. The decline is more likely attributable to the overall rightward shift in the
composition o f the Court, for which no single justice can be assigned either credit or blame.” David S.
Law & David Zaring, “Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use o f Legislative History”
(2010) 51 Wllm & Mary L Rev 1653 at 1654.
110 See Gluck, supra note 46 at 1758; also see Law & Zaring, ibid at 1653 at 1655.
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(c) The Exclusionary Rule in Canada
The story in Canada is temporally aligned with the story in England, loosely
speaking. The exclusionary rule was law until 1976 when the first exception was made.111
In the Anti-Inflation Reference, legislative history including Hansard formed part o f the
submissions.112 In the decision by Laskin, CJ, committee reports and Hansard were
considered “not to construe and apply the provisions of the Anti-Inflation Act, but to
ascertain its constitutional pivot.”113Around 1980 trial courts began accepting these
materials on occasion when such information “might settle the matter immediately, one
way or the other”.114 In 1981 the Supreme Court of Canada found it acceptable to use
Hansard and other preparatory materials to illuminate the historical background against
which legislation was enacted if the information was “relevant”.115 Under this decidedly
111 Hogg notes that there were three decisions by the Judicial Committee o f the Privy Council in the
1930's in which recourse was made to legislative history: PA.T.A. v AC Can, [1931] AC 310, 3\1;A G
BC v AG Can [1937] AC 368, 376; Ladore v Bennett, [1939] AC 468, A ll. However, there were
subsequent decisions that upheld the exclusionary rule. See for example Texada Mines v A.G. B.C.
[1960] SCR 713, 720. The consensus among scholars is that the rule was law until the late 1970's. See
Peter Hogg, The Constitutional Law o f Canada (5th Ed.) (Carswell: Toronto, 2009). Also see Beaulac,
supra note 4 at 301. Also see Bale, supra note 14 at 21.
112 Re: Anti-inflation Act, [1976] 2 SCR 373 [Anti-Inflation Reference].
113 Ibid at 379. Before the Charter; this would invariably be a pith and substance analysis. It appears that
the courts were attempting to draw a line between interpreting specific provisions and generally
understanding the subject matter affected by a law. The underlying premise is that use for specific
interpretations was too problematic while use to acquire a more general understanding was somehow
insulated from the dangers. This distinction was blurred by Upper Churchill, supra note 42 at 484,
when Sopinka J. held that “provided the court remains mindful o f the limited reliability and weight o f
Hansard evidence, it should be admitted as relevant to both the background and the purpose o f the
legislation.”
114 Supra note 35. From Beaulac supra note 4 at 301. In this unanimous judgment, Martin, Houlden and
Morden, JJ.A. rely on a quote from Lord Reid in Warner v Metropolitan Police Cmm'r; [1962] 2 AC
256 at 279 to justify an exception to the exclusionary rule “where examining the proceedings in
Parliament would almost certainly settle the mater immediately one way or the other”. Ironically, the
Hansard was found to “not meet the standard enunciated by [Lord R eid ]... and they are, therefore, o f
no assistance in resolving the issue before us”. Nonetheless, this judgment became an authority for
trial courts to consider Hansard according to Beaulac.
115 Lamer J, as he then was, stated “Reference to Hansard is not usually advisable. However, as Canada
has, at the time o f codification, subject to few changes, adopted the English Draft Code o f 1878, it is
relevant to know whether Canada did so in relation to the various sections for the reasons advanced by
the English Commissioners or for reasons o f its own” Vasil, supra note 35; This is the judgment where
Hansard was explicitly used as an aid to interpretation for a non-constitutional matter by the SCC
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vague exception, trial courts began using Hansard and other preparatory materials mainly
to interpret clauses o f the Criminal Code o f Canada."6 The exception for determining the
constitutional characterization of a statute was essentially created anew by the SCC in
1982 in Reference Re Proposed Federal Tax on Exported Natural Gas and Schneider v
British Columbia (AG)."1 Instead of relying on the Anti-Inflation Reference, both cases
cite Reference Re Residential Tenancies Act 1971 (Ontario) as the authority although the
judgment upholds the exclusionary rule.116718 Meanwhile, the precedent established in AntiInflation Reference allowing legislative history to determine the constitutional character
o f a statute was expanded to include interpreting the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms in
the Motor Vehicle Reference in 1985.119
Depending on how you parse the exceptions, there were essentially two possible
uses for legislative history. First, to illuminate the meaning of a statute within a
Constitutional determination (which includes both Charter rights and divisions o f power
issues), and to illuminate the meaning o f a statutory provision in the absence o f a
Constitutional challenge.120 The SCC continued to use these categories in a rather

according to Beaulac, supra note 4 at 301.
116 Based on cases like R v Stevenson, supra note 114, trial courts were already using legislative history
for this purpose, and arguably Vasil, ibid, merely affirmed a pre-existing practice.
117 Reference Re Proposed Federal Tax on Exported Natural Gas, [1982] 1 SCR 1004 at 1048; Schneider
v British Columbia (A.G.), [1982] 2 SCR 112 at 130-31.
118 Ironically, in Reference Re Residential Tenancies Act, Dickson, J. stated that “speeches made in the
Legislature at the time o f enactment o f the measure are inadmissible as having little evidential weight”.
Reference Re Residential Tenancies Act 1971 (Ont) [1981] 1 SCR 714 at 721. Quoted from Beaulac
supra note 4 at 303.
119 Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms; Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486 at 508-509.
120 Beaulac describes three categories: 1. as an aid to interpreting legislation; 2. for constitutional
characterization o f statutes; or 3. to help construe the Canadian Constitution. Beaulac, supra note 4 at
300.
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haphazard manner, expanding and narrowing their application until Rizzo in 1998.121
Depending on how you look at it, either Rizzo overturned the exclusionary rule in Canada
altogether, or it simply eliminated the need for justifications based specifically on
constitutional and non-constitutional contexts.122 Citing R. v Morgentaller; where Hansard
was used to construe the constitutional character o f legislation, Iacobucci, J. ruled that,
“[although the frailties of Hansard evidence are many, this Court has recognized that it
can play a limited role in the interpretation o f legislation.”123 This statement was made
without the fanfare and detailed explanation that accompanied Pepper. Significantly,
there was no formal guidance in the judgment; no ambiguity requirement, and no mention
o f specific methods or approaches to narrow the ruling.
The use o f Hansard in court has not stirred up controversy in Canada the way that
it has in the United States and the United Kingdom.124 Recourse to Hansard is relatively
uncommon, and the handful o f Canadian scholars who have considered the matter like

121 For example, in Finlay v Canada (Minister o f Finance), [1993] 1 SCR 1080, McLachlin states (albeit
in a dissenting opinion) that “[rjecognizing that reference to legislative debates has sometimes been
said to be o f limited assistance and that it is the wording o f the statute which must prevail (see Re
Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, [1981] 1 SCR 714, Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act,
[1984] 1 SCR 297), the debates may nevertheless serve to confirm the appropriateness o f a particular
statutory interpretation (see R v Sullivan, [1991] 1 SCR 489, per Lamer C.J., for the majority, at p. 503;
R v Mailloux, [1988] 2 SCR 1029, per Lamer J. for the Court at p. 1042; Vasil, supra note 35, per
Lamer J. for the majority at para 487).” In R v Heywood, it was noted that “Despite the apparent merits
o f the rule that legislative history is inadmissible to determine legislative intent in statutory
construction, this Court has on occasion made use o f such materials for this very purpose: see R v
Vasil, [1981] 1 SCR 469, at p. 487, and Paul v The Queen, [1982] 1 SCR 621.
However, it is not necessary in this case to determine the admissibility o f the debates for the purpose o f
determining legislative intent.” R v Heywood, [1994] 3 SCR 761 at 788-789. Meanwhile, it can be
argued that Rizzo did not entirely settle the matter. In R v GB, supra note 42 at para 37, it was stated
that “In fact, it is settled that when courts are called upon to consider the constitutionality o f an
enactment, they may take into account the parliamentary history, which is generally not the case for the
ordinary interpretation o f an enactment.”
122 R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 SCR 713; Rizzo, supra note 2.
123 R v Morgentaler, [1993] 3 SCR 463.
124 Arguably, the controversy in the UK made the guidance provided in Pepper necessary. Where there is
no controversy there is no need to explain, justify and narrow such a ruling.
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Bale, Beaulac, Hall, Graham and Sullivan, accept the practice and provide no
impassioned opposition to it.125
Some additional aspects of of Hansard's history in Canada are discussed in the
following section along with a comparison to the history o f other British colonies.

(d) The C olonial Perspective: Canada, Australia and New Zealand
The histories in Australia and New Zealand are temporally quite similar to history
in Canada with respect to Hansard use in court. Both nations followed the exclusionary
rule until the 1980's, at which time exceptions began to appear. In both nations, the rule
was relegated to a cautionary principle at best before the turn of the millennium. In fact
both New Zealand and Australia set aside the exclusionary rule before Canada and the
UK. In Australia, the Federal Interpretation Act was amended to permit the use of
legislative history in 1984, which is eight years prior to Pepper and fourteen years prior
to Rizzo.'26 Most Australian States and Territories followed suit.127 A 1985 New Zealand
125 Beaulac, supra note 7; Bale, supra note 14; hall supra note 28; Graham issues warnings about use o f
statements by MLAs as evidence o f the precise meaning o f a specific statutory provision but is
generally supportive o f the use o f legislative history for illuminating the meaning o f a statute in a more
general sense. See Graham supra note 78 at 155-162; also see Graham, supra note 11 at 176-181. Ruth
Sullivan, “Some Implications o f Plain Language Drafting” (2001) 22:3 Stat L Rev 145.
126 Acts Interpretation Act, supra note 4.
127 The Australian Capital Territory, N ew South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia had amended their
respective Interpretation Acts to permit legislative history at the time o f Beaulac's research in 1998.
The relevant provisions have not been amended since: Legislation Act 2001 A2001-14 (ACT) s. 142,
online: <http://www.legislation.act.govau/a/2001-14/current/pdf/2001-14.pdf>; Interpretation Act
1987 (NSW ) s. 34, online: <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ial987191/>;
Interpretation o f Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) s. 35, online:
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/iolal984322/s35.html>; Interpretation Act 1984
(W A)s. 19, online: <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/ial984191/sl9.html>. Since
that time the Northern Territories, Queensland and Tasmania have made similar amendments:
Interpretation Act (NT) S.62B, online:
<http://www.austIii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consoI_act/ial 9 1/s62b.html>; Acts Interpretation Act 1954,
(Qld) s. 14B, online: <http://www.legislation.qld.govau/legisltn/current/a/actsinterpa54.pdf>; Acts
Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas) s. 8B, online:
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/tas/consol_act/aial931230/s8b.html>. Southern Australia is the
only jurisdiction that has not enacted legislation permitting the use o f legislative history, including
Hansard as an interpretive aid.
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Law Commission Report stated that there never was an exclusionary rule in New
Zealand.128Almost immediately, the New Zealand courts began to accept legislative
history.129
The forces that motivated the rapid and nearly simultaneous change among the
former British colonies did not include UK court decisions. Beaulac argues that trends in
international law were influential.130 In accordance with principles agreed upon in the
Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties in 1969, the use of treaties and related
preparatory materials was recommended to aid in the interpretation o f statutes enacted to
enforce domestic obligations with respect to international treaties.131 Having been
exposed to the benefits o f the background information provided by these materials, it is
plausible that judges became more willing to use this method for all domestic legislation.
Another source o f influence was secondary literature. Works like Stanley
Edwards' famous article about the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and
Crankshaw's Annotated Criminal Code relied on Hansard and legislative history to arrive
at more enlightened understandings of the respective statutes.132 Indeed the Crankshaw
Code was responsible for the use o f Hansard in R v Vasil, which was the first SCC

128 NZ, Law Commission, A New Interpretation Act (Report No. 17) (Wellington: The Commission,
1990).
129 Proprietors o f Atihua-Wanganui v Malpas [1985] 2 NZLR 468; from Beaulac, supra note 4 at 289.
130 Beaulac, ibid at 297; also see Stéphane Beaulac, “No More International Treaty Interpretive Methods
in Canada's Statutory Interpretation: A Question o f Access to Domestic Travaux Préparatoires” (2010)
University o f Edinburgh School o f Law Working Paper Series, 2010/23.
131 Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Can TS 1980 No 37.
132 Stanley E. Edwards, "Reorganization under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947) 25 Can
Bar Rev 587; James Crankshaw, The Criminal Code o f Canada and the Canada Evidence Act
(Montreal: Whiteford & Theoret, 1894). There are many examples o f scholarly legal works that rely
heavily on Hansard. See for example, Marguerite E. Ritchie, Q.C. “Alice Through the Statutes” (1975)
21 Mcgill LJ 685.

42
decision to use Hansard in the absence of a Constitutional challenge.133 No doubt there
were many forces which collectively put pressure on the exclusionary rule over time.
However, the almost simultaneous overturning of the exclusionary rule throughout the
UK and the former colonies remains something o f a mystery.
The trend towards permissive use o f legislative history is a global phenomenon.
Recourse to such materials has been a long-standing practice in most continental civil
code jurisdictions.134 The UK and the former colonies of Canada, New Zealand and
Australia are now on board. Courts in Singapore began using legislative history following
amendments to the Interpretation Act mandating purposive interpretation.'35 On the
advice o f the Hong Kong Law Commission, Hong Kong attempted to pass similar
legislation in 2000.136 Even in the US, where textualists appear to be gaining ground
intellectually, the use o f legislative materials in court is only facing restrictions and not
prohibition.137 History suggests that, once a legislative assembly publishes official

133 Vasil, supra note 35. In this judgment, Lamer J relied upon quotes from Canadian Hansard to show that
Parliament adopted the wording o f the English Draft code with respect to a specific provision in the
Canadian Criminal Code and that Parliament did so with knowledge o f the reasons for the provision as
explained in the Commission Report within which the Draft Code appeared. More will be said about
this judgment at 264. UK, Report o f the Royal Commission Appointed to Consider the Law Relating to

Indictable Offences: With an Appendix Containing a Draft Code Embodying the Suggestions o f the
Commissioners (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1879) [English Draft Code].
134 See for example Dr. Christian Rumpf, “The Importance o f Legislative History Materials in the
Interpretation o f Statutes in Turkey” (1993-1994) 19 N C J Int'l L & Com Reg 267; Also see Claire M.
Germain, “Approaches to Statutory Interpretation and Legislative History in France” (2003) 13 Duke J
Comp & Int'l L 195; Ironically, Quebec did not follow suit but remained harmonious with the rest o f
Canada according to Beaulac, supra note 4 at 307-308.
135 Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 1985 Rev Ed Sing) ss 9A(1)-9A(4). See Anton Cooray and Anthony Law,
“Legislative Guidelines on the Use o f Extrinsic Materials on Statutory Interpretation: Is Hong Kong
Ready?” (2001) 9 Asia Pac L Rev 23 at 26.
136 Cooray, ibid. The authors conclude that the decision to reject the bill was because o f political concerns
i.e. that some undesirable practices o f Chinese courts would be introduced, and that in the absence o f
this fear, the bill would have been passed and that legislative history would be permissible in Hong
Kong courts. The title o f the article implies that it is only a matter o f time until Hong Kong will be
ready.
137 See Gluck, supra note 46 at 1758; also see Law & Zaring, supra note 109.
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transcripts, committee reports and related documents, judges and lawyers will inevitably
seek to use them in court, and if given enough time, any rule against their use will be
overturned.
Within this global trend, the Canadian context is unique. As a British colony, it
was separated from the English crown by an ocean. The proceedings of the Canadian
Parliament were never subject to a formal prohibition on publication.138 Meanwhile, the
legislative process is similar to that of England with its smaller volume of legislative
materials relative to the United States. Unlike in the UK, however, the shift towards
permissive use o f legislative history occurred in a gradual, almost evolutionary manner
spanning a period o f fourteen years. When the exclusionary rule was finally overturned
completely, there was little guidance beyond a vague warning about the potential frailties
and risks. The only other place where a similar confluence of circumstances has occurred
is New Zealand, where, as in Canada, few scholars are paying attention.

2.2 T he Textualism D ebate
The reasons both in favour of, and opposed to, the use o f legislative history, are
mired in rhetoric. A common misunderstanding concerns textualists' belief in the primacy
o f plain meaning. The textualist commitment to plain meaning is often overstated, with
opponents suggesting that textualists adhere to plain meaning regardless o f any other
concerns. To be fair, there are some judges who occasionally base decisions on the plain
meaning o f a statutory provision despite the fact that the interpretation brings about
138 Online: Canadian Hansard Society <http://www.hansard.ca/hansardincanada.html>. Publication o f
official records commenced in 1880. According to this source, some members o f Parliament attempted
to eliminate publication o f the debates in 1881. In response, John A. McDonald argued that, without
Hansard, “we have no means o f tracing out the very groundwork o f all our legislation - the motives
and impulses o f those petty municipal questions which were the chief subjects o f interest in the early
days and which have expanded into the larger subjects which are now engaging the attention o f the
people and the Legislature o f Canada.”
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absurd results, and there are some theorists who argue that there is merit to this position.139
However, textualists generally approve o f a strained interpretation of a statutory provision
if the apparent plain meaning brings about absurd results, or conflicts with or is
incoherent with the surrounding body of law.140 Most textualists do not argue for what
could be described as a tyranny o f plain meaning.
As well, scholars on both sides of the debate tend to use similar reasoning to reach
opposite conclusions. For example, the UK Law Commission Report argues that larger
volumes o f materials that result from the more complicated committee structures in
places like Germany, Sweden and the US provide better materials for evidence o f
legislative intent than the more sparse UK materials.141 In the US, the opposite argument
is raised: the larger volume o f materials generated makes them ill-suited as extrinsic aids
to interpretation because o f the time and complexity involved in the research.142
More fundamentally, both sides contend that the use or non-use of legislative
history by litigants in court permits judges to better determine the legislative intent. Some
scholars might take issue with the assertion that textualists argue that the non-use of
legislative intent permits judges to better determine the legislative intent. Nevertheless,
there is support for this position in the textualist literature. Textualists often comment on
the absurdity o f attributing intent about the meaning of a statute to a group of people as a

139 A well-known Canadian example is the decision by Lamer C.J. R v McIntosh, [1995] 1 SCR 686:
“Even though I agree with the Crown that the interpretation o f s. 34(2) which makes it available to
initial aggressors may be somewhat illogical in light o f s. 35, and may lead to some absurdity, 1 do not
believe that such considerations should lead this Court to narrow a statutory defence. Parliament, after
all, has the right to legislate illogically”, at 41. Also see Schauer, supra note 29.
140 See for example Antonin Scalia, A Matter o f Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1997) at 20-21.
141 Law Commission, supra note 20 at 58 to 60.
142 Danner, supra note 17 at 193.
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whole when that group is comprised of politicians deeply divided along partisan lines,
most o f whom have only cursory knowledge of the contents of any particular Bill before
Parliament.143As a result, textualists do believe that resort to non-statutory materials that
were produced in the course of enacting legislation actually muddy the waters o f an Act's
true meaning rather than revealing an Act's true meaning. Yet textualists must believe that
the words o f statutes were intended to mean something. Scholars on both sides o f the
debate, who consider the mechanics o f how language works, generally concede that the
process o f interpreting a statute requires the presumption that there is 'legislative intent' as
a figurative tool in order to make rational sense of the text.144 If the use of fictions is a
fault, then the textualist position is in no better position than purposivists and
intentionalists since textualism looks for the meaning that a fictional “ordinary reasonable
public person fully versed in the language and legal context” would attribute to the text.145
There are plenty of fictions to go around. The substance of the debate lies elsewhere.
The following exploration of textualism and the debate over the use o f Hansard in
court is divided into two sections. First, politically-rooted and ultimately ideologically143 See for example Frank H. Easterbrook, “The Role o f Original Intent in Statutory Construction” (1988)
11 Har J L & Pub PoIfy 59; also see Radin, supra note 80; also see Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Congress is a
’they* and not an 'it': Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron” (1992) 12 Int Rev L and Econ 239. It should
be noted that some proponents also criticise the concept o f legislative intent. See for example William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994) at 1825.
144 For proponents conceding the necessity of'legislative intent' see Lawrence M. Solan “Private
Language, Public Laws: The Central Role o f Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation” (2004-05)
93 Geo L J 427; also see Costello supra note 68; For textualists conceding the necessity of'legislative
intent' see John F. Manning, “Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine” (1997) 97 Col L Rev 673 at
691-692, quoting Scalia J; Also see John F. Manning “Textualism and Legislative Intent” (2005) 99 Va
L Rev 419 at 424 “textualists necessarily believe in some version o f legislative intent”; also see
Michael P. Healy “Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation in England and the United States: An
Assessment o f the impact o f Pepper v Hart” (1999) 35 Stan J Int'l L 231. Also see Law Commission,
supra note 20 at 54-56.
145 See for example Manning, supra at 144 also see Scalia, supra note 45 at 43, “a sort of'objectified'
intent - the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text o f the law, placed alongside the
remainder o f the corpus juris ” Textualism and legislative intent at 421.
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based issues will be considered, and then the more practical and logistical issues will be
discussed.
Before proceeding, the distinction between Hansard and the other items that
comprise the legislative history must be kept clearly in mind as well as the intimate
connection between these materials. Proponents o f recourse to Hansard will typically
support recourse to the supporting documents as well, because MLAs will typically rely
on the committee reports and white papers, at least in part, to understand and advocate for
(or against) legislation.146 If there is to be recourse to one, there will be many
circumstances where there must also be recourse to the other in order to provide the
complete context.147

(a) Ideological Issues Surrounding the Textualism D ebate
Opponents of recourse to legislative history consider the nature o f each type of
evidence, and criticize accordingly. Committee reports are regarded as inadmissible
because they come from non-elected persons and therefore lack the legal authority to
influence what constitutes the law.148 However, the non-elected status o f the authors is not
the real problem. MPs are elected, but their speeches in Parliament are suspect because
any individual MP will only express a personal opinion whereas the statute is a statement
ratified by the majority o f MPs, and therefore represents, figuratively speaking, the
146 According to the Government o f Canada website, “the term white paper is ... commonly applied to
official documents presented by Ministers o f the Crown which state and explain the government's
policy on a certain issue.” Online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/pages/WhitePapers.aspx>. Typically
elected members will rely on reports by committees or commission when drafting proposed legislation.
These reports are public documents. They might be quite lengthy, however it is customary for such
reports to have summary conclusions. White Papers are typically written and made available to all
members o f the House when Bills are put before the House for debate.
147 For examples and more discussion about this, see the section on “Shoehoming” in Chapter 3 at page
82.
148 See for example, Manning, supra note 144 at 689; also see Miers, supra note 71 at 105.
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opinion o f the House as a collective. This argument gets closer to the substance o f the
matter. Textualists argue that committee reports and other preparatory materials should
not be equated with “congressional ascent to their contents”;149 and, the words o f one MP
should not be equated with the words o f the House collectively.150
Ironically, proponents agree that the words of MLA's should not be given the
same weight as words in statutes. The disagreement concerns how each side believes the
evidence will be used by judges. Proponents believe that statements of the Minister in
charge o f a Bill are to be construed as nothing more than potentially relevant information
that might or might not shed light on the meaning o f a statute. They do not believe that
the words o f MLAs will be put on an equal footing with the text of statutes. Textualists
argue that, by gleaning information about the meaning of words in statutes by consulting
legislative history, the words o f a Bill's sponsor spoken in the House will become
determinative in court, and thus be put on an equal footing as words in a statute.151
Manning goes so far as to argue that this amounts to a delegation of law-making authority
that is ultra vires the US Constitution.152
There is an English equivalent for this argument. According to Steyn and Styles,
use of Hansard in court alters the constitutionally-ordained balance of power in
Parliament by giving too much authority to the executive.153 If it is known that judges will
149 Manning, supra note 144 at 683.
150 Styles, supra note 3 at 154.
151 This is an argument raised by Johan Steyn and Jeremy Waldron. See Johan Steyn, “Pepper v Hart; A
Re-examination” (2001) 21 Ox J Leg Stud 59 at 64; Also see Manning, supra note 109 at 683; Jeremy
Waldron “Legislators’ Intentions and Unintentional Legislation” in Andrei Marmor (ed.), Law and
Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 355.
152 Manning, supra note 109 at 695.
153 Styles, supra note 3 at 157; Steyn, supra note 151 at 68. In Pepper, Lord Wilkinson-Browne alluded to
this argument in his statements about the “constitutional propriety” o f considering Hansard. See
Pepper, supra n o te .
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consider Hansard, the executive will make pronouncements in the House to promote their
preferred meaning o f a statute. Meanwhile, since the views of MLAs who are not
directly involved in the promoting of the Bill are ignored, the views o f opponents will be
shut out. Thus the executive is given an unfair amount o f legislative authority.
The notion o f giving too much power to the executive does not appear very
persuasive in the context o f the Canadian first-past-the-post electoral system. When a
majority government presides, the executive controls the House. If the process of voting
in Parliament to enact legislation was the only force preventing self-serving partisan
legislation, then majority governments would surely have enacted the most brazenly
partisan o f statutes during all of the majority governments throughout the nation's history,
both federally and provincially. There would be no need to plant self-serving information
into the legislative history since the content of statutes is effectively under executive
control. Let it suffice to say that there is an air of unreality to these arguments. After a
century in the US, and nearly three decades in most other common law jurisdictions, it is
rather extreme to suggest that use of legislative history in court poses a genuine threat to
democracy.
These arguments are a reflection of the philosophical tensions inherent in a
parliamentary democracy. The notion that the process o f statutory interpretation must be
insulated from the process o f drafting reflects the desire to prevent unlawful usurping of
political power, and carries with it an implied distrust of the individual people involved in
the law-making process. It has been argued that Parliament enacts statutes with full
knowledge that any ambiguities and vaguenesses will be resolved by the judiciary, an
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independent body beyond their control by constitutional design.154 However, the nature of
language (and therefore the nature of statutory language) is such that the full extent o f the
ambiguities and vaguenesses are not knowable in advance. Provisions whose meanings
appear plain and obvious to the drafters could end up being interpreted in a manner
contrary to the their understandings simply because the reader did not have shared
assumptions about the meanings o f various words.155 This imputing o f full knowledge of
all textual shortcomings is really a fiction.156
It is rather extreme to summarily reject all information surrounding the enactment
o f a statute. Although committees might consult lobbyists, and various individuals might
have differences in opinions, there is a process that moves towards consensus and brings
about the final choice o f words in statutes. There is some intended meaning to the enacted
words.157 Therefore it is reasonable to consider that, out of respect for those who
painstakingly worked towards drafting and enacting those words into law, one might
consult the various communications involved in the process to gain a better
understanding o f how the words were understood by those involved in the process. After

154 See for example, John F. Manning. “Putting Legislative History To A Vote: A Response to Professor
Siegel” (2000) 53 Van L Rev 1529 at 1531. See contra Reed Dickerson “The Diseases o f Legislative
Language” (1964) 1 Harv J on Legis 5; also see contra Graham, supra note 23 at 179-182. Both
Graham and Dickerson believe that ambiguity is always unintentional and unanticipated while
vagueness is always intentional.
155 A full explanation would require a lengthy discussion o f linguistics. As a single but compelling
example, see Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486. The phrase “principles o f fundamental
justice” was interpreted to include substantive justice when the drafters intended the phrase to be
synonymous with “natural justice” and would therefore only include procedural elements.
156 See Dickerson, supra note 154; also see Graham, supra note 23 at 122-138.
157 This is not to say that there will necessarily be a surgically precise meaning that can be enunciated with
respect to all statutory text. The point is much more general. There will always be one or more reasons
motivating a change in the law, and one or more issues that the law seeks to address when Bills are
proposed, and subsequently enacted into law.
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all, the enacting o f a statute is a deliberate attempt by a large group o f people to shape
judicial interpretation.158
Textualists point out that Parliament can enact supplementary materials for the
express purpose o f aiding interpretation, for example, by incorporating a document by
reference if the legislators feel it is necessary.159 Indeed, the English Law Commission
report in 1969 concluded that Parliament should formally enact supplemental materials as
interpretive aids.160 However, within Canada, the US and the UK, incorporation by
reference has rarely occurred. At best, some statutes might have a preamble or a purpose
clause. Although some have argued that by not enacting supplementary materials,
legislative assemblies demonstrate their satisfaction with the completeness o f statutes as
enacted, there are competing reasons why this might be so. The most common
explanation is a lack o f legislative resources.161 Parliament has a busy agenda and a
limited number o f hours per year to get things done. The process o f enacting legislation is
complex enough without incorporating supplementary documents.
As a less resource-intensive alternative to enacting interpretive supplements,
legislatures can make laws governing statutory interpretation. In Australia, the federal
government and some provincial governments have stipulated that recourse to Hansard
and preparatory materials is permissible in court as aids to interpretation.162 In Texas, the

158 Solan makes this argument. Groups o f people delegate tasks all o f the time, and this includes the task
o f drafting legislation. When a task is so delegated, it is perfectly rational to ask those upon whom the
responsibility fell for further elaboration about the task. See Lawrence M. Solan, The Language o f
Statutes (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 2010) at 82 - 119.
159 See for example, Manning, supra note 109 at 723-724. Also see Johnathan R.Siegel, “The Use o f
Legislative History In a System o f Separated Powers” (2000) 53 Vand L Rev 1457 at 1480-1505.
160 Supra note 298.
161 See for example, Manning, supra note 109 at 722; also see Seigel, supra note 159.
162 Supra note 4.
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legislature went so far as to ordain that there is no ambiguity requirement in order for
courts to consider legislative materials.163 According to Gluck, there have been instances
o f 'dialogue' between the state supreme court and the state legislature in both Texas and
Connecticut where a statute was enacted, in response to dissatisfaction with the judicial
approach to legislative history, then the statute was amended in response to the court's
refusal to abide by the statute.164 This approach has been deployed around the world. It is
interesting to note that such statutes are much more likely to permit and regulate the use
o f legislative history than to prohibit it.165
The claim that the lack o f enacted interpretive aids is evidence that legislators are
satisfied with completeness o f a statute as enacted cannot be entirely supported or refuted
with any certainty in Canada, where the interpretation acts do not expressly permit the
use o f legislative history. This argument carried more weight when the exclusionary rule
was in place, and tacit consent could be imputed based on the legislators' knowledge of
the exclusionary rule. Now, with the permissive environment, the opposite argument can
be made: legislators make laws knowing that the preparatory materials can be used as
interpretive aids, and can include an exclusionary clause in the act if they disagree with
the practice. However, the reality is that neither argument is particularly convincing. It is

163 “In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may
consider among other matters the: (1) object sought to be attained; (2) circumstances under which the
statute was enacted; (3) legislative history” Tex Gov't Code Ann § 311.023 (Vernon 2005). The courts
refused to follow the statute: See Boykin v State, 818 SW 2d 782 (Tex Crim App 1991); see also, eg,
Williams v State, 273 SW 3d 200, 215 (Tex Crim App 2008); Ex parte Noyola, 215 SW 3d 862 (Tex
Crim App 2007) (quoting Ex parte Spann, 132 SW 3d 390 at 393 (Tex Crim App 2004); Ex parte
Medellin, 223 SW 3d 315 (Tex Crim App 2006) (same); Ex parte Spann, 132 SW 3d 390 (Tex Crim
App 2004) (same). In Gluck, supra note 46 at 1787.
164 Supra note 98 at 1784-1791 & 1824-1829.
165 Jurisdictions permitting recourse by statute include Texas, supra note 123; Connecticut, 2003 Conn
Pub Acts 154 (codified at CONN GEN STAT § l-2z (2003)); and Australia, supra note 89. Research
for this paper uncovered no jurisdiction with a statutory prohibition on recourse to legislative history.
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an attempt to use current practice to justify the current practice; and, it only serves as a
reason to preserve the status quo.
Dialogue theory,166 alluded to above, is another argument that provides no
concrete justification for or against the use o f legislative history, although it is another
reason for presuming that the statute can be regarded as complete as enacted. According
to dialogue theory, if the law-makers do not like a judicial interpretation, they have a
remedy: they can amend the legislation (or repeal it and enact something else). However
the reality seems to accord with the view that legislative resources are scarce.
Amendments tend to follow significant constitutional decisions, but lesser yet obviously
problematic statutory language can remain unrevised for decades.167
166 According to Bushell & Hogg, “[wjhere a judicial decision is open to legislative reversal,
modification, or avoidance, then it is meaningful to regard the relationship between the Court and the
competent legislative body as a dialogue.” Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell “The Charter
Dialogue Between The Courts And Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter o f Rights Isn’t Such A Bad
Thing After All)” 35 Osgoode Hall L J 110. This matter has been the subject o f significant scholarly
debate. See, for example, Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, “Six Degrees o f Dialogue: A
Response to Hogg and Bushel!” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L J 513; also see Andrew Petter “Taking
Dialogue Much Too Seriously (Or Perhaps Charter Dialogue Isn't Such A Good Thing After All)”
(2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L J 147.
167 Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 36 RFL (5th) 127, 172 OAC 276 (Ont CA) is an
excellent example o f significant Constitutional decisions that brought about relatively rapid
amendments. The common law definition o f marriage was declared to be ultra vires the Charter. At
the federal level, several provisions o f the Divorce Act became unconstitutional, and the Civil
Marriage Act was enacted to remedy the statute. The statute was later amended to make changes to
seven other statutes including the Income Tax Act, the Federal Law and Civil Law o f the Province of
Quebec Act, and the Modernization o f Benefits and Obligations Act. The Ontario legislature enacted
the Spousal Relationship Statute Law Amendment Act which amended seventy one provincial statutes
including, among others, the Accumulations Act, the Business Corporations Act, the Commercial
Tenancies Act, the Courts o f Justice Act, the Evidence Act, and the Fuel Tax Act. The Federal Law and
Civil Law o f the Province o f Quebec Act is currently enforced as Federal Law—Civil Law
Harmonization Act, Mo. 1, SC 2001, c 4; Modernization o f Benefits and Obligations Act SC 2000, c
12; Spousal Relationships Statute Law Amendment Act, 2005, SO 2005; Accumulations Act, supra note
61; Business Corporations Act. RSO 1990, c B.16; Commercial Tenancies Act. RSO 1990, c L.7;
Courts o f Justice Act. RSO 1990, c C.43; Evidence Act. R.S.O. 1990, c E.23; Fuel Tax Act. RSO 1990.
Examples o f lesser statutory provisions which have obvious problems, consider s. 34 o f the Criminal
Code. This is the self-defence provision, and as a very high profile SCC judgment made clear, an
accused person who kills an alleged attacker has more grounds to rely upon under the self-defence
provisions than if the attacker was merely injured. R v McIntosh, [1995] 1 SCR 686; This decision is
discussed by Graham, supra note 11 at 116-118.Section 1 o f the Accumulations Act is another glaring
example o f textual uncertainty persisting in a statute over time. Accumulations Act RSO 1990, c A.5.
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The range and sophistication of the arguments both for and against judicial
recourse to legislative history are testament to the importance o f this issue. It touches on
fundamental questions about how legislative power should be controlled and distributed
between the legislature and the judiciary. Thus, a fundamental question about how
statutes should be interpreted becomes a question about how democracy should work.
With this issue, as with most of the problematic details lurking beneath the visionary
concepts o f democracy and justice, our society moves forward in a grand experiment in
institutional evolution while the individuals within the society remain locked in
intractable ideological disputes. If the discussion remains focused on the “right” way to
do things, nothing more will be accomplished than an exchange o f justifications for
entrenched positions. If forward movement is to be made on this issue, the attention must
turn to the logistical issues and practical matters involved in the use of Hansard in court.

(b) Practical M atters
At bottom, all textualist arguments against the use o f Hansard in court essentially
rely on one o f two claims:
1.

The information is very unreliable and might mislead judges; or

2.

The practice is impractical because of the complexities it introduces to the
process of statutory interpretation.'68

This is where the rubber meets the road. Even proponents acknowledge that reliability is
a serious issue. The information must be used very cautiously since it would be easy to
take statements out of context. However caution is the salve. It is the second claim that
has some genuine traction.168

168 No doubt there will be many who choose to disagree on this point. I stand by this assertion.
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Given the limited time that Parliament sits, there is a relatively low probability
that any particular enactment or amendment will be discussed in any meaningful way in
Canada. Meanwhile, the cost o f permitting recourse to Hansard in court is arguably quite
high. The records are lengthy and full o f impassioned speeches. It is a time-consuming
affair to dig through the records for meaningful quotes. In conjunction, the Bills, white
papers and various reports must also be consulted so that statements made in the House
can be properly contextualized. The question arises: Do the costs exceed the benefits?
If such searches become a matter o f due diligence, this could put an onerous
burden on litigants. Given the low probability of finding relevant information, this would
hardly seem worth it. At present the practice is not a matter of due diligence in Canada,
and the use o f Hansard in court is unusual.169
Nonetheless, there is a compelling simplicity to the assertion that the statute is the
statute, and that the text should be interpreted without intensive background research into
the parliamentary records. The statute is what Parliament enacted, and that is the only
thing that should be consulted to determine the meaning of the statute. The ordinary
meaning as interpreted by someone competent in the use of the language and familiar
with the context of the law is what should carry the day.
However, this 'ordinary meaning' is no less likely to be mired in ambiguities,
vaguenesses, incoherences and absurdities than in any other 'type' o f meaning.
Meanwhile, the process o f statutory interpretation is fraught with complexities and it
169 The opposite holds true in many US jurisdictions like California and Kentucky where searches o f
legislative history are required under the duty o f due diligence, and the immense volume o f materials
available mean that there is a relatively high probability o f uncovering relevant information with
respect to an enacted statute. This might account for some o f the support that textualism enjoys in the
US. The issue o f just how often Hansard is turning up in Canadian courts will be discussed in the
quantitative analysis o f Hansard at pages 125 - 134.
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seems rather disingenuous to assert that preparatory materials needlessly complicate the
process o f interpretation. Legal experts are deployed at every stage of enactment,
litigation and adjudication. The text is considered in light of the body o f law within which
it exists. There is no getting around the complexities o f statutory meaning.170
When a judge presides over a case that hinges upon statutory interpretation, the
judge must use the cognitive processes necessary to perform the act o f interpreting
language. This depends upon a contextual understanding of the words in the statute, and
this contextual understanding is derived exclusively from sources that are external to the
text.171 The bulk o f this understanding will come from the sum total o f knowledge in the
judge's mind. This might be supplemented by dictionary definitions (whether Oxford,
Blacks or another), scholarly works, submissions and other precedents, and anything else
that the judge might feel is helpful. This will include legislative history if the judge feels
so inclined.
Given all of the externalities, why is it that the sources in closest proximity to the
creation o f statutory language, and which are arguably most likely to shed light on the
meaning o f words in a statute, should be precluded from arguments made by litigants?
Particularly, if judges are permitted to make use of these materials on their own, why
should litigants be deprived o f the ability to make use of those materials?172

170 Indeed, the notion that an ordinary citizen should be able to know what the law is by reading the
statutes is utterly absurd.
171 See supra note 24.
172 This was a significant consideration for the Irish Law Reform Commission when they recommended
amendments permitting use o f legislative history in the Irish Interpretation Act. I, Law Reform
Commission Report on Statutory Drafting and Interpretation: Plain Language and the Law (LRC-612000) (Dublin: The Commission, 2000) at 66-69.
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There is a broader principle involved. It is a question of whether or not the courts
should be summarily closing the door on potentially relevant sources o f information
because the matter is complex and the information could therefore be misleading if it is
not treated in a circumspect manner with due consideration for the risks? Arguably this
risk is present for all information brought to court.
An analogous dispute is currently being debated within a completely different area
o f law. It concerns judicial interviews o f children involved in custody disputes.
Opponents o f the practice argue that judges will end up using the words o f 10-year old
children as highly probative evidence with the absurd result that young children will be
determining matters like parental custody which are the proper domain o f mature
responsible adults.173 Proponents of the judicial interview argue that the information is not
intended to be probative, but merely useful to supplement the information provided by
the parents and various experts before making a decision that has significant
consequences for the child.174 Essentially, the opponents argue that judges cannot be
trusted with such controversial information, while proponents argue that more
information is better.
With respect to the issue of legislative history as an interpretive aid, it is
respectfully submitted that more information is better. Judicial decision-making is
supposed to be an intellectual task based upon reason. If there are to be rules which limit

173 For example, see Barbara House, Considering the Child’s Preferences in Determining Custody: Is It
Really In the Child’s Best Interest? (1998) 19 J Juv L 176; also see Cynthia Starnes, “Swords In The
Hands o f Babes: Rethinking Custody Interviews After TroxeF (2003) 2003 Wis L Rev 116.
174 For example, see Christine Davies, “Access to Justice for Children: The Voice o f the Child in Custody
and Access Disputes” (2004) 22 Can F L Q 153.
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the amount o f materials submitted by litigants, they should be based upon relevance
rather than on the source's proximity to the law-making process.
On this issue, the courts in Canada have chosen to be inclusive, and there has not
been any noticeable backlash from politicians or scholars. Indeed there has been a blissful
scholarly ignorance. The last time that the use of Hansard in Canadian courts was
examined was in 2000 by Stéphane Beaulac.175At that time the Rizzo decision was new,
and the Supreme Court of Canada was dealing with Hansard in a decidedly unprincipled
manner. In certain cases, judges were citing pre-Rizzo justifications for permitting
Hansard. Statements were being considered by opposition MLAs who were not directly
involved in the drafting and sponsoring of the bill. Some cases posited an ambiguity
requirement while other cases suggested that there was no such requirement. In some
cases, the contextual information provided in the judgment was so brief that little insight
could be gleaned from it beyond the fact that some Hansard evidence was presented to
the court.
It is plausible that things have changed with the passage of eleven years. The
judiciary might have effectively grappled with the problems, educated themselves and
moved forward in a principled manner, so that Hansard is being handled consistently and
rationally, with due consideration for the risks, and respect for the need to provide an
N

adequate explanation of the context. If so, the Canadian legal community could benefit
from an understanding of this approach. Lawyers could learn how to make better use of
Hansard, judges could refine their methods for dealing with it, and scholars could praise
or criticize as they saw fit.

175 Beaulac, supra note 7.
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It is equally possible that a principled approach has not been developed and that
Hansard is still being treated in a rather haphazard manner. If this is so, the matter should
be brought into the light. If a close examination uncovers some troubling decisions, it
could be the spark that ignites a more spirited debate. In a less glamourous light, perhaps
such a finding would indicate a need for guidance, whether by courts or legislatures, to
address any shortcomings in the judicial treatment of this information.
The evolution o f the judicial handling o f Hansard (or lack thereof) in Canada is an
important part o f the story of Hansard in court. Although it is a rarely used and often
challenging tool in litigation, it has demonstrated itself over centuries around the world to
be important enough to warrant serious scholarly and judicial consideration. The
Canadian context is unique because of the evolutionary forces that brought it to the
current situation as a former British Colony; and also because of the current state o f the
law which provides no formal guidance or statutory requirements governing how
Hansard is to be used in court. Meanwhile, the current of affairs in Canada has not been
studied comprehensively for eleven years. We do not know what is going on with respect
to Hansard in Canadian courts. It's time to bring judicial use of Hansard into the light.
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CHAPTER 3:
Q ualitative A nalysis o f H ansard U se in S C C Judgm ents
The qualitative analysis undertaken in this thesis involves revisiting the issues that
Beaulac examined in 2000. This will be done using the same the same headings and in
the same order as Beaulac's study. Emphasis will be placed on the 2010 findings in
comparison with the 1999 findings. The headings are as follow s:176
a)
b)
c)
d)

Purpose o f Use of Parliamentary Debates
Ambiguity Requirement
Autonomous Interpretative177 Means
Persuasive Force
There were thirteen judgments that made reference to Hansard in 1999 while there

were ten decisions in 2010.17817980
The 1999 judgments are as follows (in alphabetical order):
1.
2.
3.
4.

Delisle v Canada (Deputy Attorney General)™
Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v Dobsonm
Francis v Baker181
Law v Canada (Minister o f Employment and Immigration) 182

176 These are the headings used by Beaulac. See Beaulac, supra note 7.
177 Up to this point, the word “interpretive” has been used. Beaulac preferred the word “interpretative” in
his work, and this preference will be followed in the context o f the qualitative analysis.
178 Beaulac reported twelve judgments. It would appear that his research missed M & D Farm Ltd. v
Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp., [1999] 2 SCR 961, 1999 CanLII 648 [M&D Farm], in which a
statement made by the Minister o f Agriculture was used as an aid to determining the meaning o f a
provision in the Farm Debt Review Act', at 19; Farm Debt Review Act, RSC, 1985, c 25 (2nd Supp), s
23. This fact is pointed out with all due respect to Dr. Beaulac, who no doubt, took great care in his
research. Advances in computer databases and computer-based research technology has made this kind
o f research much easier than it was in 2000. Although an excellent exercise in due diligence, the
primary reason for searching the 1999 SCC judgments was to verify that the search criteria found the
same judgments as Beaulac's and would therefore capture an equivalent list o f judgments in other
years.
179 Delisle, supra note 62.
180 [1999] 2 SCR 753, 1999 CanLII 698 [Dobson],
181 [1999] 3 SCR 250, 1999 CanLII 659 [Francis],
182 [1999] 1 SCR 497, 1999 CanLII 675 [Law],

5. M & D Farm Ltd. v Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp'83
6. M. v H . m
7. Perron-Malenfant v Malenfant (Trustee of)'*5
8. RvB eaulac'*6
9. R v Davis'*1
10. R v G . (B.)m
11. R v Gladue'*9
12. U.F.C. W, Local 1518 v KMart Canada18314567990
13. Winko v British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute)'9'
The 2010 judgments are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Canada (Attorney General) v TeleZone Inc19219345
Century Services Inc. v Canada (Attorney General)m
Globe and Mail v Canada (Attorney General)m
Németh v Canada (Justice)'95
Quebec (Attorney General) v Canadian Owners and Pilots Association196
Quebec (Attorney General) v Lacombe19719820
R v Morelli'9*
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction A ct'99
Syndicat de la fonction publique du Québec v Quebec (Attorney General)

183 M & D Farm, supra note 178.
184 [1999] 2 SCR 3, 1999 CanLII 686 [M vH \.
185 [1999] 3 SCR 375, 1999 CanLII 663 [Malenfant].
186 [1999] 1 SCR 768, 1999 CanLII 684 [R v Beaulac].
187 [1999] 3 SCR 759, 1999 CanLII 638 [Davis].
188 R v GB, supra note 41.
189 [1999] 1 SCR 688, 1999 CanLII 679 [Gladue].
190 [1999] 2 SCR 1083, 1999 CanLII 650 [KMart].
191 [1999] 2 SCR 625 [Winko].
192 2010 SCC 62 [Telezone]
193 2010 SCC 60 [Century].
194 Globe & Mail, supra note 50.
195 Németh, supra note 50.
196 COPA, supra note 50.
197 Lancombe, supra note 50.
198 2010 SCC 8, [2010] 1 SCR 253 [Morelli].
199 ReAHRA, supra note 50.
200 Syndicat, supra note 50.
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10. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v Canada1201
3.1 P urpose o f U se201202
With respect to the purpose for which Hansard was used in 1999 by the SCC,
Beaulac noted that there was a tendency to discuss Hansard as if it should be treated
differently depending on the context of use.203 This resulted in a compartmentalized
approach that tended to distinguish between three different contexts of use:
1. Use for the constitutional characterization o f a statute for pith and substance in
the context o f a division of powers determination,204
2. Use for the constitutional characterization for the Oakes analysis in the context
o f Charter-based decisions; and,
3. Use for the interpretation o f a statutory provision in a non-constitutional context.
This approach was essentially a hangover from the various precedents in the
1970's and 80's that led to the overturning o f the exclusionary rule. The first exception
permitted use only for determining the “Constitutional characterization” o f legislation.205
Beaulac regarded this approach as unnecessary for two reasons. The recent jurisprudence
had tended to disregard the difference insofar as the precedents used to justify recourse to
Hansard in any particular case would tend to be from both constitutional and non

201 2010 SCC 21, [2010] 1 SCR 721 [TorStar].
202 Beaulac use the phrase “purpose o f use” to refer to the compartmentalized approach to justifying
recourse to Hansard based on particular Constitutional and non-Constitutional contexts.
203 Beaulac, supra note 7 at 597-600.
204 The Constitution sets out various head o f power which are exclusively federal and provincial. If a law
made by one level o f government is impugned as being an infringement o f the other level o f
government's exclusive head o f power, the courts will embark upon an analysis o f the pith and
substance o f the law (which considers what the law purports to do and what it actually does). See for
example General Motors o f Canada Ltd. v City National Leasing, [1989] 1 SCR 641.
205 Re: Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 112 at 387: “All extrinsic materials filed in this reference ... were
addressed not to the construction o f the terms o f the Anti-Inflation Act, but to its constitutional
characterization”.
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constitutional cases; more importantly, the purpose of use is the same for all o f the
contexts - to determine the intention of Parliament. There is no need to differentiate.206
This particular issue is difficult to address in the 2010 judgments for the simple
reason that the SCC no longer feels the need to justify recourse to legislative history, for
the most part.207 The most direct statement concerning the justification for use of these
extrinsic materials appears in Nemeth v Canada.20* In this unanimous decision, Cromwell
J. stated that “[rjesort to this material is appropriate where, as here, it is relevant and
reliable and provided it is used with caution and not given undue weight”.209 This echoes
earlier decisions like R v Vasil which point to relevance in general as the criterion that
matters.21021As authority for this proposition, Cromwell cites a textbook {Sullivan on the
Construction o f Statutes) and three precedents {Reference re Firearms Act (Can.);
Castillo v Castillo; and Canada 3000 Inc. (Re)).2" This is the most comprehensive
statement concerning the use o f legislative history as extrinsic interpretive aids among the

206 There is room to challenge this point. In the case o f a Constitutional challenge, the issue is whether or
not the statute is permissible, whereas in a non-constitutional case, the issue is merely what a statutory
provision means. In general, the inquiry is more broad in a Constitutional judgment insofar as the
intended meaning and effect o f a number o f provisions will be considered rather than interpretation o f
a provision within a very specific set o f circumstances. Although it is plausible to assert that the actual
role that Hansard plays in both circumstances is identical, there is room for deeper inquiry. Such an
inquiry is beyond the scope o f this discussion.
207 This in itself is a significant finding. It will be elaborated upon in the section on Hansard as a SecondClass Interpretative Means at page 71.
208 Nemeth, supra note 195.
209 Ibid at 46.
210 Vasil, supra note 35.
211 Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction o f Statutes, 5 th ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2008) at 60914; Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), 2000 SCC31 [Firearms], [2000] 1 SCR 783 at para 17; Castillo
v Castillo, 2005 SCC 83, [2005] 3 SCR 870 at para 23 [Castillo]; Canada 3000 Inc. (Re), 2006 SCC
24, [2006] 1 SCR 865 at paras 57-59 [Canada 3000].
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2010 SCC judgments in this study. It is one o f three judgments that cites any authority at
all concerning admissibility.212
Among the cases cited for authority, Firearms concerns the federal-provincial
division o f powers, while the remaining cases involve statutory interpretation in the
absence o f constitutional issues. Beaulac observed the same phenomenon in 1999 where
authorities were cited from different contexts. What is more important, however, is the
unqualified nature o f the statement. It suggests that relevance and reliability are the
criterion that matter when considering legislative history. The purpose o f use does not
matter.
The other two judgments which cite authority for Hansard are COPA and
Lacombe. Both contain nearly identical statements about statutory interpretation, which
hold that recourse to various extrinsic aids including Hansard, are permissible. Both cite
Kitkatla for the proposition that Hansard is admissible as an aid to statutory
interpretation.213
Within these decisions there are no statements which directly suggest any
lingering remnants o f the pre-Rizzo approach. This can be contrasted with 1999 when
there were some statements to that effect. For example, in the 1999 judgment R v G (B),

212 COPA, supra note 50, and Lacombe, supra note 50 cite authority for using Hansard as an extrinsic aid
to interpretation in Court.
213 In COPA, McLachlin CJ. states that “the purpose o f a law may be determined by examining extrinsic
evidence like purposive clauses and the general structure o f the Act, as well as extrinsic evidence, such
as Hansard or other accounts o f the legislative process: Kitkala, at para 53. ” COPA, supra note 50 at
para 18; Kitkatla, supra note 63. In Lacombe, McLachlin CJ. states that “The purpose o f a law may be
determined by examining intrinsic evidence, like purposive clauses and the general structure o f the act.
It may also be determined with reference to extrinsic evidence, such as Hansard or other accounts o f
the legislative process: Kitkatla, at para. 53.” Lacombe, supra note 50 at para 20. Ironically, no
legislative history is used in COPA, although Hansard-like evidence was used in Lacombe. More will
be said about this at 118 . Kitkatla is also an interesting precedent to cite as authority because, as with
COPA, neither legislative history nor any other hansard-like materials were used in that judgment.
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Bastarache J. stated, for the majority, that “[i]n fact, it is settled that when courts are
called upon to consider the constitutionality of an enactment, they may take into account
the parliamentary history, which is generally not the case for the ordinary interpretation of
an enactment.”214
It would appear that the courts have settled on the principle that legislative history
is admissible as an aid to statutory interpretation regardless o f purpose o f use.

(a) The D istribution o f Judgm ents Between C onstitutional and NonC onstitutional Contexts
In Beaulac's study, Hansard was used or discussed in the context of Constitutional
adjucation in six of the thirteen judgments. (There were five Charter analyses and one
division o f powers analysis.) O f the seven judgments that used Hansard in the absence of
Constitutional adjudication, six involved statutory interpretation.215 This means that 46%
o f the references to Hansard were made in the context of pure statutory interpretation in
1999. In 2010, the Hansard was only used for one Charter analysis and three division of
power disputes. In the remaining six decisions, Hansard was involved in statutory
interpretation in the absence of Constitutional issues. This means that 60% o f the
decisions made reference to Hansard in a purely statutory context. These numbers
suggest Hansard use is being split between constitutional and non-constitutional matters.

214 R v GB, supra note 42 in Beaulac, supra note 7 at 589.
215 In the 1999 judgment Dobson, Hansard from the English Parliament was used (unsuccessfully) to
persuade the Court that mothers o f unborn children should be liable for prenatal injuries. This is not a
matter o f statutory interpretation. Meanwhile, it is difficult to categorize the instances o f Hansard use
as Constitutional or non-Constitutional. In TorStar, there was a Charter challenge, but Hansard played
no role in it. Instead, Hansard was used to interpret the Quebec Charter, the Quebec Labour Code and
the Quebec Professional Code. This decision was therefore categorized as a pure statutory
interpretation decision with respect to the role o f Hansard.
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There is no indication o f a tendency for Hansard to be used more in the context of
Constitutional matters or in pure statutory matters.

3.2 The A m biguity Requirem ent
The ambiguity requirement is something o f a winnowing fan based on the plain
meaning rule. The rule (if it is, in fact, a rule) requires some sort o f ambiguity or
uncertainty with respect to the text of a statutory provision in order to justify
consideration o f Hansard and other extrinsic materials. By prohibiting the use of
legislative history when statutory text has an obvious meaning, the number o f cases where
legislative history would be admissible is reduced.
Beaulac points out that this rule is problematic because the determination that the
language in a statute is clear is the result o f interpretation and not a preliminary step to
interpretation.216 In order to decide whether or not there is any uncertainty surrounding the
meaning o f a statutory provision, one must consider the meaning o f text in the context of
the entire statute and the surrounding body o f law, including all relevant information that
sheds light on this context.217
Despite criticism, this rule was established in England in Pepper v Hart.2'*
Textualist judges like Scalia J. often make remarks to this effect, although this rule has
not carried the day in the US Supreme Court.219 The federal Acts Interpretation Act of
216 Sullivan is cited in support o f this point. Beaulac, supra note 7 at 604 ; Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the
Construction o f Statutes, 3rd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 430.
217 “[I]t is illogical and indeed erroneous to require that an enactment be obscure as a preliminary
threshold text to interpretation or, by the same token, as a precondition to invoking parliamentary
debates.” Beaulac, supra note 7 at 604.
218 Pepper, supra note 3. There is some doubt about whether the rule has been followed. See for example,
Michael Healy, supra 144 at 247-250.
219 Several empirical studies have found widespread use o f legislative history over the past 30 years. See
for example, Law & Zaring, supra note 109; also see Patricia M. Wald, “The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use
o f Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term o f the United States Supreme Court”
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Australia provides a nuanced approach which does not exclude legislative history in the
context o f plain statutory language, but limits its use to corroboration in the absence of
ambiguity.220 Put another way, in Australia, it is not permissible to use legislative history
to contradict the plain meaning of a statutory provision.
In 1999, the issue o f whether or not there was an ambiguity requirement was
unsettled, according to Beaulac:
in M. v H., Justice Gonthier expressed the following view in his dissenting
reasons: “Where the statutory language, in the context of the statute as a
whole, is unclear or ambiguous, resort may then be had to other indicia of
legislative intent, such as statements made in the legislature”. Similarly, in
Delisle, Bastarache J. wrote for the majority: “Although extrinsic sources
may be used to interpret legislation and to determine its true meaning,
when the meaning of the challenged provision is clear, they are o f little
assistance”. In Baker, however, the court explicitly stated that the term
“inappropriate” in s. 4(b) o f the [Federal Child Support] Guidelines
suffered no ambiguity, but nevertheless proceeded to examine in some
detail the enactment's parliamentary debates to support the given
interpretation.221

In the 2010 judgments, there is a decided absence of comment about the
admissibility o f legislative history. However there are judgments where legislative history
was considered to assist with the interpretation o f statutory text that was relatively clear

(1990) 39 Am U L Rev 279. Some studies have found a decline in references to legislative history in
the 1980’s. See for example Michael H. Koby, “The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on
Legislative History: The Impact o f Justice Scalia’s Critique” (1990) 36 Harv J Legis 369.
220 Acts Interpretation Act, supra note 4. It should be noted that Beaulac kept his discussion o f the
ambiguity requirement and the corroboration requirement separate. He only discussed the rule against
using Hansard to contradict statutory text in the context o f legislative history as an autonomous
interpretative means.
221 Beaulac, supra note 7 at 601-602. Note that “Baker” refers to M v H, supra note 184. None o f these
statements clearly enunciate an ambiguity requirement. Although Beaulac does not address this point
directly, the wording is such that it could be construed as implying that there is an ambiguity
requirement. Based on the (admittedly very remote) possibility that the words could be interpreted in
such a manner, there is a slight lacking o f clarity. This issue is hotly debated elsewhere, and as a result,
it is significant in Canada.
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and uncontroversial, and this suggests that the SCC has settled the matter in favour of no
ambiguity requirement.
Syndicat de la fonction publique du Québec v Quebec (Attorney General) is an
excellent example.222 One o f the key points o f law in this case concerned the impact o f s
93 o f the Act respecting labour standards which states that “[i]n an agreement or decree,
any provision that contravenes a labour standard or that is inferior thereto is absolutely
null.”223 Based on a literal interpretation o f this provision, clause 4-14.28 of the collective
agreement, which precluded part-time and seasonal employees from filing a grievance in
contravention o f express provisions o f the ARLS, was “deemed unwritten” leaving the
provision setting out the grievance procedure to apply.224 Deschamps J. did not agree with
this reasoning and turned to Hansard as well as provisions of the Quebec Labour Code to
demonstrate that the legislature did not intend for arbitrators to have exclusive jurisdiction
over labour disputes involving unionized employees in Quebec. She argued that exclusive
jurisdiction was the result o f the majority's interpretation of s 93.22526Arguably, Deschamps
J. was using Hansard to justify an interpretation that strayed from the apparent plain
meaning o f a statutory provision.
Another case where Hansard was referred to with respect to relatively straight
forward statutory language was Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v Canada.™ At issue was
the mandatory publication ban o f bail hearings at the request of the accused under s 517

222 Syndicat, supra note 50.
223 Act respecting labour standards, RSQ, c N -l .1 \ARLS\\ quoted from ibid at para 40.
224 Syndicat, supra note 50 at para 50.
225 IbidsX 115.
226 Syndicat, supra note 50.
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o f the Criminal Code?21 The wording of the provision was uncontroversial, yet recourse
was made to the legislative history to uncover its purpose.227228 In the wake of the Ouimet
Report, the relevant provision had been enacted with only a discretionary ban in 1971.229
The mandatory ban at the request of the accused, which was recommended in the report,
was enacted in a subsequent amendment in 1976. The Court noted that the legislative
history provided absolutely no information about why the recommendation was not
included in the initial amendment and why Parliament chose to do so later on.230 This
judgment settled two different cases, one from Alberta, and the other from Ontario. The
delay in the enactment and the absence o f information about it in Hansard was noted by
Dumo J. for the Ontario Superior Court, and by Booker J. for the Court o f Queen's
Bench for Alberta.231
In R v Morelli, Hansard was used to elaborate on the purpose of s 163(4.1) o f the
Criminal Code which stipulates that anyone who “accesses ... child pornography” is
guilty o f an offense.232 It was enacted to catch cases o f Internet downloading where it
might be difficult to prove possession. As with the other decisions discussed, not a word

227 Criminal Code , RSC 1985, c C-46.
228 It might be more accurate to say that Hansard was being used to link a provision in the Criminal Code
with the purposes enunciated in a 1969 committee report. This issue will be discussed in the section
entitled Shoehoming at 82.
229 Canada, Report o f the Canadian Committee on Corrections — Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and
Corrections, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969) [Ouimet Report].
230 TorStar,; supra note 201 at 29.
231 R v Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., 2007 CanLII 6249 (ON SC) at 16 “However, in 1972, the Bail
Reform Act was enacted, with a discretionary ban, regardless o f who sought the ban at the bail hearing.
In 1976, the section was amended to provide for the current wording, a mandatory ban upon
application o f the accused, and discretionary if sought by the prosecution. Counsel were unable to
provide any reference in Hansard or other documentation to explain why the Ouimet Report
recommendation was not enacted in 1972, or why it was in 1976; R v White, 2007 ABQB 359 at 28:
“These amendments were not debated in Parliament.”
232 Morelli, supra note 198.
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is said about admissibility or restrictions in any manner that suggested an ambiguity
requirement.
Within these three judgments, Hansard was considered in the context o f relatively
plain language. When judges dissented (and there was dissent in all three o f these cases,)
the use o f Hansard in the absence o f ambiguity was never criticized. Instead, they focused
their dissent on other aspects o f the decision. Given these examples and the general
absence o f comment about admissibility in the 2010 judgments, it would appear that
recourse to legislative history is presumed to be acceptable at the SCC even in the
absence o f ambiguity.
The final point with respect to the ambiguity requirement concerns one o f the
authorities cited to justify recourse to legislative history in Nemeth. On behalf o f a
unanimous court, Cromwell J. cites paragraph 23 o f Castillo:
The appellant contends that where the plain language of a legislative
provision is clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence o f legislative
intent should not be admissible. I do not find the ordinary meaning of s.
12 to be clear and unambiguous. I would also question whether statutory
interpretation should ever proceed solely on the basis o f the plain
language o f the legislation, without consideration of the entire context,
including the purpose and the scheme o f the Act. In approving of
Professor Driedger’s approach to statutory interpretation, Iacobucci J.
recognized that “statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the
wording o f the legislation alone” (Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes, at para. 21; see
also R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction o f Statutes
(4th ed. 2002), at pp. 9-18). It is now well accepted that legislative history,
Parliamentary debates and similar material may be quite properly
considered as long as they are relevant and reliable and not assigned
undue weight: Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 SCR 783, 2000
SCC 31, at para. 17.
This quote is from a concurring opinion by Bastarache J., for a court that is unanimous
with respect to the outcome, but not entirely on the reasons. Yet, it has the endorsement of

70
a unanimous court in Nemeth. Meanwhile, it says explicitly what the court appears to be
doing in 2010. There is no ambiguity requirement. There is no compartmentalized
approach. There is only a principled approach to legislative history which treats such
materials as admissible where relevant and reliable, and the usefulness of the materials is
assessed in the circumstances o f each case.

3.3 A utonom ous Interpretative M eans
This criterion concerns whether or not legislative history is a subordinate evidence
o f statutory meaning relative to other extrinsic aids like dictionaries, statutes in related
areas o f law, and canons o f interpretation. The most common ways to relegate legislative
history to the status o f a second class interpretive method is by requiring corroboration, or
by only permitting such materials to confirm but not to contradict the meaning of
statutory text. Whenever this material is confined to a narrow scope o f use in comparison
to other extrinsic aids, legislative history is being denied status as an autonomous
interpretative means.
Beaulac argued that “these materials are no different than other interpretive
elements extrinsic to the enactment” and that as long as appropriate weight is given to
these materials, there is no reason to treat legislative history differently.233
Beaulac's study revealed some inconsistency among the 1999 decisions on this
point. In R v Gladue, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. stated that, although not decisive, such
materials “are nonetheless helpful, particularly insofar as they corroborate and do not
contradict the meaning and purpose to be derived upon a reading o f the words o f the
provision”.234 Beaulac also cites the 1997 decision of Construction Gilles Paquette Itee v
233 Beaulac, supra note 7 at 607.
234 Gladue, supra note 189; also see Beaulac, ibid at 606.
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Entreprises Végo liée.235As discussed earlier, this is the authority cited in M alenfant. In
this decision, Hansard was used to “confirm that the interpretation given was correct”.236
Beaulac also cites “Bastarache J.'s concurrence in M v H which states that, although
legislative history is often helpful, “the ultimate standard ... is the provisions of the
legislation itself’.237
Beaulac could be accused o f overreaching on this point. These statements could
be rather innocuous statements about the usefulness o f Hansard (or the lack thereof) in
the particular instance rather than a statement about the circumstances that restrict the
use o f Hansard. Indeed, Justice Bastarache's statement in M v H appears to be an
insistence upon the primacy o f statutory language rather than an attempt to subjugate the
role o f Hansard. The text o f the statute is what Parliament enacted and nothing else. It
deserves the privileged position as that which is the subject of interpretation, while all
other tools o f interpretation are supplementary to it.
However, given the efforts in several nations to restrict Hansard to the role of
supporting and not contradicting language that has a plain meaning, it is reasonable to
scrutinize judgments for language that might contain the raw materials from which such
a rule could be constructed.238 Meanwhile, answering the question o f whether or not
Hansard is treated as an equal among extrinsic interpretive aids involves more than
235 Supra note 190 at para 20.
236 Supra note 189.
237 Beaulac, supra note 7 at 606; M v H, supra note 184.
238 As stated in Chapter 2, several US states, and all jurisdictions but one in Australia have legislated a
plain meaning rule that confines the role o f Hansard. The UK has a judicially created plain meaning
restriction. In 2000 the Irish Law Commission recommended an amendment to the Irish Interpretation
Act which confined the use o f Hansard to statutory text that was ambiguous or brought about absurd
results, and only if it corroborated a meaning that can be “gathered from the Act as a whole”. See Law
Reform Commission Report, supra note 172 at 70. It is therefore necessary to look very closely at this
issue in Canada, even though it might seem obvious at first glance that there is no restriction.
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scrutiny for restrictions in the context of plain meaning. It is a deeper question that points
to some surprising changes in the way that legislative history is being used by the SCC.
The issue o f Hansard as an autonomous interpretative means can be broken down
into two sub-issues. First, is this material treated as subordinate to other interpretive
tools? Second, is this material used as a stand-alone interpretive tool?
The first sub-issue is addressed in the following section titled “Legislative
History as a Second-Class Interpretative Means.” The second sub-issue concerning the
use o f Hansard in the absence o f corroborating extrinsic materials will be discussed later
in a section titled “Hansard as a Stand-alone Intepretative Means.”

(a) Legislative H istory as a Second-C lass Interpretative M eans
Based on the instances of use in 2010, it appears that the judges at the SCC treat
Hansard as an equal to all other extrinsic interpretive aids. As Syndicat demonstrates,
there is no requirement that the evidence must support and not contradict the plain
meaning o f text in order for it to be useful. However, changes in the way the court cites
authority for extrinsic materials between 1999 and 2010 reveal a more subtle and
powerful change injudicial behaviour towards legislative history.
The cases of Lacombe, COPA and Nemeth represent the total number of
decisions o f the SCC in 2010 where any authority is cited that justifies the use of
legislative history. In terms of numbers, there has been a relatively minor change in the
Court's tendency to cite authority in comparison to 1999. In 1999 there were five
decisions citing authority for recourse to legislative history. Given the larger number of
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cases in 1999, the change is negligible.239 However, a closer inspection reveals that there
has been a substantial change with respect to citing authority if Hansard is distinguished
from other more unusual types o f extrinsic aids. O f the five decisions where authority
was cited in 1999, four involved Hansard in its archetypical form, quotes of statements
made by members in the House o f Assembly, while the fifth likely involved Hansard or
something very closely related to it.240 In 2010, only one o f the cases involved Hansard.
In the second case, no extrinsic materials were considered, and in the third case, the
authority was used to justify a very unusual type of extrinsic evidence. By this measure,
authority was cited for one o f ten cases in 2010 as compared with four and potentially
five o f thirteen cases in 1999. The numbers speak very clearly: Hansard is presumed to
be admissible. Authority is not required to justify its use in court.
Furthermore, the three judgments in 2010 represent the total number of judgments
in which general statements were made about the usefulness o f legislative history
materials. This too marks a departure from 1999 where six judgments contained
discussion about the use o f legislative history in general, however brief.241 In all, eight
judgments either cited authority for recourse to legislative history, or made a comment
about the use o f legislative history in general, or both.242 The shift away from citing
authority and commenting on the use of legislative history suggests that the SCC has
239 5 o f 13 cases in 1999 amounts to 38%. 3 o f 10 cases in 2010 amounts to 30.%. Given such a small
number o f cases in the data set, this difference could easily be regarded as insignificant.
240 Francis, supra note 181; Malenfant, supra note 185; R v GB, supra note 42; Gladue, supra note 189.
All involved quotes o f statements by MLAs. In Davis, supra note 187, some sort o f evidence from the
legislative history was put forward, but the evidence was rejected as unhelpful, and Lamer did not feel
the need to reveal its precise nature.
241 Gladue, M v H , R v GB, supra note 42, Delisle, supra note 62, Perron and Davis contained general
comments about the use o f legislative history.
242 Four judgments cite precedents to justify recourse to legislative history: Francis, supra note 181;
Malenfant, supra note 185; Davis, supra note 187; and KMart, supra note 190. In R v GB, supra note
188 a textbook is cited to justify recourse to legislative history.
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grown to accept legislative history. The judges no longer feel that justification or
comment is necessary.
It is difficult to find any evidence that legislative history was regarded as
inherently problematic in 2010. Based on the judgments, it was considered on its merits
when it was presented. It was included without qualification in the judgment alongside
the traditional methods o f interpretation like precedents, canons o f interpretation, related
statutes, etc.. It would appear that legislative history was not regarded as a second-class
interpretive tool in 2010. It was merely one of the various interpretive aids available to
litigants and judges alike when a legal problem involving statutory interpretation was
presented in court.

(b) E xplicit R ejection o f H ansard
Before considering Hansard as a stand-alone interpretive tool, there is another
aspect about the SC C s treatment o f legislative history which deserves attention. In 1999
there were four cases where Hansard was cited and discussed but the decision did not
concur with the interpretation suggested by the Hansard.243 In 2010, a very different
approach was taken. With one sole exception, judges did not comment on Hansard or
legislative history with the express purpose o f rejecting it. Instead, silence was the
preferred approach when the evidence was regarded as unpersuasive. This pattern
becomes all the more obvious when the various majority and dissenting opinions are
243 In Dobson, supra note 180, Cory J. discusses a passage from the UK Parliament and the point o f law
that the evidence was intended to support was denied. In Law, supra note 182 at para 97, Cory and
Iacobucci JJ. reject the notion that the impugned legislation was founded upon stereotypical
presumptions. In Davis, supra note at 50, Lamer J. notes that the Hansard and Committee Reports
provide no useful information with respect to the issue in need o f resolution. In Delisle, supra note 62,
legislative history materials including Orders-In-Council were presented to impugn the purpose o f
demonstrate the purpose o f the Public Service Staff Relations Act, RSC, 1985, c P-35 [ASS7?/f]. At para
20 L’Heureux-Dub6 J., for the majority, discusses the Orders-In-Council and decides that they are
irrelevant since they were revoked before the PSSRA was enacted.
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compared. For example, in Morelli, Fish J. for the majority finds some quotes from
Hansard to be helpful in determining the legislative intent of s 163.1(4) o f the Criminal
Code and therefore makes reference to the materials. In her dissent, Deschamps J. makes
no reference to the materials, even when citing and analyzing Fish J.'s opinion to point
out his reasons for disagreeing with them.244
The following tables show the pattern. The first pair of columns indicate whether
or not an opinion made reference to Hansard. For opinions that made reference to
Hansard, the second pair o f columns indicate whether or not the decision concurred with
the Hansard for the particular reason(s) for which it was put forward. It is this second
pair o f columns that tracks the phenomenon, and in particular, it is the column furthest to
the right that tracks the relevant phenomenon. This column points out all judgments
where Hansard was discussed but the opinion did not concur. Note the number of
opinions that do not concur with the Hansard in 1999 compared with 2010.

244 Morelli, supra note 198.
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Table # 1: Opinions Referring to Hansard for Support in 1999

1999 Judgm ents

Hansard
C onsiderd

D e c isio n
Concurred

Yes

Yes

No

No

D e l i s l e v . C a n a d a (D e p u ty A tto r n e y G e n e r a l)

Bastarache (majority)
Cory & lacobucci (dissent)
L'Heureux-Dube (concurring)

X
X

X
X

X

D o b s o n ( L it ig a t io n G u a r d ia n o f) v . D o b so n

Cory (majority)
Major (dissent)

X

X
X

F r a n c is v . B a k e r

Bastarache (unanimous)

X

X

L a w v. C a n a d a ( M in is t e r o f E m p lo y m e n t an d I m m ig r a tio n )

lacobucci (unanimous)

X

X

M .v . H.

Cory & lacobucci (majority)
Gonthier (dissent)
Major (concurring)
Bastarache (concurring)

X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

P e r r o n -M a le n fa n t v . M a le n fa n t (T r u ste e of)

Gonthier (unanimous)
R . v . B e a u la c

Bastarache (majority)
Lamer & Binnie (dissent)

X

X
X

R . v. D a v is

Lamer (unanimous)

X

X

R . v. G . (B .)

Bastarache (majority)
McLachlin (minority)

X

X
X

R . v. G la d u e

Cory & lacobucci (unanimous)

X

X

X

X

U .F .C .W ., L o c a l 1 5 1 8 v. K M a rt C an ad a

Cory (unanimous)
W in k o v. B r it is h C o lu m b ia ( F o r e n s ic P s y c h ia t r ic In s titu te )

McLachlin (majority)
Gonthier (dissent)

X

X
X

M & D F a r m L td . v. M a n ito b a A g r ic u ltu r a l C r e d it C o r p .

Binnie (unanimous)

X

X
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Table #2 - Opinions Referring to Hansard for Support in 2010

2010 Judgm ents

Hansard
Considerd

D ecision
Concurred

Yes

Yes

No

No

Q u eb ec (A tto r n e y G e n e r a l) v. L acom b e

McLachlin CJ. (majority)
Deschamps J. (dissenting)

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

C e n tu r y S e r v ic e s In c. v. C anada (A tto r n e y G e n e r a l)

Deschamps J. (majority)
Abella J. (dissenting)

X

R e fe r e n c e r e A ssiste d H um an R e p r o d u c tio n A ct

McLachlin J. (split)
LeBel & DesChamps JJ. (split)
Cromwell J. (controlling)

X
X

X
X

R . v. M o r e l li

Fish J. (majority)
Deschamps J. (dissenting)

X

X
X

C anada (A tto r n e y G e n e r a l) v. T e le Z o n e Inc.

Binnie J. (unanimous)

X

X

X

X

N ém eth v. C anad a (J u s tic e )

C rom w ell J (unanimous)
T o r o n to S ta r N e w sp a p e r s Ltd. v. C anada

Deschamps J. (Majority)
Abella J. (dissenting)
G lo b e and M a il v. C anada (A tto r n e y G e n e r a l)
L eB el J. (unanimous)

X

X
X

X

X

S y n d ica t de la fo n c tio n p u b liq u e du Q u éb ec v. Q u eb ec (A .G .)

LeBel J. (majority)
Deschamps J.(dissenting)

X
X

X

Note that the only opinion in 2010 that makes reference to Hansard that is not
regarded as probative is the majority opinion by Deschamps J. in Century.2*5 Presumably
these materials were submitted by the litigants and were therefore appropriate targets for
judicial comment. Ironically, in Lacombe, McLachlin CJ. and Deschamps J. cite the
same Hansard-like evidence to reach the opposite conclusion. Both claim to find the
evidence compelling. This pattern runs through the 2010 decisions. Generally, judges
will only mention legislative history in support of points to be made in their opinions.
Re AHRA provides another instructive example.245246 In this decision there is a
strong disagreement between McLachlin CJ. on the one hand, and LeBel and Deschamps
JJ. on the other, who each write opinions for a 4-4 split, leaving Cromwell J. with the
245 Century, supra note 193.
246 Re AHRA, supra note 50.
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controlling opinion. At issue is whether it is acceptable for criminal laws (under federal
jurisdiction) to restrict medical practitioners by way o f a licencing scheme with respect
to assisted human reproduction (eg. in vitro fertilization) and stem cell research. The
regulation o f professions is exclusively a provincial matter while criminal law is
exclusively federal.247 In her reasons, McLachlin CJ. makes reference to a particularly
significant Commission report, but in all other respects, her reasoning is decidedly
textualist in nature, relying almost entirely on precedents and the text o f the impugned
statute.248
In contrast, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. make extensive use o f an entire laundry list
o f legislative history materials including four Hansard citations, three citations o f
Evidence o f the Standing Committee on Health, six Bills (five o f which died on the order
paper), “an affidavit filed in evidence during the hearing in the Court o f Appeal, Francine
Manseau, Senior Strategic Policy Advisor, Assisted Human Reproduction
Implementation Office, Department of Health Canada” (concerning the mandate she was
given by the Minister o f Health) and a news release from Health Canada (as evidence of

247 The Canadian Constitution, supra note 55, s. 91(27): “The Criminal Law, except the Constitution o f
Courts o f Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters.”
248 Canada, Proceed with Care: Final Report o f the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies
(Ottawa: Minister o f Government Services Canada, 1993) [Baird Report].
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“a moratorium on certain reproductive technologies and practices”).249 This opinion
leaned heavily on legislative history and on the Baird Report, in particular.250
McLachlin CJ. criticizes the reasoning of LeBel and Deschamps JJ. because “it
treats the Baird Report as proof of the purpose behind the Assisted Human Reproduction
Act.”251 In effect, she is accusing LeBel and Descamps of giving too much weight to the
report. In response, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. argue that:

249 House o f Commons Debates, 37th Pari, 1st Sess, voi 137, No 188(21 May 2002); House o f Commons
Debates , 37th Pari, 1st Sess, vol 137, No 192 (27 May 2002); House o f Commons Debates , 37th Pari,
2nd Sess, vol 138, N o 047 (28 January 2003); House o f Commons Debates, 37th Pari, 2nd Sess, vol
138, N o 072, (18 March 2003) at 4335; House o f Commons, Evidence o f the Standing Committee on
Health, 37th Pari, 1st Sess (3 May 2001), online:
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?
DocId=1040776&Mode=::l&Parl=37&Ses=l&Language=E.>;
House o f Commons, Evidence o f the Standing Committee on Health, 37th Pari, 1st Sess, (17 May
2001), online: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/ Publication.aspx?
DocId:=1040839&Language=E&Mode=l &Parl=37&Ses=l>;
House o f Commons, Evidence o f the Standing Committee on Health, 37th Pari, 2nd Sess, No 013 (9
December 2002), online: ,http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?
DocId=628385&Language=E&Mode= 1&Parl=37&Ses=2>;

supra note 183 at paras 161-163:
“Several bills were introduced before the AHR Act. They can be divided into two groups.
The scope o f the first group o f bills was limited to the prohibition o f certain activities:
Bill C-47, An Act respecting human reproductive technologies and commercial
transactions relating to human reproduction, 2nd Sess, 35th Pari., 1996; Bill C-247, An
Act to amend the Criminal Code (genetic manipulation), 1st Sess, 36th Pari., 1997; Bill
C-336, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (genetic manipulation), 1st Sess, 37th Pari.,
2001. The second group o f bills purported to regulate certain activities associated with
assisted human reproduction and to create an agency that was to be responsible for
administering the Act. The purpose o f each o f the bills in the second group was to
implement both the recommendations o f the Baird Report: Bill C-56, An Act respecting
assisted human reproduction, 1st Sess, 37th Pari., 2001-2; Bill C-13, An Act respecting
assisted human reproduction, 2nd Sess, 37th Pari., 2002.
All five o f these bills died on the Order Paper at the end o f the sessions o f Parliament in
which they were introduced.
Finally, Bill C-6 respecting assisted human reproduction and related research, the source
o f the current legislation, was introduced on February 11, 2004.”

Supra note 183 at para 177; Health Canada, N ews Release 1995-57, “Health Minister Calls for
Moratorium on Applying Nine Reproductive Technologies” (27 July 1995).
250 Supra note 183 at para 177, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. state that “[i]n sum, the substantive and formal
distinctions between controlled activities and activities that are prohibited completely stem from the
legislative history, from the nature o f the activities and from how they are presented in the AHR Act.”
251 ¡bid at 29.
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The Chief Justice interprets the AHR Act very differently. She disregards
its legislative history, even criticizing us for attaching importance to the
Baird Report. She takes no account o f the distinction the Commission
drew in its report between prohibited activities and controlled activities. In
this regard, she asserts that the fact that the Commission recognized the
positive aspects of assisted human reproduction does not mean that
Parliament shared the Commission's concerns. We can only emphasize
that there is no factual basis whatsoever for the Chief Justice's
interpretation. Her approach is contrary to the usual approach to
constitutional analysis.252
It is interesting that the entire disagreement was couched on the language of weight; the
notion o f admissibility o f the legislative history was not questioned. This is the approach
that Beaulac advocated in 2000. Within this evolution, the judges have settled on the
practice o f only commenting on those elements of legislative history that they feel have
weight. The materials will only be discussed in an opinion if the judge concurs with the
point supported by the materials.
The claim that the “usual approach to constitutional analysis” involves a
circumspect consideration of all available information surrounding the impugned
enactment shows how far the court has come with respect to legislative history. For
LeBel and Deschamps JJ., it is regarded as normal, at least in the context of
Constitutional analysis. The fact that one Supreme Court Justice would fault another for
disregarding legislative history is equally revealing.253
252 Supra note 183 at para 177.
253 This point could be used to argue for a compartmentalized approach with respect to legislative history,
but in the opposite sense that was discussed by Beaulac, i.e. that in Constitutional cases there is a
heightened need to consider such evidence. This decision represents the only explicit evidence for this,
and it is in a split decision. The controlling decision by Cromwell J. does not cite any legislative
history, and none o f the paragraphs by LeBel and Deschamps JJ. that he claims to agree with contain
any references to legislative history. Meanwhile the Court has demonstrated an equal willingness to
consider all manner o f legislative history materials in the context o f non-constitutional cases. The
notion that there is a different treatment o f these materials based on category is not compelling. There
is, o f course, a difference in the type o f information about a statute that is relevant in the context o f
Constitutional analysis because o f the nature o f such an inquiry, which involves a more general
assessment o f the purpose and practical effect rather than determining the meaning o f a provision with
respect to a particular set o f facts. There might be a difference in treatment that arises out o f this. Such
an inquiry is beyond the scope o f this study, and would make for an interesting study.
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Based on the various factors discussed above, it would appear that legislative
history is far from a second-class interpretative means. It is considered on its merits in
the circumstances o f each case. When it is found to be compelling it will appear in the
judge's opinion, and when it is found to be unconvincing, it is disregarded.

(c) H ansard as a Stand-A lone Interpretative M eans
In his study, Beaulac argued that Hansard should be an equal among interpretive
aids, however, he did not stop there. He insisted that Hansard should “constitute an
autonomous and prime weapon in the court's arsenal”.254 The concept of Hansard as a
primary tool o f interpretation suggests that Hansard should literally be able to stand
alone. It should be acceptable to rely upon a single (appropriate) quote from Hansard to
justify a particular interpretation of a statutory provision without the support of
corroborating evidence o f intention. The analysis of this criterion is another area where a
comparison between the 1999 and 2010 decisions exposes a significant change in the
judicial treatment o f Hansard.
With the other issues dealt with thus far, Hansard and other materials that
comprise the legislative history have been treated as a collective whole, more or less. It
should be noted that Hansard is the sole concern here, which includes transcripts of
proceedings both in the legislative assembly and committees for the purposes o f this
study. The question is simply this: Can transcripts of proceedings be used as an aid to
interpretation without the corroboration o f other extrinsic aids?
In 1999 there were several instances where Hansard was cited to support a
particular point without any other piece o f extrinsic material that concurred on that point.
254 Beaulac, supra note 7 at 609.

82
For example, in R v GB, a quote by the then Minister o f Justice was used to show that s
672.21(3)(/) o f the Criminal Code, which permits the use o f an otherwise inadmissible
statement to be used to challenge the credibility of an accused, was an attempt by
Parliament to balance between the need to learn the truth against the need to protect the
accused.255 There was no further extrinsic evidence provided for this point. This also
occured in M & D Farms.256 A statement by the Ministry o f Agriculture was used to
determine the purpose behind the Farm Debt Review Act, and this assessment was
supported primarily through an examination of various provisions o f the Act without any
other extrinsic evidence.257 Similarly, in U.F.C. W, Local 1518 v KMart Canada, a quote
made before the B.C. Legislature was used to support an interpretation o f purpose o f the
B.C. Labour Relations Code, again with no other legislative history materials.258 This
also occurred in Law v Canada and in Francis v Baker}59
This method of citing a single passage from Hansard, accompanied only by
jurisprudence and statutory text was found in only two decisions of the 2010 judgments
in this study.260 In all other cases, there were either multiple references to Hansard under
different dates and at different stages o f a Bill's consideration, or there were references to
other pieces o f extrinsic evidence. It would appear, therefore that, although legislative
history has come to be treated just like any other interpretive aid, the judges have come
to prefer the shotgun approach to justifying the various points made in their opinions.

255 R v G 5, supra note 42 at para 39; Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
256 Supra note 178 at para 19.
257 Farm Debt Review Act, RSC, 1985, c 25 (2nd Supp); Supra note 178.
258 KMart, supra note 190 at para 60; Labour Relations Code , SBC 1992, c 82.
259 Law, supra note 182 at paras 8 & 97; Francis, supra note 181 atpara38.
260 Morelli, supra note 187; Syndicate supra note 50.
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The surgical strike where statutory text is quoted and elaborated upon with a single
Ministerial utterance is out o f favour.261
One excellent example o f the shotgun approach is Telezone.262 In this case, the
authority o f provincial superior courts to hear cases involving tort and contractual
liability against the Crown was challenged. The history o f the provision in the Federal
Court Act which initially granted exclusive jurisdiction for civil cases to the federal court
was elaborated upon, including the subsequent amendment which permitted concurrent
jurisdiction over contractual and tort-based claims, using quotes from Hansard.263
Although no other type o f extrinsic aid was consulted, there were three separate quotes
cited including a lengthy paragraph from the House o f Commons Debates in 1971, a
paragraph from the House o f Commons Debates in 1989 as well as a passage from the
Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence o f the Legislative Committee on Bill C-38.

(d) Shoehorning
With respect to the use of Hansard in the judgments considered, there are, loosely
speaking, two ways that Hansard is being used. It can be used as a stand-alone piece of
evidence insofar as it is not directly related to other pieces of evidence put forward in
support o f a particular point, or it can be used to inject some other extrinsic aid, like a
committee report, into the law-making process by demonstrating that this extrinsic item

261 There is the possibility that in 1999 it simply turned out that there were no second or third references in
support o f a particular interpretive issue and that more references would have been presented if such
references had been available. Nonetheless, the difference between the 1999 and 2010 judgments is
quite striking on this point. Single references to Hansard were common in 1999 without the support o f
other extrinsic materials whereas Hansard was almost always accompanied by corroborating extrinsic
materials in 2010.
262 Telezone, supra note at 192.
263 Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7.
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was “on the minds” o f the MLAs. This particular strategic use of Hansard will be
referred to as “shoehoming”.
An early Canadian example of shoehoming occurred in R v Vasil.264 At issue was
the phrase “unlawful object” in s 212(c) o f the Criminal Code. Lamer J. noted that the
wording o f the text was identical to the English Draft Code.26526The reasons for choosing
this particular phrase was explained in the “British Commissioner's Report”, and
Hansard was used to show that the members of the Canadian Parliament deliberately
chose to use the English Draft Code and that they were aware o f the the British
Commissioner's Report and indeed discussed the report in the House. Thus Hansard is
literally used to legitimize the Commissioner's Report.
As Vasil shows, shoehoming is a long-standing practice at the SCC. However,
among the cases in this study, this practice is much more common in 2010 than it was in
1999. The only case where shoehoming appears in 1999 is in M v H, where Hansard
quotes were used to show that the legislators were motivated to reform the support
provisions in the Ontario Family Law Act for reasons cited in a 1975 Law Commission
Report}66
In 2010, there were a number of cases where Hansard was used to show that the
law-makers relied directly upon a report when enacting and amending legislation. In Re

264 Vasil, supra note 35.
265 English Draft Code , supra note 133.
266 Supra note 185 at paras 85-94; Family Law Act, 1986, SO 1986, c 4; Ontario, Law Reform
Commission, Report on Family Law, Part VI, “Support Obligations” (Toronto: Ministry o f the
Attorney General, 1975). It should be noted that M v H is not a classic example o f shoehoming.
Hansard was being used in a more subtle way to reinforce the reasoning rather than to directly prove
that the Minister drew directly from the report.
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AHRA, the Baird Report became the centre of attention for the 4-4 split between LeBel
and Deschamps JJ. and McLachlin CJ., as explained previously.267
In Nemeth, three excerpts from Hansard (including statements by the
Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government and another elected member
whose title and relationship to the legislation is not stated) were used in conjunction with
statements by a civil servant, the General Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section,
Department o f Justice, from the Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence o f the Standing
Committee on Justice and Human Rights.268 The express purpose o f these quotes was to
show that the legislators were aware of, and based amendments to the Extradition Act on
the UN Model Treaty on Extradition and the Extradition Convention for the purpose of
fulfilling Canada's international obligations with respect to non-refoulement.269
In TorStar, the Ouimet Report was the government document which
recommended a mandatory publication ban on bail proceedings at the request o f the
accused.270 The trial court judges all found it puzzling that the initial amendments to the
Criminal Code which occurred following the report, and which were largely in
267 Supra note 183. Between the Chief Justice and LeBel and Deschamps JJ. the Baird Report is referred
to, discussed and cited 23 times. Ironically, while he is in substantial agreement with LeBel and
Deschamps JJ. concerning the outcome, Cromwell J. disagrees with their reasons. “I respectfully
disagree with the results proposed both by the Chief Justice and by Justices LeBel and Deschamps.” at
282; “I part company with my colleagues at the first step o f the constitutional analysis” at 284.
Cromwell J. makes no reference to the Baird Report.
268 Nemeth, supra note 50 at paras 83-84; House o f Commons Debates, 36th Pari, 1st Sess, vol 135, No
162 (30 November 1998) at 10591-92 & 10595; House o f Commons, Minutes o f Proceedings and
Evidence o f the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 36th Pari, 1st Sess, (17 November
1998), at 11:45, 12:05; House o f Commons, Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence o f the Standing
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 36th Pari, 1st Sess, (5 November 1998), at 17:10.
269 Refoulement is the the “direct or indirect removal o f refugees to a territory where they run a risk o f
being subjected to human rights violations. "Nemeth, ibid at paras 19, 81-86; Extradition Act, S.C.
1999, c. 18 [EA]\ Model Treaty on Extradition, GA res 45/116, UNGAOR 68th plen mtg, Supp No
49A, UN Doc A/45/49 (1990) [Model Treaty]', European Convention on Extradition, 13 December
1957, Eur TS N o 24, Art. 3(2) [European Convention].
270 Ouimet Report, supra note 231.
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accordance with the recommendations o f the report, did not include the mandatory
publication ban, but left the ban subject to judicial discretion. The amendment enacting
the mandatory ban occurred four years later. This is a case which cried out for
shoehoming, yet there was no direct statement in the record which explained why the
particular recommendation was not followed in 1971 and why it was enacted in 1976.
The statements by the then Minister o f Justice were quoted merely to provide an
explanation for the reasons behind amendments to the bail process in general.271 As well,
a statement was used to demonstrate that the Minister had argued for mandatory
publication bans for preliminary inquiries.272
There can be little doubt that the Ouimet Report was central to the drafting o f Bill
C-218. Indeed, when the Bill was being introduced to the House on February 5, 1971, the
Hon. Robert McCleave (an opposition member) said the following: “I refer to the remedy
that appears in the Ouimet Report, which is the backbone o f this measure we are

271 TorStar.; supra note 201 at 13: “The new legislation was promoted as protecting individual rights. John
Turner, the then Minister o f Justice, declared in the House o f Commons:
I said that as soon as we could, I intended to turn once again along the road o f law reform
and continuing enhancement and protection o f civil liberties.. . . This bill is directed at
making that first contact between citizens and the criminal judicial process less abrasive.
(House o f Commons Debates, vol. Ill, 3rd Sess., 28th Pari., February 5, 1971, at pp. 311314)”.
272 Ibid at 31: “Furthermore, mandatory publication bans were not unknown at the time o f the Ouimet
Report. For instance, s. 539 Cr. C. requires that a ban on the publication o f evidence adduced at a
preliminary inquiry be ordered should the accused apply for one. That ban was discussed by the
Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs. Minister Turner justified it as follows:
We are not talking about a situation o f legitimate publicity at an open trial once the jury is
empanelled. If the evidence at the preliminary inquiry is then brought into the trial it
becomes part o f the evidence o f the trial. What we are trying to prevent is a preliminary
pre-trial by newspaper prior to the time that a magistrate may have bound a man over for
trial. He may find that the charges are dismissed but the damage has been done.
(Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, No. 11, 1st Sess., 28th Pari., March 18, 1969, at pp. 501-2)
These comments go beyond averting jury bias. They address the broader goal o f protecting the right to a
fair trial.”
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considering today”.273 Mr. McCleave was criticizing the Bill because it did not follow the
Report's recommendation to create a central registry. This was not discussed in the
judgment. However, the wording of the mandatory publication ban enacted in 1976 was
almost identical to the wording recommended in the Report, and this fact did have some
import. Ironically, therefore, this case does not provide a clear-cut example of
shoehoming, but it is a case where the Hansard quote was relatively unimportant,
whereas the commission report was significant. Meanwhile it was a case where the trial
court judges decried the absence of Hansard for the purpose o f shoehoming. It was a
situation that cried out for it.
In Globe & Mail, the ability for courts to compel journalists to disclose
confidential information sources was challenged under the Charter and the Quebec
Charter.274 The Charter argument was rejected without recourse to Hansard. Hansard was
used to demonstrate that the legislators deliberately excluded journalists from the
enumerated list o f professionals for whom professional secrecy was protected by law.
This is done by quoting the provision in the Quebec Civil Code, which protects any
“person bound to professional secrecy by law” from compelled disclosure.275 The list of
professionals so bound by law were enumerated in the Quebec Professional Code. This
was supported by reference to ajournai article.276 LeBel J. stated that “[t]his list does not
include journalists, even though their inclusion was contemplated, but yet ultimately
rejected, by the National Assembly (see Journal des débats: Commissions

273 House o f Commons Debates, 28th Pari, 3rd Sess, no 1II (5 February 1971 ) at 3119.
274 Globe & Mail, supra note 50.
275 Professional Code, RSQ, c C-26.
276 Supra note 182 at para 35; N. Vallières, “Le secret professionnel inscrit dans la Charte des droits et
libertés de la personne du Québec” (1985) 26 C de D 1019 at 1022-23.
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parlementaires, 3rd Sess., 30th Leg., No. 6, January 22, 1975, at p. B-322; Ministry of
Justice, Justice Today, by J. Choquette (1975), at pp. 232-35).”277
When the cited materials are examined, some interesting facts become clear. The
Professional Code was enacted in 1973 and was not the topic of debate in 1975.278 The
Hansard excerpt cited is from the Quebec equivalent to the Minutes and Proceedings o f
the Standing Committee on Justice during deliberations over projet de loi no 50 - Loi
concernant les droits et les libertés de la personne, which is the Bill that became the
Quebec Charter. The pinpoint cites a dialogue between M. Rene Mailhot on behalf o f the
Fédération professionelle des journalistes de la province de Québec and M. Choquette,
the then Minister o f Justice. M. Mailhot is arguing for stronger rights to freedom of
expression. There is no discussion about including or excluding journalists from the
enumerated list o f professionals. There is no direct discussion of professional secrecy. In
this respect, this citation is hardly an authority for the point for which it is put forward.
The government document cited in conjunction with the Hansard is the item that
makes explicit reference to professional secrecy. Justice Today is a white paper authored
by Choquette, and within the pages cited, he considers professional secrecy with respect
to journalists, and concludes that “journalists are entitled to some protection, but that
they should not be given absolute professional secrecy.”279 This white paper was a

277 Globe & Mail, supra note 50 at para 35.
278 See for example CMAJ, “Quebec National Assembly adopts Professional Code” (1973) 109 CMA J
242.
279 Québec, Ministère de la justice, Justice Today, (Québec: Publications du Québec, 1975) at 234 (Jérôme
Choquette, Q.C., Ministère de la justice).
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prelude to the Quebec Charter, and it is an exhaustive examination of the judicial
institutions o f Quebec.280
This combination o f Hansard and a white paper is a particularly oblique instance
o f shoehoming. One must infer from the collected sources, that:
1.

Choquette is the Minister in charge o f the Bill that became the Quebec
Charter;

2.

Choquette knew that the enumerated list of professionals in the
Professional Code excluded journalists; and,

3.

that this exclusion was deliberate.

The sources make a plausible but not ironclad case. Meanwhile, one further inference
must be drawn:
4.

that the Quebec Legislature was in agreement with what was in the mind
o f the Minister o f Justice about the Professional Code when the Quebec
Charter was enacted.

This is an enormous amount o f inference packed into a few short sentences. All o f the
analysis presented in this discussion o f Globe & Mail concerns only one paragraph and
occupies half a page. This treatment does not appear to give much consideration to the
complexities involved in this combination o f extrinsic aids to interpretation. It is an odd
way to determine the precise meaning of a vague provision in a quasi-Constitutional
statute enacted to serve a function analogous to that of the Charter. Arguably, this case
demonstrates complacency: the judges have become comfortable with legislative history
to the point where the potential sources o f problems are disregarded.

280 Supra note 279. One way that this reference supports the point being argued for is by bolstering the
reliability o f Choquette. It demonstrates that he is both an accomplished lawyer and an accomplished
legal scholar who is thoroughly knowledgeable about the law in Quebec with respect to legal theory,
Quebec cultural and procedural matters.
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(e) C onclusions A bout H ansard as an A utonom ous Interpretative M eans
Based on the preceding discussion, it appears that Hansard is not being used as a
prime interpretive weapon in court. Instead, it is being used in conjunction with
commission reports and committee reports, and often for the sole purpose of bringing the
ideas presented in those reports into the interpretive process. As TorStar demonstrates,
there have been many times where statutes were enacted or amended where there was no
statement about it in the transcripts of proceedings. It would appear that, given the
admissibility o f legislative history in general, litigators are making a greater effort to dig
into the knowledge available to law-makers at the time o f law making in all of its many
varieties rather than focusing on Hansard. If the judgments in this study are
representative, there has been a move towards the use of clever combinations of these
materials to bolster their rhetorical force. In 2010, the real star o f the show is legislative
history in general rather than Hansard.

3.4 P ersuasive Force and the Beaulac Test
Whenever evidence is tendered in court, the court must determine the weight or
probative value o f that evidence. The same is true for Hansard. When Hansard is
presented as an aid to interpretation, an assessment must be made concerning how much
weight ought to be assigned to it. In a 1998 work, Beaulac put forward a set o f criteria for
determining the appropriate amount o f weight that should be given to Hansard.281 This
will be referred to as the Beaulac Test. It consists o f four criteria that should be
considered when assessing the weight that ought to be given to Hansard, namely:

281 Beaulac, supra note 4.
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1.
2.
3.

The reliability of the source o f information.
The contemporaneity with the legislative process.
The proximity to the legislative process.

4.

The trustworthiness o f the records.
These items are general and there is some overlap between them. Indeed Beaulac

does not provide a concise point-by-point breakdown. Instead, he elaborates upon the
four factors as follows: “[t]hus, for instance, statements of the Minister responsible for
the enactment made at the end o f the third reading and found in an official report will
carry much more weight than ad-lib comments made in parliamentary committee by a
member o f the Opposition in response to an evasive answer given by the Government and
recorded only in the assembly president's manuscript notes.”282
Reliability relates primarily to the role o f the speaker, and the depth o f knowledge
that a person in that role would likely possess respecting the particular piece o f legislation
at issue.283 As noted by Beaulac, the Minister in charge of a Bill would generally be the
most authoritative person to make pronouncements about a Bill.284 They are the ones who
stick-handle a Bill from conception, drafting, committees etc.. O f all members o f the
House, they are presumably the most knowledgeable about the particulars o f the Bill, and
therefore the most reliable to make pronouncements about the meaning o f the text o f a
Bill.285
282 Beaulac, supra note 7 at 609. Beaulac has also described the test as an assessment o f “reliability,
authoritativeness, proximity and contextual value”. Beaulac, supra note 4 at 324.
283 Beaulac cites a work by W. K. Hurst as an influence in the development o f this test. Hurst uses the
term “credibility”to assess what Beaulac refers to as reliability. See W. K. Hurst, “The Use o f Extrinsic
Aids in Determining Legislative Intent in California: The Need for Standardized Criteria” (1980) 12
Pacific LJ 189. Beaulac also cites R. M. Rhodes, J. W. White & R. S. Goldman, “The Search for Intent:
Aids to Statutory Construction in Florida” (1978) 6 Fla St U L Rev 383 as an influence in the
development o f the criteria in the Beaulac Test.
284 This point was also upheld in Pepper, supra note 3.
285 This is a presumption that could be challenged. There is no guarantee that a Minister in charge o f a Bill
is knowledgeable about the Bill and conversely, being a member o f the opposition does not guarantee a
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Contemporaneity is a straight-forward criterion. Statements made at the time of
legislation would obviously be more closely associated with the actual process, while
statements made a year later would be coloured by changes in perspective that occur over
time with afterthought. Statements made at a very early stage in the process o f drafting
and enacting would be less authoritative than statements made closer to completion. O f
course, if the wording of the provision at issue has not changed from a recommendation
o f a report, to the Bill at first reading all the way through to enactment, then a statement
made early in the deliberations might be contemporaneous with respect to that provision.
Proximity to the legislative process again relates to the role of the person making
the statement. An expert speaking in Committee is an outside adviser who does not vote
in the assembly and is therefore more remote to the process than an MLA. However
proceedings in committee are closer in proximity to the legislative process than a
commission studying a Bill. However, there is another way that proximity comes into
play. This concerns how directly a statement addresses a statutory provision. Statements
that require inference-drawing in order to connect the statement to an alleged
interpretation are more remote and therefore less proximate.286
The reliability o f the records is self-explanatory. This is a non-issue for the official
records kept by all legislative assemblies in Canada. Hansard in the UK was written by
private journalists in the early 1800's and is therefore not very reliable.

lesser degree o f knowledge about a Bill.
286 Neither Beaulac nor Hurst identify this particular issue as one which pertains to proximity. Indeed, it is
not entirely clear how this issue fits into the criteria they put forward for their analyses; however in
practice it is essential to account for the clarity o f statements and the degree to which they directly
apply to the statutory provisions for which they are put forward as evidence o f meaning. Arguably this
could be regarded as a matter o f reliability since a statement which requires inference-drawing is less
reliable than a statement which unequivocally addresses a statutory provision. Nonetheless, it fits into
the concept o f proximity as well, and that is how it will be dealt with in the discussion that follows.
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Like most other legal tests, the Beaulac Test is a non-exhaustive list of criteria that
cannot be applied in a formalistic manner. Instead, it provides a checklist that points out
the most likely sources o f potential shortcomings when using Hansard and Hansard-like
materials as interpretive aids. It is an entirely subjective assessment o f the weight or
probative value o f the Hansard as evidence o f statutory meaning.
Before applying the Beaulac Test to the various Hansard passages that appear in
the 2010 judgments, however, the issue of citation must be addressed. This was
something that Beaulac dealt with in his research in 1999 for the simple reason that
complete information about a passage from Hansard is required in order to apply the
Beaulac Test. Proper citation is a necessary precursor to the assessment o f weight.

(a) C itation
As Beaulac notes about quotes from Hansard, “before an appropriate weight can
be given to them, one must know the details of the materials actually at stake, which was
the main problem with the 1999 decisions.”287 At issue is disclosure o f the information
necessary to assess the value o f the evidence. As a basic requirement, one needs to know
the name and title of the person speaking as well as the immediate context. The
immediate context concerns whether a Bill was being presented for first, second or thirdreading (or in committee), and might also include whether the statement is made while
introducing the Bill to the House or in response to a question (or anything else that might
prove relevant).

287 Beaulac, supra note 7 at 610.
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Within his study, Beaulac found that in Law, and the majority opinion in M v H ,
neither the name nor title o f the person whose statement was referred to was stated.288 He
also found that “In Gladue ... although the first references involved the responsible
Minister's speeches, we know nothing significant regarding the statements of the other
MPs and senators. Similar shortcomings occurred in R v Beaulac, Kmart and
M alenfant”289
When considering this issue, it makes sense to consider the size and relative
importance o f a quote, and to provide as much supplemental information as is justified by
the circumstances. A quote can be several paragraphs long, and it could be put forward in
support o f a point that is a relatively significant matter within a judgment, Conversely, the
quote might be merely a reference in support of a point that is relatively minor, and for
which there are many other justifications like canons of interpretation, precedent, etc..
This distinction is helpful because judges cannot be expected to provide comprehensive
information about all o f the sources of information that they draw upon for everything
touched upon in their decisions. Meanwhile, Hansard is extraordinarily complicated. One
might need to explain the Bill, changes in the wording that preceded the debate, the
question being responded to, who the answer is directed at, and potentially subsequent
changes to the wording in the Bill to properly understand a particular statement. Citation
is time-consuming, and given the complexities involved, a sliding scale approach is
justified.
Based on the judgments considered in this study, it appears that the SCC judges
took greater care to provide supplementary contextual information for larger and more
288 Supra note 7 at 610.
289 Ibid. Beaulac, supra note 7 at 610.
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significant quotes in 2010. One o f the few glaring omissions occurs in Deschamps J.'s
dissent in Syndicat. A statement from the debates of the National Assembly occupies
seven lines o f text in the opinion. The speaker's name and title are not mentioned,
although the Bill number is provided as well as the immediate context.290
It was more common in the 2010 decisions for the immediate context to be left
out o f the explanation. This occurred in Nemeth, Morelli and Globe & Mail. However, the
omission is arguably justified in Nemeth. The wording o f the provision of the Extradition
Act was almost identical to the wording o f the non-refoulement29129provisions in the
European Convention and the UN Model Treaty?92 One can therefore be fairly certain that
the wording o f the Bill did not change significantly as it moved through the House and
Senate. Meanwhile, several of the references appear merely as footnotes for additional
support rather than as primary evidence o f the purpose of the provision. Arguably, the
citations are as complete as they need to be, given the role the references are serving in
the judgment.
Morelli is a bit more challenging on this point, although the quote included in the
case was merely used to reinforce a relatively uncontroversial interpretation o f s 163(4.1)
o f the Criminal Code, which prescribes the crime o f accessing child pornography. At
issue was the purpose behind the law against accessing child pornography, which is a
relatively tangential issue in this decision. Arguably, the need to supplement a citation is
lower for a narrow point that is uncontroversial and plays a relatively insignificant role in

290 Syndicat, supra note 50 at para 83. The immediate context is the stage o f a Bill's passage during which
a statement is made, for example, introducing a Bill to the House for first reading.
291 See refoulement, supra note 269.
292 EA, supra note 269; European Convention, supra note 269; Model Treaty, supra note 269.
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the judgment. It is not crucial to know the stage in the Bill's passage during which the
statement was made in this circumstance.
Globe & Mail is an interesting case because o f the multiple inferences required to
establish that journalists were not bound by professional secrecy in the Quebec
Professional Code and that the Quebec Charter did not extend protection of professional
secrecy to journalists.291 There is a rather clever weaving together of ideas. From a
citation perspective, LeBel J. failed to provide some crucial information as the name and
title o f the speaker were not stated in the Hansard citation. The white paper that was cited
immediately following the Hansard citation for additional support was penned by J.
Choquette for the Ministry o f Justice. By consulting briefly with the Hansard and the
white paper, it becomes obvious that Choquette was the Minister o f Justice at the time of
publication and was involved in the dialogue cited from the proceedings o f the
committee. It could be argued that this interpretation is relatively uncontroversial.
However, the point being supported by the extrinsic aids is central to the decision.293294 The
inclusion o f name(s) and title(s) is a rather simple addition to a citation that goes a long
way to clarify the relevance and import o f the reference. In Globe & Mail it cannot be
inferred from the citations alone as they appear in the judgment that the person who
wrote the document is also the person quoted in Hansard.295 The connection to the
proposition for which it is cited as authority is therefore unclear without extensive
research.

293 See the discussion o f shoehoming at 93.
294 Based on the finding that the national assemble deliberately excluded journalists from statutory
protection o f professional secrecy, LeBel J. concluded that “professional secrecy cannot ground a
quasi-constitutional right to the protection o f media sources”. Globe & Mail, supra note 47 at para 35.
295 Ibid.
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(b) F ootnoting
When Hansard is mentioned in judgments, specific passages are not always
quoted. Hansard can also be cited to support an interpretation without including a quote,
and this type o f usage will be referred to as “footnoting”. Footnoting was a fairly
common occurrence in 2010, and this stands in stark contrast to 1999 when the practice
was relatively rare. The only judgment where this occurred in 1999 was in M v H.296297In
2010, references to Hansard were made via footnote-like citations in Re AHRA, Syndicat,
Telezone, Century Services Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), Nemeth and Globe &
Mail.291
The practice o f citing Hansard as an authoritative footnote is related to the
phenomenon o f Hansard being used in conjunction with multiple corroborative
justifications. It is one o f the many ways that reasons for a particular interpretation are
supported. The addition o f Hansard in conjunction with committee reports and
commission reports, alongside the pre-existing practice o f citing journal articles and
textbooks has changed the character of SCC judgments in a subtle but interesting way.
Arguably, the decisions are slowly coming to resemble scholarly legal works.
When Hansard was cited by way o f footnoting in the 2010 judgments, the name
and title o f the speaker were usually provided. Deschamps J. once again provides a rather
noticeable exception, In Syndicat, a relatively lengthy passage from the Journals des

296 M v H, supra note 184 at paras 84, 94 & 98.
297 Re AHRA, supra note 50 at para 216; Syndicat, supra note 50 at para 83; Telezone, supra note 192 at
para 50; Century, supra note 193 at para 20, although the reference was for a piece o f extrinsic
evidence that was rejected, so it was not being used to support a point o f law that was relevant to the
judgment; Nemeth, supra note 50 at para 83; Globe & Mail, supra note 50 at para 35.
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débats is quoted followed by two page references from the same session o f the legislature
in support, without stating the name and title o f the speaker(s).29829
The name and title o f the relevant speaker are essential for Hansard citations and
judges should take care to provide this much as a baseline. There can be statements from
as many as four different people on a typical page in these records, and it is good form to
include this essential factual information, if not for the benefit o f legal scholars, then in
the name o f proper disclosure so that the correct source of the justifying information is
accurately identified for any member o f the public who wishes to achieve a larger
understanding o f a particular judgment.
As an example o f the difficulties that bare references cause, Beaulac pointed to
Kmart™ In that judgment, Cory J. cited a passage where a member o f the government,
identified as the Hon. L. Hanson stated “yes, that's also my interpretation” in response to
a scenario outlined by an opposition member as examples of a union-related activity
which was legal under the previous laws and which the new legislation would replace.300
In the absence o f knowing the title o f the person quoted, the response “yes, that would be
my interpretation also” is a highly ambiguous statement. It could have been said in
298 Syndicat, supra note at para 83.
299 Kmart, supra note 190.
300 Beaulac, supra note 7 at 611-612, quoting Kmart, supra note 190 at para 60: “In Kmart, Justice Cory,
for the Court, used the following extracts from the parliamentary debates on the adoption o f an old
version o f the Labour Code'.
Mr. Clark: ... I'll just give you an example: Canadian Tire in Prince George went on strike.
There was a campaign to boycott Canadian Tire. There was picketing at other stores o f
Canadian Tire. That was ruled not to be allowed by the former Labour Relations
Board, so what the union did instead was an extensive boycott campaign that involved
things like large 4-by-8 signs, almost like election signs, that said “Boycott Canadian
Tire.” In my riding o f Vancouver East alone there were something like 100 4-by-8's up
on all the major highways, saying “Boycott Canadian Tire.” Can the minister confirm,
then - I think it's his intention - that those kinds o f acts are still legal under this bill,
and not prohibited in any way?
Hon. L. Hanson: Yes, that's also my interpretation.
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earnest upon a clear understanding of the Bill, but could just as easily be said by one who
knew little about the substance o f the Bill but was called upon to answer as a stand in for
a Minister who was away. By always including the name and the title o f the speaker in
the citation, the message is sent that the judges are paying attention to this issue.
On a more positive note, the SCC does appear to have settled on a standard format
for citing Hansard. In 2010, with only minor variations, the citations were included
within the text o f the opinion at the end of the relevant sentence(s) in brackets, typically
in a format similar to that which is set out in the Canadian Guide to Uniform Legal
Citation.30' The citations included the jurisdiction, the official title of the record, the
volume, the session and Parliament/Legislature number, the dates and page number. In
most cases, the relevant supplementary information was included within the brackets
before the citation, and this could include the name o f the person speaking and their title
(which usually indicated their role relative to the legislation), as well as the Bill number
and the stage o f passage o f the Bill.301302 This format was not consistently used in 1999, and
the evolution is a positive one. There is an unfortunate tendency for additional Hansard
references to exclude supplementary information.303 As stated previously, the name and
title o f the speaker is essential for making use o f these references.

301 Canadian Guide to Uniform Legal Citation 7th ed, (Toronto: Carswell, 2010). The order o f
information is different, but the requirements are nearly identical. For example, in Nemeth, supra note
50 at para 83, the citation is was follows: “the Hon. Peter Adams, Parliamentary Secretary to the
Leader o f the Government, House o f Commons Debates, vol. 135, No. 162, 1st Sess., 36th Pari.,
November 30, 1998, at pp. 10591-92”. To conform with the McGill Guide, the citation would be:
House o f Commons Debates, 36th Pari, 1st Sess, vol 135, No 162 (30 November 1998) at 10591-92
(the Hon. Peter Adams, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader o f the Government).
302 Information such as the Bill number, the immediate context (eg. first or second reading) etc. tended to
be included in the text o f the opinion.
303 In ReAHRA, supra note 50 at 253 there is a citation to Evidence o f the Standing Committee on Health
followed by three additional references to Hansard which provides the dates but no page numbers.
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In general, although there is some room for improvement, the judges have become
more consistent and more thorough in providing the name and title o f the person whose
speech is being cited, as well as mentioning further information with respect to the Bill
being debated, the stage o f passage, based on the cases in this study (which includes
decisions by Deschamps J.).304

(c) A pplication o f the Beaulac Test to the 2010 Judgm ents
Whenever a statement made by a member of an elected body is presented as
evidence o f statutory meaning, it is crucial to determine how much weight should be
given to the statement. The purpose o f the Beaulac Test is to facilitate the assessment of
weight. It achieves this objective by focusing attention on four key factors:
1.
2.
3.

The reliability o f the source of information.
The contemporaneity with the legislative process.
The proximity to the legislative process (which includes: (i) the proximity of
the speaker to the legislative process; and, (ii) the proximity o f the statement to
the statutory provision at issue).

4.

The trustworthiness o f the records.

Occasionally it becomes clear that the court has given weight to questionable materials. It
should be kept in mind that this is a subjective analysis of judicial explanations. The
justices are free to assign weight to whatever concepts and information that they see fit,
and they are free to explain as much (or as little) as they see fit. The point o f this exercise
is to cast a critical eye on Hansard, despite the inherently subjective nature of such an
analysis and the many surrounding complexities.305
304 Within the cases where footnoting was used, Telezone, ReAHRA, Nemeth, and Globe & Mail provided
the essential information. In TorStar, Deschamps J. included all relevant information.
305 There are a host o f ideological issues which lie underneath the presumption that the assignment o f
weight to evidence o f meaning is a productive endeavor. For example, there is a body o f scholarship
which asserts that judges made decisions based on various factors that are external to the legal process,
such as personal values, personal experiences, ideological leanings etc.. Reasons are merely
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(i)

Hansard Use that Meets the Test Requirements

Telezone and Morelli are judgments in which the use o f Hansard holds up well
under the Beaulac Test. In Telezone, the issue to be settled was whether or not provincial
superior courts had jurisdiction to hear cases where the the Crown was liable under the
law o f contract. All quoted passages were statements made by the relevant Minister of
Justice, and are therefore reliable. The statements were made contemporaneously with
the deliberations that preceded passage o f the relevant Bill. As well, the statements were
made in the House and in committee, and they directly addressed the issue at hand.
Therefore the statements are proximate. For example, when considering the history of
the concurrent jurisdiction for tort and contract law that is shared by both the Federal
Court and provincial superior courts, a statement was quoted that explains why exclusive
jurisdiction was initially granted to the Federal Court in 1971. This statement was made
about the Bill that amended the Federal Courts Act and it corroborates the meaning of
provisions o f the previous version of the Federal Court Act.306 The text o f the relevant

justifications for decisions arrived at through other means. See for example Stéphane Beaulac and
Pierre-André Côté “Driedger’s 'Modem Principle' at the Supreme Court o f Canada: Interpretation,
Justification, Legitimization”, (2006) 40 RJT 131 ; also see Randal N. M. Graham, “What Judges Want:
Judicial Self-interest and Statutory Interpretation” (2009) 30 Statute L Rev 38; also see Hutchinson and
Boyle, supra note 23. In accordance with this general school o f thought, the analysis o f weight is more
accurately described as an analysis o f rhetorical justification value. An exploration o f these ideological
issues is beyond the scope o f this thesis.
306 Federal Court Act, SC 1970-71 -72, c 1; Telezone, supra note 192 at para 50: “This multiple
supervision [by the provincial courts], with a lack o f consistent jurisprudence and application, can
work serious hardship not only on the boards and commissions but on those who appear before
them___ It is for this reason . . . that the conclusion was reached that this superintending jurisdiction
should be vested in a single court that enjoyed the same nation-wide jurisdiction as the federal boards,
commissions and tribunals themselves. The bill is therefore designed to create a single and uniform
basis o f superintending jurisdiction in relation to federal boards and commissions and to place them on
the same footing in this regard as provincial boards and commissions.
(House o f Commons Debates, 2nd Sess., 28th Pari. March 25, 1970, at pp. 5470-71 ; see also Factum, at
para. 79; Khosa, at para. 34.)”
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provision did not change from first reading o f the Bill through to the enactment o f the
statute, so the statements were made concerning the appropriate text.307
The current version o f the provision grants concurrent jurisdiction “in all cases in
which relief is claimed against the Crown” and two passages were quoted in the opinion
which explain very directly the intended result o f this provision and reasons for the
change.308 The first passage is from the committee stage and the second passage is from
the House o f Commons Debates while introducing the Bill to the house for second
reading.309Again, the quoted passages directly reinforce the point that “relief against the

307 Bill C -192, >1/7 Act respecting the Federal Court o f Canada, 2nd Sess, 28th Pari, 1970 (first reading, 2
March 1970); Federal Court Act, RSC, 1970 (2nd Supp), c 10.
308 Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, s 17, “[R elief Against the Crown] (1) Except as otherwise
provided in this Act or any other Act o f Parliament, the Federal Court has concurrent original
jurisdiction in all cases in which relief is claimed against the Crown.”
309 Telezone, supra note 192 at 58: “As the Minister o f Justice stated in 1989 before the Legislation
Committee examining Bill C-38, which resulted in, among other changes, today’s version o f s. 17;
[W]e have made provision in the bill whereby ordinary common law and civil
law actions for relief against the federal Crown, which are presently the
exclusive jurisdiction o f the Federal Court, may also be heard by provincial
courts. Such provision acknowledges the fact that the Federal Court possesses no
unique expertise in areas o f ordinary contract and tort law. [The Minister here
went on to describe the practical jurisdictional and procedural problems created
by the Federal Court’s prior exclusive jurisdiction over federal authorities.]”;
(Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence o f the Legislative Committee on Bill C-38, No. 1,
2nd Sess., 34th Pari., November 23, 1989, at pp. 14-15)
On second reading o f the Bill, the Minister again emphasized that the purpose o f the
amendments was to allow the plaintiffs to sue the federal Crown in either the provincial
superior courts or the Federal Court:
For example, a person should be able to sue the Crown in a suitably convenient
court for breach o f contract to purchase goods or for negligent driving by a
Crown employee that causes injuries to another motorist. At the moment, such
actions can only be brought in the Federal Court. However, it is not as available
as provincial courts.

Moreover, for both citizen and lawyer alike, provincial courts, including their
procedures and personnel, are much more familiar. Therefore, the Federal Court
is often not the most convenient one for the private litigant. With this in mind,
the government has proposed that both the provincial courts and the Federal
Court share jurisdiction with respect to such actions, thereby generally giving a
plaintiff a choice o f forum. [Emphasis added by Binnie J.]
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Crown” includes tort and contract-related legal actions. Although not stated in the
opinion, the wording o f the provision at issue did not change from first reading through
to passage, therefore the statements were made with respect to the appropriate statutory
text.310As a result o f all o f these factors, the statements are contemporaneous and
proximate. Meanwhile, by including two passages at different stages in the process, the
point is reinforced that the Minister o f Justice was involved throughout the Bill's passage
and his reliability is therefore increased. As well, the consistency o f the statements
reinforce the strength of the Hansard quotes as evidence o f meaning. It becomes clear
that the reasons motivating the amendments persisted beyond the second reading of the
Bill.
In Morelli, the Hansard also holds up well under the Beaulac Test. The statement
was made by the Minister o f Justice during passage o f the Bill. The opinion does not
indicate what stage o f passage the Bill was at when the statement was made; however
despite this shortcoming, the nature of the statement is such that there is little doubt about
it's relevance to the statutory provision which it is intended to support.
Fish J., for the majority in Morelli, quotes Hansard as part o f an explanation of the
purpose o f s 163.1(4.1) o f the Criminal Code, which makes the act o f accessing child
pornography a crime.311 The opinion states that “[parliam ent's purpose in creating the
offence o f accessing child pornography, as explained by the then Minister o f Justice, was
to “capture those who intentionally view child pornography on the [Internet but where
(House o f Commons Debates, 2nd Sess., 34th Pari., November 1, 1989, at p.
5414).
310 Bill C-38 , An Act to Amend the Federal Court Act, the Crown Liability Act, the Supreme Court Act and
other Acts in consequence thereof,Second Session, 34th Pari, 2nd Sess, s. 17 (as passed by the House
o f Commons Feb 15, 1990); Federal Courts Act, supra 308 at s 17.
311 Criminal Code , supra note 255.
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the legal notion o f possession may be problematic” (Hon. Anne McLellan, House o f
Commons Debates, vol. 137, 1st Sess., 37th Pari., May 3, 2001, at p. 3581).”312 As stated
earlier, the interpretation being supported was not particularly controversial. Nonetheless,
the statement was made by an MP in a position o f knowledge with respect to the
legislation and is therefore reliable (or credible). The statement was made in the House
during the act o f pushing the appropriate Bill through the House and directly addressed
the purpose o f the statutory provision at issue.313 It is therefore contemporaneous and
proximate. The Hansard evidence in this case is a salient aid to interpretation with respect
to the purpose for which it is quoted.314
(ii)

Hansard Use that Raises Questions

Among the 2010 judgments examined in this study, several made use o f Hansard
quotes that suffered from a variety o f deficiencies with respect to the Beaulac Test.315
312 Morelli, supra note 198 at 26.
313 The language o f the provision did not change from first reading through to passage. See Bill C-15,
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2001 , 37th Pari, 1st Sess, 2001-02, s 11(3). The Bill was severed into
two Bills, the relevant provision was included in Bill C-15 A, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and
to amend other Acts. Bill C -15 A received royal ascent on June 4, 2002.
314 The reliability o f Ms. McLellan is further supported by a passage quoted by the dissenting judge at the
appeal decision that preceded this judgment. Richards JA. cites the words o f the Minister o f Justice
while addressing the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights:
“In speaking to the amendment that put s. 163.1(4.1) in place, the Minister o f Justice said
this: The bill will create an offence o f accessing child pornography to capture those who
intentionally view child pornography without legally possessing it because they do not
have control over the material. The bill provides that a person would access child
pornography when that person knowingly - and this is very important, because I know
there have been some concerns raised about the creation o f this new offence o f accessing
- when that person knowingly causes child pornography to be viewed by, or transmitted
to, him or her. The definition ensures that inadvertent viewing would not be caught under
this offence. [Emphasis added]”

R v Morelli, 2005 SKQB 381 at 109; also see: Proceedings o f the Standing Committee on
Justice and Human Rights, 1st Session, 37th Parliament; October 2, 2001, p. 1635.
315 Within the following analyses, the amount o f weight that judges appear to have assigned to particular
Hansard-like materials is not always addressed. The purpose o f this section is to critically assess
Hansard and there is no larger criticism o f the judgments intended here. Where a particular point in a
complex judgment is supported by a variety o f materials such as precedents, legal reasoning and/or
multiple pieces o f legislative history, it is often a vexing issue to assess just how much weight has been
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TorStar is one such case. At issue was the mandatory ban on publication o f bail hearings
at the request o f the accused. The Ouimet Report, published in 1969, recommended such
mandatory publication.316Amendments to the bail hearing process, which were
undoubtedly based on the recommendations in the Report, were enacted in 1971 but the
provision governing publication bans did not follow the recommendations, and left the
ban up to the discretion o f the judge. It was in 1976 that the Criminal Code was amended
to provide for a mandatory ban. The evidence therefore suffers from two key
shortcomings.
The statements quoted were made by the relevant Minister and are therefore
credible, however there is a temporal disconnect since the quotes used were from 1971.
This is a shortcoming in contemporaneity. As well, there is the issue o f proximity to the
legislative process insofar as the Hansard quotes were not directly on point. One quote
was cited to explain the very general purpose for the 1971 amendments to the bail
process. The other quote was cited to explain the justifications for publication bans on
preliminary inquiries, which are similar to bail hearings in certain respects, but not
sufficiently so to make the statements directly applicable to bail hearings.
The opinion does not appear to give significant weight to the Hansard, but
Dechamps J. does find the information helpful to illuminate the history of the
amendments to bail process. Significant weight is given to the Ouimet Report, and this
too could be criticized for similar reasons.

assigned to one piece o f evidence. For the sake o f economy, it is presumed that when Hansard is put
forward in a judgment in support o f a point, it is being treated as having been assigned some weight.
The issue o f how much weight appears to have been assigned to any particular piece o f Hansard has
therefore been disregarded in many (but not all) instances, particularly when such an assessment would
have been unduly complex or inconclusive.
316 The matter is discussed at 65.
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It is rather puzzling that the judges at all levels (from the trial court through to the
SCC) felt the need to connect the Ouimet Report directly to the publication ban
provisions in order to find the reasons for such a ban, as enunciated in the report, to be
compelling reasons for upholding the constitutionality o f such a ban. Surely provisions
which Parliament enacted to protect the rights o f the accused could serve the multiple
purposes that a larger view o f justice requires, even though these purposes were never
clearly expressed by the law-makers in the records at the time o f enactment. Justice
requires a complicated balance between a multitude o f factors and principles. This is the
nature o f justice and judicial systems, regardless of what law-makers specifically say or
do not say when enacting and amending laws.
Century is another judgment that involved the use o f Hansard that suffers from
deficiencies under the Beaulac Test. In this case, Ted LeRoy Trucking Limited attempted
a restructuring under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement A ct?'1At the time, it had
GST withholdings which are deemed to be held in trust for the Crown under s 222 o f the
Excise Tax A ct?n In accordance with the approved restructuring, this amount was placed
in a trust account by the Monitor of the restructuring.31738319 When the restructuring failed and
proceedings commenced under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Crown sought to
acquire the amount held in trust; however the trust created under s 222(3) o f the ETA does

317 Companies* Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36.
318 Excise Tax Act, RSC 1985, c E -15, s 222(3): “Despite any other provision o f this Act (except
subsection (4)), any other enactment o f Canada (except the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act), any
enactment o f a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held
by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the
manner and at the time provided under this Part, property o f the person and property held by any
secured creditor o f the person that, but for a security interest, would be property o f the person, equal in
value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed ...”. Quoted from Century, supra note
193 at para 34. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC, 1985, c B-3.
319 The “Monitor” is the person appointed by the court to oversee a restructuring under the CCA A . CCAA,
supra note 317 at ss 11.8 & 23.
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not apply to proceedings under the BIA.m What adds to the complexity, however, is s
18(3) o f the CCAA, which nullifies statutory deemed trusts under restructurings arising
under the ETA. It was enacted in 1997 while s 222(3) of the ETA was enacted in 2000.
Arguably, the provision enacted later in time should supercede the earlier one.320321 However
a subsequent amendment to the CCAA re-enacted the trust-nullifying provision, albeit
with a slight change in wording and renumbered.322
In Century, Abella J. quotes Hansard to support an interpretation of the trustnullifying provision o f the CCAA in her dissent. Abella J. regards the change in wording
and renumbering o f the provision as purely technical, and therefore as evidence that it
should be treated as if it had not been amended at all:
During second reading, the Hon. Bill Rompkey, then the Deputy Leader
o f the Government in the Senate, confirmed that s. 37(1) represented only
a technical change:
On a technical note relating to the treatment o f deemed trusts for
taxes, the bill [sic] makes no changes to the underlying policy
intent, despite the fact that in the case o f a restructuring under the
CCAA, sections o f the act [sic] were repealed and substituted with
renumbered versions due to the extensive reworking o f the CCAA.
Federal legislation must receive majority support in the Senate, and therefore
statements made in the Senate should be treated in the same way as statements made in
320 See supra note 318.
321 This would be in accordance with a maxim o f interpretation, leges posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant. It is sometimes referred to as the doctrine o f implied repreal. It means “later laws abrogate
earlier contrary laws”; see Human Rights Commission v Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation
Commission, 2005 NLCA 61 at 14; also see Saumur v City o f Quebec, [1953] 2 SCR 299 at 388; also
see Alberta v Lefebvre, 1986 ABCA 236 at 71.
322 The 1997 provision o f the CCAA is s 81.3(1): “Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any
provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect o f deeming property to be held in trust
for Her Majesty, property o f a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty
unless it would be so regarded in the absence o f that statutory provision.”
The provision as amended in 2005 became s 37(1): “Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in
federal or provincial legislation that has the effect o f deeming property to be held in trust for Her
Majesty, property o f a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty
unless it would be so regarded in the absence o f that statutory provision.” See ibid at 37.
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the House o f Commons. With this in mind, the role o f the Deputy Leader with respect to
this Bill is unclear, and therefore the depth o f his knowledge about the specific provision
is uncertain. This casts some doubt upon the reliability o f this quote. Meanwhile, this
statement does not clearly state that the deemed trust should survive bankruptcy
proceedings. It is a much more general statement - that there is no change to the
underlying policy with respect to the treatment o f trusts. In the absence o f elaboration
about the underlying policy intent, this is less than solid evidence o f the legislative
intention that the Hansard is cited to prove. It therefore suffers from a deficiency with
respect to proximity as well.323
In Globe & M ail, Hansard was presented in support o f the notion that protection
o f freedom o f information, as enshrined in the Quebec Charter, did not prevent
journalists from disclosing confidential information sources when ordered to do so by the
court.
The Hansard occurred in the form o f a footnote-style reference to the Journal des
débats: Commissions parlementaires accompanied by a reference to a White Paper
authored by Jerome Choquette, for the purpose o f showing that the National Assembly
contemplated but rejected the idea of extending protection o f freedom o f information
under the Quebec Charter to include journalists.324
323 These deficiencies are apparent deficiencies based on the Hansard as presented in the judgment. The
Hansard could, in fact, be very compelling, however this cannot be determined based on the
information provided in the judgment. There is no necessary implication here that Abella J. was at fault
for relying on the Hansard in this context.
324 Globe & Mail, supra note 50 at para 35:
Professional secrecy applies only to those professionals bound to it by law, and is currently
restricted to the 45 professional orders subject to the Quebec Professional Code, R.S.Q., c.
C-26 (see, e.g., N. Vallières, “Le secret professionnel inscrit dans la Charte des droits et
libertés de la personne du Québec” (1985) 26 C. de D. 1019, at pp. 1022-23). This list
does not include journalists, even though their inclusion was contemplated, but yet
ultimately rejected, by the National Assembly (see Journal des débats: Commissions
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The evidence cited concerns committee deliberations over projet de loi no 50 Loi concernant les droits et les libertés de la personne, which became the Quebec
Charter. For this fact alone, this reference is suspect. The list of enumerated professionals
is in the Professional Code, not the Quebec Charter. If there was any solid evidence that
the legislature considered including journalists in this list, deliberations over the Bill
enacting or amending the Professional Code would be the only truly probative source.
This is a significant shortcoming with respect to both proximity and contemporaneity.
Furthermore, the page reference, which did not include the name o f the speaker,
includes a dialogue between the Minister o f Justice and M. Rene Mailhot on behalf o f the
Fédération professionelle des journalistes de la province de Québec. Mailhot is a lobbyist
o f sorts, and he makes a rather rhetorical exhortation decrying that there can be no right
to information if, for example, journalists are afforded no legal protection for professional
secrecy or the police can seize journalists' documents.325
Choquette responded by noting that he had no objection to a strong right to
information, but questioned how such clear rights were to flow from the general wording
o f a Charter. This, o f course, is a reasonable response given the context. However, as
evidence that the legislators enacting the Quebec Charter were aware that the list of
professionals in the Professional Code excluded journalists, this is decidedly weak. One
must infer, from Choquette's response to Mailhot's rhetoric that both are aware o f the fact
that the laws protecting professional secrecy in Quebec did not cover journalists. Such an
interaction between a lobbyist and a Minister which did not directly address the matter at

parlementaires, 3rd Sess., 30th Leg., No. 6, January 22, 1975, at p. B-322; Ministry o f
Justice, Justice Today, by J. Choquette (1975), at pp. 232-35).
325 See supra note 328.
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hand suffers from a serious deficiency in proximity. There is the issue o f reliability
concerning statements made by a lobbyist. Such a person could hardly be regarded as an
authority about the meaning of the Bill.
The white paper is much more clear on the subject, but it was not written in
contemplation o f the Professional Code. On the contrary, it was written as an overarching
examination o f Quebec's legal institutions.326 It therefore has deficiencies in both
contemporaneity and proximity.
On a more charitable view, the combination of the white paper and the Hansard
presents some support for the notion that the Minister who played a central role in the
enactment o f the Quebec Charter knew that journalists had no legally protected
professional secrecy, and therefore it can be inferred that there was no intention to extend
this protection in the Quebec Charter. However, these many inferences are drawn about
the beliefs o f one person and imputed to the legislature about the meaning o f a quasi
constitutional statute. At the very least, it would be reasonable to expect more than a
single paragraph to expound such a significant point o f law.
In Syndicat, Deschamps J. used related statutes and Hansard to conclude that a
provision in the Quebec Labour Code should not be interpreted literally. Among the
reasons, the following point is supported by recourse to Hansard:
That transcript shows that it was assumed that unionized employees would
not necessarily submit every grievance to an arbitrator appointed under
their collective agreement — they would sometimes have to turn to the
forum designated in the Act. At that time, the Act designated the Labour
Commissioner General as the forum for recourses exercised under the
326 Supra note 279 at 30: “The main objective o f this white paper is to examine judicial institutions; it
contains a complete picture o f the way in which the justice system functions in Quebec. It also
reassesses those reforms already introduced, and examines a great many others needed for the future.”
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A.L.S. in respect o f dismissals. The C.N.T. Could represent a nonunionized employee if the recourse was based on ss. 122 and 123
(prohibited practices), but not if s. 124 was relied on. The purpose o f the
proposed amendment (now s. 126.1) was to make up for this deficiency
while at the same time trying to limit costs for the C.N.T. The following
passage from the National Assembly’s debate shows how the procedure
was being interpreted at that time:
[TRANSLATION] According to the Labour Commissioner
General’s office, representing employees in dismissal cases will
have to result in an increased w orkload.. . . The bill also amends
the Act as regards the Commission des normes. It will be amended
so that the Commission represents, in recourses against dismissals
without good and sufficient cause . . . it will be ensured that
employees have to contribute. Employees covered by collective
agreements will be defended by their unions; employees eligible for
legal aid will be defended by legal aid. [Emphasis added.]
(National Assembly, Journal des débats, 2nd Sess., 35th Leg., Bill
31, An Act to amend the Act respecting labour standards
(Introduction), May 23,1996, at p. 1325; see also pp. 1332 and
1334.).
Although not stated in the judgment, the person speaking is M. Matthias Rioux, the
Ministre du Travail (Minister o f Labour) at the time. This person is in a position o f
knowledge. The passage cited does support the notion that the Legislature expected that
unionized employees would appear before the labour tribunal, however some inference
drawing is required. The passage includes the statement that “Employees covered by
collective agreements will be defended by their unions”. From this statement, we are to
infer that that these employees will be defended by their unions at the tribunal. Given the
context o f this statement, this is a reasonable inference. In this case, therefore, the
evidence does warrant some weight for the assertion for which it is put forward, that the
Legislature believed that unionized employees would be appearing before the tribunal
(and by implication did not expect unionized employees to always arbitrate).
The second reference to Hansard cites page 1332. This page contains statements
made by Liberal member M. Jean-Mark Fournier and Liberal member M. Lawrence S.
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Bergman.327 Both are opposition members and the depth o f their understanding o f the
legislation is questionable. As well, their statements are not directly on point. Instead,
they consist o f more general criticisms of the Bill, and one must infer that the Legislature
expected unions to represent members at the tribunal as implied within on a much larger
discussion.328 Due to the deficiencies in reliability and proximity, this reference is not
particularly compelling as an interpretive aid.
In Lacombe, a municipal by-law restricted the location of 'aerodromes' for 'float
planes' to a particular lake in a region containing several lakes surrounded by cottages.329
Because the by-law restricted the location o f airports, it was challenged on the basis that
it interfered with th qAeronautics Act and therefore infringed on an exclusively federal
head o f power. As is typical for most municipal councils, there are no transcripts of
proceedings. In lieu o f such transcripts, the judges relied upon the attestation o f the
Director General and Secretary-Treasurer of the Municipality of Sacré-Coeur about the
motivations o f the council for enacting the by-law. This was justified on the same
grounds as recourse to Hansard. When assessing the purpose of the by-law, in the context
o f the pith and substance analysis, McLachlin CJ. stated for the majority that:
the municipal council discussed “doing something about the float planes
327 Syndicat, supra note 50 at 84; Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 35th Leg, 2nd Sess, at
1332. Although irrelevant to the current discussion, it is interesting to note that most o f M. Bergman's
statements are in English.
328 Indeed, both comments make general references to employees being represented by unions. It is not
entirely clear that this is a specific discussion o f employees being represented in the tribunal rather
than a discussion o f employees being represented by unions in a more general sense. The page from
the transcript is attached as Appendix 6: Québec, Assemblée nationale. Commission permanente de la
Justice. Étude du projet de loi no 50 — Loi concernant les droits et les libertés de la personne. Journal
des débats: Commissions parlementaires, 3e sess., 30e lég., no 6, 22 janvier 1975 at page 163.
329 Municipality o f Sacré-Coeur, By-law No. 260, Règlement aux fins de modifier le règlement numéro

209 intitulé « Règlement relatif aux permis et certificats, aux conditions préalables à l ’émission de
permis de construction, ainsi qu ’à l ’administration des règlements de zonage, de lotissement et de
construction », le règlement numéro 210 intitulé « Règlement de zonage », le règlement numéro 211
intitulé « Règlement de lotissement », de façon à créer la nouvelle zone 61-RF (1995).
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using Gobeil Lake . . . with a view to finding a solution to the
incompatibility o f that commercial activity of maintaining a float plane
base with the use o f the lake by vacationers” (solemn affirmation of
Sarto Simard, Director General and Secretary-Treasurer o f the
municipality o f Sacré-Coeur, at para. 12).The council crafted a solution
that had the effect of prohibiting certain aviation activities — and only
those aviation activities — from a significant portion of the municipality
(those zones in which water aerodromes are not specifically approved)330
This statement was made to emphasize the contrast with the purpose o f the by-law as
enunciated in the preamble which claims to “find a balance between the activities of
summer home owners and more commercial land uses”.331 The Hansard-like attestation
was essentially a challenge o f the colourability of the by-law.332 The by-law was
impugned for having a hidden agenda - an objective that is different from what it
purports to do within the text o f the by-law itself. This evidence appears to have been
given significant weight in the decision, although, consistent with the observed pattern in
the 2010 judgments, corroborating reasons were given in support. The by-law was
declared to be ultra vires.
Witness testimony is rather questionable evidence o f intent. This person was in a
position o f knowledge with respect to the by-law, however the solemn statement was
made after the enactment o f the by-law and was therefore potentially influenced by time,
memory, emotion, after-the-fact consideration etc. This was not a verbatim transcript of
proceedings at the time but something much more remote. As a result, there are obvious
shortcomings in contemporaneity and reliability of the records.

330 Supra note 179 at para 22.
331 Ibid.
332 Colourability o f purpose is essentially the allegation that a law was enacted for a purpose that was
quite different (and typically dubious) from the ostensible purpose stated or implied in the statute.
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Ironically, Deschamps J. uses the same evidence in conjunction with related by
laws to support a very different point and to reach the opposite conclusion with respect to
the by-law:
As is clear not only from the Director General’s solemn affirmation, but
also from both the letter and the spirit o f zoning by-law No. 210, aviation
activities had been prohibited on Gobeil Lake since 1993. Once again,
the relevant passage from the solemn affirmation reads as follows:
[t r a n s l a t i o n ] “the municipality . . . decided . . . to maintain the
prohibition on commercial activities involving the use o f [the aerodrome]
. . . and to specifically authorize . . . commercial activities for the new
zone” (emphasis added). On the question o f the purpose and effects of
by-law No. 2 6 0 ,1 therefore attach greater weight to this statement o f the
Director General o f the municipality than to any slightly contradictory
comments made by counsel for the A.G.Q. in his factum or at the hearing
before this Court.333

The use o f witness testimony to assess the purpose of a statute is a significant issue. One
wonders where this might lead in the future. Consider a case like TorStar where
amendments were made to the bail process and there is a significant difference between
the recommendations o f a commission report and the statutory provision as enacted. If
there is nothing in the transcripts of proceedings, in circumstances like TorStar where
elaboration would be particularly helpful to the judge, would the testimony o f the
Minister be acceptable? Would the testimony o f a drafting consultant be acceptable?
These types o f activities would cause impassioned criticism in the United Kingdom. In
Canada, as always, no one seems to have any strong opinions about it.
(iii)

Hansard Use that Challenges the Beaulac Test

The Beaulac Test is not a mechanistic tool o f analysis that yields determinative
results. Indeed there are judgments where the analysis suggests that evidence is
333 Lacombe, supra note 50 at 197.
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questionable when in fact the evidence does provide reasonable support as an interpretive
aid. Nemeth provides an example.334 This unanimous decision by Cromwell J. was a
judicial review o f a decision by the Minister o f Justice to extradite a Roma couple to
Hungary despite the fact that these people were admitted into Canada as refugees from
Hungary. Canada has international treaty obligations which prohibit refoulement, which
is the “direct or indirect removal o f refugees to a territory where they run a risk o f being
subjected to human rights violations.”335
Cromwell J. concluded that amendments to the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act [IRPA\ and the Extradition Act were made “to harmonize the extradition
and refugee recognition processes and to entrust to the Minister o f Justice the ultimate
decision about the extradition o f a person claiming refugee status.”336 In support, he
mentioned the testimony o f Jacques Lemire (Senior Counsel, International Assistance
Group, Department o f Justice) and Gerry Van Kessel (Director General, Refugees,
Department o f Citizenship and Immigration).337 As well, he quoted a lengthy passage by
Van Kessel.338
334 Nemeth, supra note 50.
335 Nemeth, supra note 50 at para 17: “Canada has ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Can. T.S. 1969 No. 6 ( “Refugee Convention ”), as well as the 1967 Protocol Relating to the

Status o f Refugees, Can. T.S. 1969 No. 2 9 .“
336 Ibid at para 47.
337 Ibid; Senate, Proceedings o f the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 36th
Pari, 1st Sess, No. 60, (10 March 1999) at 60:6; House o f Commons, Minutes o f Proceedings and
Evidence o f the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 36th Pari, 1st Sess (November 17,
1998).
338 Ibid: “As Mr. Van Kessel put it during his testimony:
. . . the basic question we believe we face is how to deal with persons who are facing
extradition and make refugee claims. At the present time they are separate processes.

Bill C-40 [which became the 1999 Extradition Act] changes will legislate the rules for the
interaction between the extradition process and the refugee determination process for the
first time.
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By Beaulac's criteria, these statements should be viewed with skepticism. Both
Jacques Lemire and Van Kessel are civil servants, not elected officials. Yet, upon reading
the judgments, one is left with the impression that this passage was influential. It was the
first and the most lengthy justification for the proposition that the Minister o f Justice is
the person who Parliament intended to have authority over decisions concerning
extradition o f refugees.339 Yet, arguably, this point is a small part o f a larger decision
made in this case. Cromwell J. decided that the IRPA was not applicable to persons who
have completed the process o f claiming refugee status (despite submissions by Mr.
Nemeth). In the context o f this larger decision, the Hansard only addresses one o f several
sub-arguments within the decision. Meanwhile, the statement addressed the matter for
which it was put forward very directly. Furthermore, Dr. Van Kessel is well-respected,
knowledgeable and highly accomplished in the area o f international law that concerns
refugees.340
Upon citing the passage by Van Kessel, Cromwell J. asserted that
[t]his evidence is consistent with the text and scheme o f the EA and the IRPA :
the Minister o f Justice was intended to take the lead when a refugee’s rights
are implicated in an extradition decision. In addition, the reference in the

Bill C-40 also says protection [i.e. o f refugees] remains an issue and a concern that the
Minister o f Justice needs to deal with, and that is also dealt with in Bill C-40. The choice
made there is that the Minister o f Justice, before making a final decision on extradition or
surrender order, shall refuse to make a surrender if the refugee definition applies . . . . In a
sense, what has really changed here is who the decision-maker is. [Emphasis added; at
11:45 and 12:05.]
339 Judges are not bound by any rules o f form regarding the order o f ideas presented or the length o f
descriptions. This is not a scientific analysis, only a justification for the impression that the quote
appears to have been persuasive and influential.
340 Dr. Van Kessel served as the Coordinator o f Intergovernmental Consultations (IGC) on Asylum,
Refugees and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia (a UN initiative). He was
invited to speak at the 2004 Universal Forum o f Culture in Barcelona: coniine:
http://www.barcelona2004.org/www.barcelona2004.
org/eng/banco_del_conocimiento/personajes/ficha9771.html?cod_personaje=3595 >
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evidence to the Minister’s duty to refuse surrender “if the refugee definition
applies” clearly refers to s. 44 o f the EA, not to s. 115 o f the IRPA”34]
Cromwell J. regarded the Hansard as a supplement to an otherwise textualist analysis.
This case highlights the complexities faced when assessing legislative history for
weight. Upon strict application, Beaulac's test would suggest that this evidence should be
disregarded or given very little weight, yet the statement by Van Kessel does appear to be
relevant. It shows what the law-makers were being told by the experts about the purpose
o f proposed legislation in committee. It does not prove that the MLAs understood that, by
enacting the EA9the Minister of Justice would have authority over decisions concerning
the extradition o f status refugees. Yet in the context of this case, the evidence is
compelling, particularly in light o f the similarities in the texts o f s 44 o f the EA and the
provisions concerning refoulement in the Model Treaty and the European Convention?42
The notion that s 44 o f the EA was the domestic provision enacted to secure compliance
with an international treaty for the specific purpose o f prohibiting refoulement appears to
be very well-supported by the arguments.3412

341 Nemeth, supra note 195 at 48.
342 Supra note 269. Section 44 o f the Extradition Act is as follows:
(1) The Minister shall refuse to make a surrender order if the Minister is satisfied that

(b) The request for extradition is made for the purpose o f prosecuting or punishing the
person by reason o f their race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, language, colour,
political opinion, sex sexual orientation, age, mental or physical disability or status or

that the person's position may be prejudicedfor any o f those reasons. [Emphasis added\
Article 3(2) o f the UN Model Treaty prohibits extradition “if the requested Party has substantial
grounds for believing that a request for extradition for an ordinary criminal offence has been made for
the purpose o f prosecuting or punishing a person on account o f his race, religion, nationality or
political opinion, or that that person’s position may be prejudiced for any o f these reasons”.
Article 3(b) o f the Extradition Convention states that extradition is prohibited “[i]f the requested State
has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition has been made for the purpose o f
prosecuting or punishing a person on account o f that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin,
political opinions, sex or status, or that that person’s position may be prejudiced for any o f those
reasons”.
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(iv)

Hansard Use that Defies Analysis

Re AHRA involved the constitutional challenge o f a federal Criminal Law statute
that created a licencing scheme which regulated medical practices involving assisted
human reproduction (eg. in-vitro fertilization) and related research. Regulation of
professions is a provincial matter. The main issue concerned whether the licencing
scheme was justified under the federal jurisdiction over criminal law or whether it was an
infringement o f the provincial jurisdiction over the regulation o f professions.
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. noted the distinction between those activities that the
legislators regarded as categorically “morally reprehensible” (like receiving payment for
being a surrogate mother, the cloning o f humans and experiments which mixed human
DNA with non-human DNA) that were prohibited by the legislation, and the various
activities that were “regulated” via the licencing scheme which were not universally
regarded as morally reprehensible by the legislators, but indeed were regarded as
beneficial.343 This distinction was discussed by the Baird Report at great length. Hansard
was used by LeBel and Deschamps JJ. in conjunction with a variety o f other extrinsic
aids to support the notion that Parliament had a much deeper awareness o f the distinction
between these two types o f activities than one might conclude by only considering the
Baird Report,344
343 What constitutes morally acceptable practices with respect to cloning and stem-cell research are
matters that are fraught with controversy and conflicting opinions within society. This thesis takes no
position on the propriety o f the judges' stances.
344 Re AHRA, supra note 50 at para 177: “... the substantive and formal distinctions between
controlled activities and activities that are prohibited completely stem from the legislative
history, from the nature o f the activities and from how they are presented in the AHR
Act. ... In conducting such analyses, this Court gives considerable weight to the legislative
facts. Moreover, in an affidavit filed in evidence during the hearing in the Court o f Appeal,
Francine Manseau, Senior Strategic Policy Advisor, Assisted Human Reproduction
Implementation Office, Department o f Health Canada, clearly stated that the mandate
received from the Minister had been [TRANSLATION] “to analyze the Baird Report and
develop policy statements consistent with its recommendations and findings” (A.R., at p.
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It was noted that the prohibited activities were subjected to a moratorium by
Health Canada in conjunction with repeated attempts to pass legislation two years after
the Baird Report was published, and eight years before the impugned legislation was
debated in Parliament. During this time the regulated activities were left alone.
In support o f the proposition that the regulated activities were not regarded as
morally repugnant by Parliament, a series o f experts were cited:
... Dr. Roger Gosden, in testifying before the Standing Committee on
Health on May 17, 2001 (11:40), stressed the important role that research
plays in enhancing our understanding o f the causes o f infertility,
improving the success rate o f infertility treatments and avoiding inherited
diseases.
In the course o f the debate in Parliament, particular attention was devoted
to research involving transgenics. Some members suggested that such
research be prohibited rather than being regulated (as it is under s. 11 of
the AHR Act). In responding to two proposed amendments, Health
Canada representatives explained that such an approach would not be
desirable.
Regarding a proposal for a total ban on transgenics, the chair of the
Standing Committee on Health asked Rodney Ghali, a science policy
analyst from the Special Projects Division o f the Department o f Health,
what the impact of prohibiting all transgenic research would be. Mr. Ghali
answered that research in this huge field, which is beneficial for all
Canadians, included research into cancer, Huntington's disease and other
diseases of the nervous system. The proposed amendment was rejected
(Evidence o f the Standing Committee on Health, House o f Commons, 2nd
Sess., 37th Pari., No. 013, December 9, 2002, 10:25-10:35).
Similarly, in response to a motion to amend that would have resulted in a
ban on transgenics, Jeannot Castonguay, the Parliamentary Secretary to
the then Minister o f Health, explained in the House of Commons that
such a ban “would have the effect o f immediately, and permanently,
putting an end to the efforts of numerous Canadian researchers and
laboratories to develop therapies for the treatment of a number o f dread
diseases, among them cancer and Alzheimer's.” {House o f Commons
Debates, 2nd Sess., 37th Pari., vol. 138, No. 072, March 18, 2003, at p.

6961). We therefore prefer to keep the legislative history and the distinctions between
prohibited and controlled activities in mind.” Also see Baird Report, supra note 248.
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4335).345
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. incorporated an enormous quantity o f materials into their
opinion and they should be forgiven for dealing with this information in what could be
regarded as a cavalier fashion. This case is strikingly similar to M v H These two
judgments represent a genre o f SCC decision that bares certain identifiable traits
including a central moral controversy, a deeply divided court, and in-depth consideration
o f policy-related matters via commission reports and scholarly literature. The amount of
information that the judges had to digest in the submissions must have been massive. In
setting about an analysis o f the weight that ought to be assigned to various pieces of
Hansard, one must be keenly aware that there are limits to what can be addressed
specifically in this type o f opinion.346A piece-by-piece analysis is not feasible.
Nonetheless it is preferable that judges be forthright in mentioning all materials that were
found to be compelling, even in a cursory way, rather than leaving them out.
It is worth noting that some rather unusual extrinsic aids were referred to in this
judgment. Bills that died on the order table, and statements made by expert consultants in
committees were being used to prove that Parliament regarded those activities which
were regulated as fundamentally different from those activities which were prohibited
outright. It is fair to ask if this should be used as compelling evidence o f parliamentary
intent with respect to the Assisted Human Reproduction Act,347

345 Re AHRA, supra note 50 at paras 2 1 3 - 2 1 5 .
346 The notion that time imposes an “economic” constraint on statutory interpretation is explored further
by Graham. See supra note 305 at 61-69.
347 SC 2004, c 2.
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(d) C onclusions A bout the B ea u la c A nalysis
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the Beaulac Test is a valuable guide but
not a formalistic tool for the analysis of Hansard and other legislative history materials.
Based on the preceding assessment o f the 2010 judgments, which is necessarily
subjective, it would appear that the SCC justices are occasionally using materials of
questionable value. In this respect, there has not been a significant change since 1999.348
Despite this finding, the preceding analysis does reveal a trend. In 1999 much of
the controversy surrounded Hansard in the archetypical form o f passages quoted from the
debates in Parliament. There was much more use of proceedings o f committees in 2010,
and in particular, more statements by consultants and civil servants.
This change suggests that there has been a broadening o f the scope o f evidence of
legislative intent since 1999. The testimony o f a municipal councillor,349 failed Bills350
and statements made by a lobbyist351 are examples of the more unusual types o f extrinsic
aids that were considered by judges at the SCC in 2010.
It seems quite likely that judicial use of such materials would have inspired heated
scholarly criticism in other nations, and this does raise a serious question: what limits
ought to be imposed upon extrinsic aids to interpretation? Transcripts are official records.
A statement about a law, made years after the law was enacted is entirely different, and
Lacombe pushes the envelope in a decidedly dangerous direction. In the absence o f an
exclusionary rule, it is up to judges to make responsible decisions about what sources of
348 Beaulac found that questionable materials had been used in several judgments in 1999. See Beaulac,
supra note 7 at 609-613.
349 Lacombe, supra note 50.
350 ReAHRA, supra note 50.
351 Globe & Mail, supra note 50.
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information are deserving o f weight, and what sources are too doubtful to trust. It is up to
lawyers to criticize where appropriate and keep the judiciary in check. The Canadian
legal community has a collective responsibility to ensure that these materials are treated
in a manner that respects the risks and frailties.352
It is fascinating to watch how different judges might treat the same piece of
Hansard differently within a judgment. For example, in Re AHRA, some Justices were
swayed by the various extrinsic materials, but the legislative history was not universally
convincing. Indeed, Cromwell, J., who regarded legislative history as quite compelling in
Nemeth, comes to a conclusion strikingly similar to LeBel and Deschamps JJ. in Re
AHRA, but he appears to eschew all o f the reasons that are based on legislative history.353
This pattern was evident in several o f the 2010 judgments. Deschamps J. made
use o f Hansard in Lacombe, Re AHRA, TorStar and Syndicat but left it out o f her reasons
in Century and Morelli. McLachlin CJ. referred to Hansard in Lacombe but not in Re
AHRA. All the judges who wrote two opinions or more both used and rejected Hansard;
Binnie J. and Fish J. each wrote one opinion, and both referred to Hansard.354 The
following table makes the pattern more visible:

352 In Rizzo, supra note 6 at 35, Iacobucci J. noted that “the frailties o f Hansard evidence are many”. The
passage that Iaccobucci J. quoted by Sopinka J. in R v Morgentaler, [1993] 3 SCR 463 at 484 cautioned
that Hansard should be admitted “[provided that the court remains mindful o f the limited reliability
and weight o f Hansard evidence”. Some serious reflection on these frailties would serve the legal
community well.
353 His decision is brief, amounting to 12 paragraphs. The paragraphs by LeBel and Deschamps JJ.
opinion that Cromwell J. cited in concurrence are ones that do not touch on legislative history.
Meanwhile, he assessed the essence o f the impugned provisions in a single paragraph, by simply
stating that they constitute “regulation o f virtually every aspect o f research and clinical practice in
relation to assisted human reproduction”. Re AHRA, supra note 50 at paras 282-294.
354 Telezone, supra note 192; Morelli, supra note 198.
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Table #3: Opinions that Rely on Hansard in 2010
Opinion
Made Use o f
Hansard

2010 Judgments

Yes

No

Quebec (Attorney G eneral) v. Lacombe

McLachlinCJ. (majority)
Deschamps J. (dissenting)

X
X

Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney G eneral)

Deschamps J. (majority)
Abella J. (dissenting)

X
X

R eference re A ssisted Human R eproduction Act
X

X
X

McLachlin J. (split)
LeBel & DesChamps JJ. (split)
Cromwell J. (controlling)
R. v. M orelli

Fish J. (majority)
Deschamps J. (dissenting)
Canada (Attorney G eneral) v. TeleZone Inc.
Binnie J. (unanimous)
Ném eth v. Canada (Justice)

Cromwell J (unanimous)

X
X
X
X

Toronto Star N ewspapers Ltd. v. Canada

Deschamps J. (Majority)
Abella J. (dissenting)

X
X

G lob e and M ail v. Canada (Attorney G eneral)

LeBel J. (unanimous)

X

Apparently there are no textualist judges at the Supreme Court o f Canada. Meanwhile,
there is no evidence that use o f Hansard usurps judicial discretion. The Justices freely
accept or reject Hansard independently from each other.

3.5 C onclusions about the Q ualitative A nalysis
In general, the following changes have occurred since Beaulac's study of the 1999
SCC judgments. Based on the judgments in this study, the compartmentalized approach to
legislative history is dead. The materials were considered regardless o f the presence or
absence o f Constitutional issues, and there were no statements in the opinions which
suggested that admissibility was affected by the context. Meanwhile, Hansard was used
for both Constitutional and non-Constitutional issues in a fairly even split.
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The Court did not insist upon any ambiguity requirement in 2010, and there were
no other class-based rules or cautionary approaches which would suggest that legislative
history was treated as a second-class interpretive aid. It is an equal among extrinsic
materials. Nonetheless, Hansard is rarely used as a stand-alone interpretive aid. Instead,
in 2010 Hansard is typically used in combination with other pieces of legislative history,
and often for the purpose o f shoehoming committee reports and commission reports into
the reasons.
Within the judgments, there was no discernible pattern which suggested that
certain judges were more likely to use legislative history than others. Instead, all judges
accepted and rejected these submissions depending on the utility o f such submissions in
justifying each judge's preferred outcome.355 Furthermore, there was often disagreement
between the judges in any particular case about whether or not any particular materials
are compelling.
In 2010, the Justices at the SCC were much less likely to cite authority for
recourse to Hansard than in 1999. The justices were also much less likely to comment on
the admissibility o f legislative history as an interpretive aid in general. When they
commented on any particular piece o f legislative history, it was because they found the
item compelling. When they did not find it compelling, they did not mention it in their
opinion. Significantly, a standard form o f citation has evolved which is similar to the
format recommended by the McGill Guide.

355 There is no suggestion here that judges are biased in any way or that judges choose personal
preferences over the law, so to speak. When issues make it to the Supreme Court o f Canada they are
such that reasonable people can disagree about the appropriate outcome based on a good-faith
assessment o f the law and the facts as presented in the submissions. The only point being made is that
judges look to the arguments presented in the submissions to support the outcome they find the most
appropriate in all the circumstances o f any particular case.
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Altogether, these findings suggest that recourse to legislative history has reached a
new stage o f maturity in the past ten years. The judges have become comfortable with
these materials, and the law is becoming settled. Along with this, there has been a gradual
expanding o f the repertoire o f interpretive aids. In 1999, statements made by elected
members in Parliament and legislatures were the predominant item at issue. In 2010 such
things as statements by experts, legal consultants and civil servants in committee were
much more common. This shift was perhaps inevitable. When legislative history is
admissible, there is an incentive for lawyers to dig into the legislative history and bring
up anything that supports the client's position. This practice most certainly does not stop
with transcripts o f proceedings.
O f course, this is not a conclusion derived from the study, but speculation about
the forces behind the trend. This study did not examine the submissions o f counsel.356 It
only examined judicial comment on legislative history in judgments. Based on this study,
judges are commenting on a wider variety o f legislative history materials in more
complex combinations, typically involving multiple pieces o f corroborating items.
There is need to restate a caveat here. The findings are based on a relatively small
set o f judgments, and there is always the possibility of anomalous sets o f decisions in any
particular year. The findings appear to be reasonable and plausible. They are based on the
judgments as they appear. It is a strategic snap-shot. It is a calculated glimpse into a
phenomenon that is not well-studied in Canada, and more research is needed to support
(or refute) the findings.
356 Given that judges tend to rely on extrinsic aids presented by counsel and rarely present their own
'evidence o f meaning' in court, it is reasonable to assume that Hansard finds its way into judgments via
submission from counsel. Speculation about the behaviour o f counsel as an underlying cause is
therefore reasonable.
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CHAPTER 4:
Q u a n tita tive A n alysis o f H ansard in the C ou rts o f C anada
The rest o f this thesis will focus on the issues that were dealt with via quantitative
analysis. In the following discussion, it will become clear that Quebec is no more likely
to be the source jurisdiction for an SCC judgment referring to Hansard than other
jurisdictions in Canada. In order to show that there is no “Quebec phenomenon”, the
prevalence o f Hansard use will be examined at the SCC, the Appellate Courts, the
provincial superior courts and the Federal Court o f Canada. First, the prevalence of
Hansard use at the SCC will be considered. Then, the source jurisdictions o f the SCC
judgm ents referring to Hansard will be examined. Next, the prevalence o f judgments
referring to Hansard at the appellate courts in Canada will be examined; and finally the
prevalence o f judgem ents referring to Hansard at the provincial superior courts and the
Federal Court will be examined.

4.1 H a n sa rd in S C C Ju d gm en ts from 1999 to 2010
Given that Hansard and Hansard-like materials appeared in ten judgments in the
2010 study and in thirteen judgments in the 1999 study, it seems fairly obvious that the
use o f Hansard at the SCC represents a relatively small percentage o f the total judgments
rendered. However, unless calculations are made, the prevalance o f Hansard use remains
an estimate. The following table shows the total number o f judgments rendered by the
SC C for each year from 1999 through to 2010, along with the total number o f judgments
that make reference to Hansard, and the percentage o f judgments that make reference to
Hansard:
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Table #4: Judgments Referring to Hansard at the SC C from 1999 to 2010357
T otal
# of

# of
Ju d gm en ts
involving

% of
Ju d gm en ts
Involving

Year

Ju d g m en ts

H ansard

H ansard

1999
20 00
2001
2002
20 03
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
20 10

81
72
91
88
81
78
89
79
58
74
70
69

13
8
5
9
8
4
7
8
8
5
8
10

16.0%
11.1%
5.5%
10.2%
9.9%
5.1%
7.9%
10.1%
13.8%
6.8 %
11.4%
14.5%

Average

77

8

10.0%

Some things should be kept in mind when digesting this table. First, the search
criteria turned up any judgm ent in which a statement was made that referred to Hansard
or to Hansard-like materials. This includes minutes and proceedings in committee. This
has caught some other unusual extrinsic interpretive aids in 1999 and 2010; however this
was incidental by-catch: The search criteria did not seek this type o f material out directly,
o f the search criteria. There is no guarantee that cases that make use o f these outlying
phenomena will be included in the list o f cases. This does catch cases like COPA and
Kitkala, which discuss Hansard but do not actually consider such materials. Based on the
1999 and 2010 judgments, something in the neighbourhood o f 10% o f the judgments will
refer to Hansard-like materials but not actually use them in the reasoning.358

357 The total number o f judgments for 2000 through to 2010 were taken from the Supreme Court o f
Canada Statistics 2000-2010: Supreme Court o f Canada Statistics 2000-2010: Bulletin o f Proceedings
- Special Edition, (Ottawa: Supreme Court o f Canada, 2011). The CanLII database purports to be
complete with respect to SCC judgments in 1999.
358 There was one case in 1999 and one case in 2010. This is a small sample size and the estimate must be
understood in lieht o f this.
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Based on these numbers, 1999 is the high watermark for Hansard use in terms o f
the num ber o f decisions in one year and as a percentage o f total judgments in one year,
over the study period. As can be seen, the number o f judgments that refer to Hansard can
fluctuate quite dramatically from year to year. This is understandable given the small size
o f the data set and the complexities surrounding adjudication. However, the percentages
range from 5% to 16%, while the average is 10% over the study period, and this is fairly
close to the mid-point between the highest and lowest percentages. It would be fair to say
that, in any given year Hansard will be referred to in 10% o f SCC judgments plus or
minus 5%.
The following graph shows the percentage o f judgments referring to Hansard
over the study period:

Figure #1: Percentage o f SC C Judgments Referring to Hansard from 1999 to 2010
18

1999 2000 2001

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Year
Based on this data, judicial reference to Hansard at the SCC is relatively stable
over the study period.
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4.2 T h e Sou rce Jurisd iction s o f S C C Ju d gm en ts R eferring to H ansard
During the analysis o f the 2010 SCC judgments, one particular detail stood out.
Among the ten judgm ents in 2010 caught by this study, six o f arose out o f issues on
appeal from the Quebec Court o f Appeal. This raises the potential issue o f the influence
o f the civil code heritage in that province. In order to determine if this was more than just
an anomaly, two different research questions were asked. First, was there a pattern to the
source o f SCC decisions that extended beyond 2010? Second, was there a pattern with
respect to the lower courts o f the provinces? The first question is the most obvious
avenue o f inquiry. If there is a “Quebec phenomenon”, it will persist over time. The
second issue is a broader inquiry. If a disproportionate share of decisions at the SCC
involving Hansard come from Quebec, what is going on in the lower courts? Are the
Quebec court judgm ents more likely to refer to Hansard than courts in other
jurisdictions? In the process o f answering this question, the prevalence o f Hansard use
throughout the various courts o f Canada was examined.
The following chart provides the answer to the first research question. It shows
the source jurisdictions for all SCC cases that met the search criteria between 1999 and
2009. The percentage o f judgments originating from each jurisdiction over the entire
study period is shown in the far right column.
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Table #5: Source Jurisdiction of SC C Judgments from 1999 - 2009359
99
A lb e rta
B .C .
F e d e ra l
M a n ito b a
N .B .
N fld & L a b .

4
1
1
1
1

00

1
3
3
1

01

2

2
3

Q uebec
Sask.

2
3

03

04

05

06

07

1
2

1
1

2

1

1

1
1

1
2
1

2

08

09

T o ta l

%

1
1
2

8

9.5%

17

20.2%

12

14.3%

5

6.0%

2

2.4%

3

3.6%

2

2.4%

16

19.0%

17

20.2%

2

2.4%

1
1

N .S .
O n ta rio

02

2

1
1
1
2

3

1
2
2

3
3

1
3

1
2
1

1
3

This chart suggests very strongly that 2010 was an anomaly. Quebec is not the
source o f the majority o f decisions that make reference to Hansard at the SCC over time.
There is a tendency for the curious to ponder the relationship between Hansard use and
the Civil Code roots o f the Quebec legal system. This historical, cultural legacy could
impact any number o f issues, but given the fact that the 2010 figures appear anomalous,
the use o f Hansard at SCC judgments does not appear to be among them. Meanwhile, it is
interesting to note that P.E.I. is the only province absent from the list. Given the very
small population o f that jurisdiction, there is no reason to suspect any other cause than
probabilities for this absence. Generally, this is a widely distributed phenomenon. As will
be seen in the analysis that follows, this wide distribution occurs throughout the courts of
Canada.359360

359 The total source jurisdictions exceed the total number o f SCC decisions in certain years. Occasionally
an SCC judgment will settle issues arising from multiple judgments from different jurisdictions. Each
jurisdiction was counted separately for those judgments.
360 Although this study did not uncover any SCC judgments for which P.E.I. was the source jurisdiction,
there was a decision at the P.E.I. Supreme Court that referred to Hansard. See CHD Investments Inc. v
P.E.I. (The Government of), 1995 CanLII 3484 (PE SCTD). The Yukon Territory was the source
jurisdiction for an SCC judgment that referred to Hansard. See Gould v Yukon Order o f Pioneers,
[1996] 1 SCR 571.
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4.3 J u d icia l R eferen ce to H ansard at the A p p ellate and P rovincial Su perior
C ou rts o f C an ada
Although the issue o f Quebec as a source jurisdiction is resolved decisively by
examining the source jurisdictions o f SCC judgments, the prevalence o f Hansard use
throughout the various courts o f Canada remains a compelling subject o f inquiry. Thus
far, the following insights have been uncovered in the quantitative analysis:
1. Hansard will be referred to in approximately 10% o f SCC judgments
2. SC C Judgments that make reference to Hansard deal with issues on appeal from
all jurisdictions in Canada.
The complete picture o f Hansard use in Canada can be achieved by looking at the
appellate and provincial superior courts.
The following table shows the number o f judgments that make reference to
Hansard at the appellate courts across Canada. For the courts serving larger jurisdictions,
the total number o f judgments are indicated for 1999 and 2010, as well as the percentage
o f cases referring to Hansard.

Table #6: Appellate Court Judgments Referring to Hansard in 1999 and 2010
1999

201 0

#of
%of
Total
Judgments Judgments
Involving Involving
# of
Hansard
Judgments Hansard
1
Alberta
369
0.27%
British Columbia
774
6
0.78%
6
1.84%
Federal Court
326
1
Manitoba
New Brunswick
0
1
Nfld & Labrador
0
Nova Scotia
811
2
Ontario
0.25%
Quebec
709
5
0.71%
Saskatchewan
0
T o ta l
A v e ra g e %

2989

22

#of
%of
Total
Judgments Judgments
# of
Involving
Involving
Judgments
Hansard
Hansard
394
4
1.02%
570
6
1.05%
348
3
0.86%
2
0
0
2
868
8
0.92%
2414
2
0.08%
2
4594

0 . 74%

29
0 . 63 %
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The total num ber o f judgments for each court was taken from CanLII, which purports to
have all published judgments for both years in their database. The field in gray is
problematic. According to CanLII, it is the current policy o f the Quebec Court o f Appeal
to publish all decisions rendered including procès-verbal d'audience. This means that
judgm ents concerning administrative matters such as requests for adjournments are being
included in the database.361 The total number o f judgments for the Quebec Court o f
Appeal in 2010 is therefore not suitable for direct comparison with the other numbers
provided. The very large number o f published judgments is inconsistent with the other
jurisdictions, and it is also inconsistent with the total in Quebec for 1999. It seems likely
that the “correct” number o f substantive decisions (i.e. those touching on genuine issues
o f fact and law) would be closer to the 1999 number.362
Despite the shortcomings in the total number o f judgments for 2010, it is clear
that the Quebec Court o f Appeal does not refer to Hansard more often than the appellate

361 An explanation was provided via email from Emma Elliott, Gestionnaire de projets/Project Manager at
Lexum on April 31, 2011. Two main reasons were given: “Firstly, it is the QCCA’s policy to publish all
decisions rendered, even those referred to as 'procès-verbal d'audience'... which are decisions rendered
per example by a lone judge about matters as mundane as the rescheduling o f hearing dates, requests
for extensions o f deadlines, etc. This policy is opposed to other Courts o f Appeal who are more
restrictive in their publications and who will publish only decisions touching directly on the merits o f a
case.
A lso, Quebec is the only province to have a regulation obliging all clerks o f the courts and the quasi
judicial tribunals in Quebec to send all decisions delivered with reasons to the Société québécoise
d'information juridique (http://soquij.qc.ca/ff/english) with whom an agreement for publication has
been entered into. The effect o f such a by-law is that in Quebec, the distribution o f judgments is more
complete than elsewhere in Canada.” By-law respecting the collection and selection o f judicial
decisions , RRQ, c S-20, r 1, online: CanLII < http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/regu/rrq-c-s-20-rl/latest/rrq-c-s-20-r-l .html>.

362 According to Statistics Canada, the population o f Quebec was 7,363,262 in 1999 and 7,907,400 in
2010. See supra note . This is approximately a 7% increase. Note that a commensurate modest
increase in total judgments rendered occurred in Alberta, Ontario and at the Federal Court between
1999 and 2010. It is reasonable to expect that the appropriate number o f judgments would be in the
neighbourhood o f 7% above the number o f 1999 judgments. This would be much closer to 709 than
2414.
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courts in other jurisdictions. Instead, the data indicates a broad and relatively even
distribution throughout the courts.
Also, it would appear that the phenomenon o f Hansard use in court is relatively
stable throughout the appellate courts, although dramatic changes might occur in any one
jurisdiction for any particular year. Within the courts that serve larger populations, any
particular court might use Hansard in .2% to 1.8% o f judgments, and the overall average
remains around 0.7%. This is an interesting figure in comparison with the 10% average at
the SCC.
The following table provides the equivalent information for the provincial
superior courts and the Federal Court for that which was provided previously for the
appellate courts.

Table #7: Trial Court Judgments Referring to Hansard in 1999 and 2010
1999
#of
Total

2010
% of

Judgm ents Judgm ents

# of

% of

Total

Judgm ents

Judgm ents

#of

Involving

Involving

# of

Involving

Involving

Ju d g m en ts

Hansard

Hansard

Judgm ents

Hansard

Hansard

A lb erta

1058

13

1 .2 3 %

727

9

1 .2 4 %

British C olum bia

2128

7

0 .3 3 %

184 8

7

0 .3 8 %

F ed eral C ourt

1707

8

0 .4 7 %

134 6

4

0 .3 0 %

M anitoba

4

2

N e w B run sw ick

0

0

Nfld & Labrador

0

1

N o va Scotia
O ntario
Q u eb ec

0

353
NA

S askatchew an

Total
Average %

6
N.A.

2

1.70%

3336

6

0 .1 8 %

6966

6

0 .0 9 %

3

5246

3

41

14223
0.78%

40
0.28%
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Some things to keep in mind: Only the provincial superior courts (i.e. the s 96 courts) and
the Federal Court were included in this study.163 The figures in gray are problematic. The
data for the Ontario Superior Court was incomplete for 1999, and for the Quebec
Superior Court the data is lacking entirely.
This table suggests that there may be an “Alberta phenomenon” rather than a
“Quebec phenomenon”, and only at the trial court level. This is counter-intuitive. One
would expect that the tendency to refer to Hansard would occur in both trial courts and
appellate courts. More research would be required to confirm that this is more than an
aberration. It is an interesting finding nonetheless. Unlike Quebec with its civil code
tradition, there is no obvious reason why there might be a difference in Alberta.
As well, the phenomenon demonstrates a wide distribution among the
jurisdictions. It should be noted that, although no judgments from P.E.I. or the North West
Territories were found for 1999 or 2010, there have been judgments referring to Hansard
from these jurisdictions.164
Meanwhile, it would appear that, outside o f Alberta, the percentage o f superior
court and federal trial court judgments that make reference to Hansard remains within the
0.2% - 0.4% range, approximately.364

363 There are cases referring to Hansard at the provincial courts o f justice in both 1999 and 2010, however
the total number o f decisions published was very small (for example, there were only 571 decisions o f
the Ontario Court o f Justice in the CanLlI database for 2010). There can be little doubt that more
judgments are rendered than show up in the database. As a result, this information would tend to inflate
the percentages if it were included in the table. It was therefore left out. It is interesting, nonetheless,
that Hansard is being used at the provincial court level.
364 See for example, supra note 218; also see Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v Richardson, 1995
CanLlI 6235 (NW T SC).
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4.4 C on clusions: T h e R elation ship B etw een R eferen ce to H ansard and the
L evel o f C ou rts in C anada
The data suggests that there is a numeric relationship between the various levels
o f courts in Canada. There is a relatively low probability o f Hansard being used at the
trial level (-0.3% ). There is a higher probability at the courts o f appeal (-0.7% ), and the
highest probability is at the SCC (-10% ).
This makes sense for a number o f reasons. Given that sifting through the
legislative records is time-consuming and expensive, it is reasonable to expect that
litigants would be more likely to do so as a legal dispute moves up to the higher level
courts. As litigants make the decision to follow through with an appeal, they become
more invested in the dispute and more willing to devote time and money to the process.
Meanwhile, many o f the issues to be settled at the trial court level are likely not to
be as complex and challenging as the issues for which leave to appeal is granted.
Arguments based on more traditional and less costly materials like precedent and the
canons o f interpretation are likely sufficient for the majority o f the legal determinations at
the trial court level. In these types o f cases, research into legislative history would be an
unnecessary expense.
Furthermore, as the complexity o f the legal determinations increases at the higher
courts, so too does the demand for justifications by the judges who have the unenviable
task o f defending their judgments. In economic terms, there is greater demand for
justifications in the higher courts, and the prevalence o f Hansard use reflects this.
O f course, an economic analysis o f Hansard use is merely one possible
interpretation o f the results, and it is an interpretation that would require more research to
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substantiate. First and foremost, this is a study o f judicial comment on Hansard. The
central finding is this: Judges are more likely to comment on Hansard as decisions move
up to higher courts.
Some caution must be taken when assessing the very tiny glimpse at Hansard in
the various lower courts. The difference between the trial courts and the provincial
appellant courts and the federal counterparts would need further research to confirm the
numerical relationships, particularly in light o f the findings in Alberta. However, the
difference between the various trial and appellate courts in comparison to the SCC is
clear. Judicial comment on Hansard is much more likely to occur at the SCC than at all o f
the courts below.

4.5 O verall C on clusions
There has been considerable evolution with respect to Hansard use in SCC
judgm ents since Beaulac's study in 1999. In 2010 there was no ambiguity requirement
and there were no lingering hints o f the pre-Rizzo compartmentalized approach to
admissibility that considered the context o f the adjudication. In comparison to 1999, the
use o f Hansard and Hansard-like materials was rarely justified by precedents in 2010.
Although Hansard and Hansard-like materials were treated as extrinsic aids that
are equal to and not subordinate to other extrinsic aids in 2010, these materials were
m uch less likely to have been used in the absence o f corroborating materials. This
corroboration often occurred in the form o f footnote-style citations following a quote
from Hansard. As well, there was an expanded repertoire o f materials drawn from
legislative history that appeared in the 2010 SCC judgments. Ironically, despite the
expanding repertoire, the prevalence o f Hansard use was stable over the study period.

137
This is counter-intuitive and rather curious to say the least. Nonetheless, this is what the
study revealed. This is an issue that deserves further research.
While answering definitively that there is no “Quebec phenomenon” with respect
to where decisions involving Hansard come from, there appears to be an “Alberta Trial
Court phenomenon” and this too is counter-intuitive. Surely if a jurisdiction is more
likely to use Hansard in judgments, this would occur at the appellate level as well.
However the data set is particularly small for trial court judgments and further research
would be required to confirm that there is in fact an “Alberta Trial Court phenomenon”
before attempting to understand the forces behind it.
The numerical relationship between the courts with respect to the prevalence o f
Hansard is another finding that deserves some further inquiry. Again, a larger data set
would help to add force to the findings. If the prevalence is stable over time and increases
at higher courts, as this study suggests, then there is cause to study the underlying forces
at work.
One issue that has not changed since 1999 is the ongoing use o f materials that
have questionable or doubtful weight. When considered in the context o f the expanding
variety o f extrinsic aids that are finding their way into the SCC opinions over time, there
is the question o f whether the courts are sliding down a slippery slope. Given that
testimony under oath by a municipal councillor was considered to determine the
legislative intent behind a by-law,365 and the consideration given to civil servants and
lobbyists,366 would the court consider testimony of a drafting consultant under oath years

365 Lacombe , supra note 50.
366 Re ÂHRA , supra note 50; Globe & Mail, supra note 50; Németh , supra note 50.
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after the legislation was drafted? This question is not asked as a damning condemnation
o f Hansard use in 2010, but merely as a cautionary question. In general Hansard use does
not appear to be out-of-control. Indeed, many o f the “doubtful” Hansard excerpts likely
suffer from a lack o f fully fleshed out citations rather than the use o f evidence to justify
interpretations for which the evidence is not well-suited. Nonetheless, the direction o f the
evolution is troubling in some respects, and care should be taken going forward.
Despite the rather modest glimpse into judicial use o f legislative history provided
by this study, the insights are thought-provoking. Until now, Beaulac's study o f the SCC
judgm ents in 1999 was the only in-depth scholarly examination o f Hansard use in
Canadian Courts. With this study, Beaulac's findings have been revisited and brought up
to date. As well, the SCC decisions can be placed in the larger context o f Hansard use in
Canadian Courts in general. The findings are deserving o f some skepticism because o f
the very sparse sample from which they were drawn. However, the insight that this
research provides is the essential “next step” for further insight into this area o f law.
Welcome to the spotlight, Hansard. After years in the darkness, we now know just a little
bit more about you.
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droit à la libre expression, du droit à l'instruction,
du droit d'association, tout cela. Je sais que M. le
ministre a mentionné, tout à l'heure, que ces
droits, déjà, constituaient, à toutes fins utiles, le
droit à l'information. Vous nous permettrez de ne
pas être d’accord sur cette interprétation de ces
droit. On pourrait, par exemple, dire que, si un
citoyen du Témiscamingue ou de la Gaspésie a le
droit à la libre expression, le droit de parole ou le
droit d’association, il n'a pas forcément le droit à
l'information, parce qu’il peut en être privé, et c'est
le cas.
En faisant un survol assez générai du Québec,
on pourrait comme cela trouver plusieurs endroits
où les gens, effectivement, n’ont pas ce droit à
l’information.
Quand un Etat permet une concentration in
due qui débouche sur des situationsde monopole,
soit à l'échelle locale, régionale ou nationale, le
droit à l’information est brimé parce que l'on coupe
la diversité dans l'information, etc. On peut revenir
là-dessus. Quand l'Etat ne permet pas le secret
professionnel pour les journalistes, c’est un peu
ce qui risque de se passer. Quand l’Etat permet,
faute de s’être penché plus sérieusement sur le
problème, la saisie de matériel journalistique par
les corps policiers ou l’arrestation induedujournaiiste, c’est encore le même droit qui est brimé.
Quand on permet le huis clos ou un huis clos indu,
c'est encore ce même droit qui est brimé. Et on
pourrait continuer comme cela, par exemple, en
pariant de la question du papier journal; si l'Etat
permetqu’une situation assez anarchique, comme
ceile qu’on connaît maintenant, se perpétue et que
cela puisse avoir comme conséquence que cer
tains journaux qui ont les reins moins solides que
d’autres disparaissent du marché, c’est encore ce
même droit qui est brimé. Quand l’Etat tes retient
indûment ou permet ou ne permet pas l’accessibi
lité aux documents publics, c’est encore ce même
droit qui est brimé. Et je ne pense pas que te droit à
l'expression, ou le droit de parole, ou le droit d'as
sociation soit suffisant dans un cas comme celuilà.
Le Président (M. Pilote): Avez-vous terminé?
L'honorable ministre de la Justice.
M. Choquette: Voici, je n'ai rien contre l'idée
du droit à l'information. Je pense que donner une
information extensive et complète est sûrement
un objectif désirable, et cela s’inscrit tout à fait
dans un contexte démocratique, pour permettre
aux citoyens de juger des affaires publiques et, le
cas échéant, de prendre des positions, soit à l’oc
casion d'élections ou autrement. Alors, ce n'est
pas que j'en ai contre l’objectif que vous visez. A
ce point de vue. je vous dirais que je vous suis
reconnaissant d ’avoir souligné un certain nombre
de législations étrangères oü on a mentionné ce
droit à l’information.
Mais je vous pose la question: Comment
voyez-vous ce droit à l’information dans un projet
de loi qui cherche, en même temps qu’il énonce
des principes, à rendre ces principes concrets et à
donner et conférer des droits spécifiques qui dé-

coulent de la violation de ces droits? Vous aurez
noté, par exemple, que les droits qui sont men
tionnés généralement dans ce projet de charte
peuvent faire l’objet de sanctions par les tribu
naux. Moi, je vous demande comment le droit à
l’information, principe sur lequel je n’ai aucune
critique à faire, pourrait faire l’objet d’une sanction
par les tribunaux?
M. Mailhot: Nous le voyons dans le domaine
des droits fondamentaux, dès le départ. Il n'y a
absolument rien qui nous empêcherait — et d'en
tenir compte dans la C harte des droits de
l’homme — de circonscrire quatre ou cinq de ces
droits parce qu’il faut absolument disséquer la notion de droit à l'information, qui est quand même
un droit très vaste. Mn’y a rien qui nous empêche
rait donc de circonscrire trois ou quatre de ces
droits.de lesinscriredanslacharte, évidemmentà
titre non limitatif, et de poursuivre, par la suite, à
développer graduellement un cadre institutionnel
législatif qui s'attaquerait à des problèmes aussi
importants— auxquels on est confronté de plus
en plus sérieusement, ailleurs, depuis deux ou
trois ans — que le problème de la concentration
des entreprises de presse, que la question du se
cret professionnel. Vous avez vous-même souli
gné. lors des discussions à l'Assemblée nationale
sur ce projet, que vous étiez en train d ’étudier
d'assez près la question du secret professionnel
pour les journalistes.
Alors, ilfautquand mêmecommencerquelque
part. On voyait l’inscription de ce droit dans la
charte comme une espèce de pierre angulaire, si
vous voulez, ou de pierre d’assise sur laquelle on
pourrait baser tout le reste.
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M. Choquette: Vous avez parlé de décortiquer
l'idée de droit à l’information en un certain nombre
de droits qui pourraient être inscrits à la charte.
Est-ceque vous pourriez me citer ces éléments qd
pourraient être mentionnés?
M. Mailhot: Dans ceux que j'ai déjà mention'
nés, M y aurait au départ, bien sûr, celui qui rne
paraît, dans l'immédiat, comme étant le plus i*
gent, peut-être pas dans l'ordre, je veux dire, P*8
le seul problème très important, mais le plus
gent parce qu’on vit actuellement une situation
assez catastrophique dans ce domaine, c’est I*
problème de la concentration des entreprises d*
presse. Je pense que l'Etat peut assez facilemejj
en arriver à adopter une position très claire vis**
vis de ce problème. Cela fait quand même quatrt
ou cinq ans que l’on en parle au Québec,
commissions parlementaires de la liberté déj*
presse ont été saisies de mémoires, d’études,»8
faits, de chiffres par des douzaines d’organisnj0“
différents, entre autres le nôtre, et on sait très bt*
ce qui se passe au Québec, on a une image ffjj*
précise de la situation. Il est même presquè%
pensable de réaliser qu’en 1975, alors que l'on^
ces problèmes depuis plusieurs années, on
encore rien fait dans ce domaine. Cela Poürry
être un droit inscrit, quand je parle d'en circof^
crire trois ou quatre.
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